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INTRODUCTION: 
MAPPING MORAL COMPLEXITY
Interrogator [I]: “Could machines ever think as human beings do?”
Alan Turing [A.T.]: “Most people say no…”  
I.: “You are not most people…”  
A.T.: “Well, the problem is that you are… asking a stupid question.” 
I.: “I am?”  
A.T.: “Of course machines… can’t think as people do. A machine is 
different… from a person. Hence, they think differently. The interesting 
question is, just because something, uh, thinks differently from you, 
does that mean it’s not thinking? Well, we allow for humans to have 
such divergences from one another. You like strawberries, I hate ice-
skating, you… cry at sad films, I… am allergic to pollen. What is the 
point of – of different tastes, different… preferences if not to say that 
our brains work differently, that we think differently? And if we can 
say that about one another, then why can’t we say the same thing for 
brains… built of copper and wire, steel?”
It is with this dialogue from the movie, The Imitation Game, that Alan Turing 
is imagined as explaining to the police officer the nature of thinking regarding 
artificial machines1. The grounding argument has great philosophical 
appeal; just because there are different ways of thinking, it does not mean 
that they are not all part of what we consider thinking. If we apply this idea 
to the moral domain, we can further appreciate the intuitive allure of this 
point. The almost infinite number of variables that a moral agent faces in 
everyday life and the diversity of moral deliberations by different agents 
give us a glimpse of the typical complexity of moral experience. Not only do 
we acknowledge complexity, but we might also consider it problematic as 
we also face the large number of conflicts among values, opinions, and rules 
1  A topic introduced in his famous essay, A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence, 
«Mind», LIX (236), 1950, pp. 433–460. 
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of conduct that arise. However, for this reason, we should not lose faith in 
finding a unifying feature among the different expressions of what we call 
morality. I believe that the answer to the rather specific question of how 
we deliberate morally can help us cast some light on the troublesome (and 
more general) question of what it means to live a good life. If we take these 
questions seriously, we cannot help but acknowledge that human beings can 
make their moral choices differently. Again, just because we can identify 
different ways of reasoning, it does not mean that we cannot conceive all 
these ways of reasoning as constitutively moral. Rather than trying to figure 
out which of these ways has to be preferred, understanding how and why 
this is the case seems to be a preferable way to strive for desirable moral 
progress.
In the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines 
morality as the achievement of an end2 (τέλος), and this end is humans’ 
greatest good—happiness3 (ευδαιμονία). Notice that conceiving morality as a 
teleological subject does not entail a consequentialist theoretical framework. 
As we have briefly underlined, the final moral end (that of a life lived well 
and in communion with others) can be achieved in many different ways, 
not only by paying attention to the consequences of our acts. Following the 
Aristotelian starting point, I believe that to grasp what our ultimate end is, 
understanding how we make our moral choices is essential. The present work 
has been carried out with the belief that interpreting our moral capacities 
will help us identify our final moral destination. As a consequence, if we 
recognize that human beings have different ways of moral reasoning, we 
will be willing to concede that in life, we take different things as valuable 
in themselves. These are the two interconnected understandings of 
moral pluralism that I hope will become clear in the following chapters: 
a methodological pluralism (that describes the different ways of moral 
reasoning) and an axiological pluralism (that describes the different values 
to which we assign ultimate importance)4. If we analyze the first-person 
moral experience, such a variety of means and ends appears evident even 
in the same moral agent. In the present work, I focus on the complexity 
typical of the moral domain; as moral agents, we neither deliberate in a 
unique way nor always according to the same moral end. I might want to 
2  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a.
3  Ivi, 1097b.
4  I have already introduced this distinction in S. Grigoletto, Facing Moral Complexity. The 
Role of Moral Excellence in Guiding Moral Judgment, «Teoria», XXXIX (2), 2019, pp. 239–258. 
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help a friend because I have promised her to do so (and I believe in the 
importance of promise keeping per se); at the same time, I might decide 
to divide my birthday cake equally because it is the act that maximizes a 
certain moral good. We are willing to concede that an agent, such as myself 
in this hypothetical case, would not be considered schizophrenic. Again, 
moral reasoning is not subject to a single and unique source of moral value 
(axiological pluralism), and the different sources of value can be accounted 
for by different ways of moral reasoning (methodological pluralism).
Certainly, the first and most fundamental sign of the complexity of 
our moral framework is the common distinction between the right and 
the good. In this book, the moral approach expressed by the well-known 
works of W. D. Ross, while not explicitly addressed, has always been taken 
as a source of inspiration from the outset5. The idea of a pluralistic morality 
that distinguishes between the realm of obligations and duties (the right) 
and a broader category of intrinsic moral values (the good) is a theoretical 
prerequisite of the moral concepts taken into account in the present work. 
In other words, this distinction is a decisive feature of the soundness of the 
arguments that attempt to ground these concepts. A complex approach to 
morality primarily means acknowledging this distinction, one that finds its 
intuitive appeal in the analysis of the first-person moral experience. 
My first more general claim about this book’s content is the fact that I place 
supererogatory acts under a favored category to analyze moral complexity. 
As I shall attempt to show, the concept of supererogation springing from the 
theoretical distinction between the right and the good is the reason why I 
have decided to analyze this peculiar category of acts. My second general 
claim is that moral complexity and supererogation are only apparently two 
separated issues. I think that once we realize how the former grounds the 
latter and thus, how supererogation is an expression of moral complexity, 
we will be able to appreciate the correlation between these two questions of 
ethics. I take the questions about moral complexity as metaethical questions 
about the structure of morality6, and I consider the debate on supererogation 
a consequence, at the normative level, of the endorsement of a complex 
system. My present work thus has a twofold aim. First, I shall try to show 
how the two subjects are mutually dependent to a point where we cannot 
5  See W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, New York, Oxford University Press, 1930; W.D. Ross, 
The Foundations of Ethics, New York, Oxford University Press, 1939.
6  Alternatively, using more obscure terminology, I consider them metatheoretical issues.
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make sense of supererogation without the endorsement of a complex moral 
system. Consequently, if we are willing to concede the existence of acts that 
are good but not morally required, we can only acknowledge the complexity 
typical of morality. Second, if this relation really makes sense, I will have 
undertaken a second task—the demonstration of how these two questions 
of morality can suffice as mutual justificatory grounds. Nonetheless, this 
will make possible a parallel remark (but not a less important one) about the 
peculiar nature of supererogatory acts. More specifically, the advocacy of a 
complex and pluralist system of morality to ground supererogation has been 
a desired contribution to the philosophical debate about this concept since 
the late 1950s. If this secondary achievement is sound, I think that we will 
understand what this category of acts needs to be grounded and why the 
most widespread moral systems have struggled to acknowledge it.
In Chapter I, I highlight the reasons and the importance of a 
phenomenological approach to morality. These premises will focus on 
Maurice Mandelbaum’s overlooked work, The Phenomenology of Moral 
Experience, and its more recent development by Terry Horgan and Mark 
Timmons. They hold that morality is a subject that deals with human agency 
in everyday experience. As such, the analysis of such first-person experience 
is the preferred starting point. I believe that this attitude toward the study of 
morality discloses moral complexity. 
In Chapter II, I then attempt to define moral complexity, claiming that 
this feature is primarily the acknowledgment of a multilevel structure of 
morality. I explain the normative consequences of this approach by focusing 
on the position offered by Charles Larmore in Patterns of Moral Complexity 
and expanded in The Autonomy of Morality. Larmore’s position is taken as 
a fruitful starting point to manage a pluralistic account of morality. At this 
stage, however, another Aristotelian insight will help us understand how 
to deal specifically with the moral justification of an act within a system so 
understood. Taken as the faculty of moral interpretation, moral judgment 
will suffice to play the role of facing complexity with less hardship.
In Chapter III, I introduce the concept of supererogation by explaining 
why I adopt this category of acts to explore moral complexity. As I have 
briefly highlighted above, supererogation is considered a complex concept 
that requires a complex system to be justified. In light of this remark, I define 
the concept by following the widespread connotation presented by David 
Heyd in Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory. I then try to show how 
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the necessity of a complex system to make sense of supererogatory acts 
finds its roots in the Christian theological tradition that originally gave 
birth to the concept. As developed by Christian theologians, the distinction 
between precepts and counsels represents the reason why a “secular” 
account of supererogation requires a multilevel system of morality that 
clearly distinguishes between the right and the good.
In Chapter IV, I intend to show how the account of supererogation will 
become problematic if we fail to acknowledge the complexity of morality. I 
discuss how this argument can be generally raised against monist theories, 
as they fail to distinguish among the many levels of the moral discourse. 
Similarly, this problem arises when we have a theory that conceives the 
maximization of the good as obligatory. Broadly speaking, both utilitarianism 
and Kantian ethics express this same attitude (even if in different forms). 
It is then not surprising how both these theories usually tend to endorse 
forms of anti-supererogationism. The lack of complexity typical of monist 
systems results in the denial of the theoretical space of supererogation. Far 
from being a specific criticism against any system, this point aims to show a 
common deficiency of monism regarding supererogatory acts.
In Chapter V, I address the deficiencies underlined by the argument 
against monist accounts of morality by proposing a pluralistic account of 
supererogation. If we conceive a moral system that allows for different 
sources of the good, these will serve as the different levels of moral 
achievement that make it possible to go “beyond the call of duty”. In other 
words, the complexity that is necessary to account for supererogation will 
be granted by the plurality of the sources. In particular, one source will 
represent the level of obligation, while another will show the way to exceed 
the obligatory—what I call the multiple sources dynamics. Furthermore, this 
will tell us something about the specific phenomenology that supererogatory 
acts entail.
Generally speaking, this work aims to deal with some of the major issues 
in contemporary moral philosophy. The metaethical aspects of the main 
thesis deal with both the structure of a moral system and the importance of a 
phenomenological attitude toward the moral subject. From this starting point, 
further questions (typically addressed in normative ethics) arise, as follows: 
“How does moral deliberation work?” “How is moral justification possible?” 
“What is moral pluralism?” “How do we give an account of supererogatory 
acts?” Regarding all these questions, I have tried to answer, only through 
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complexity. This entails the belief that a life lived well is richer if we endorse 
a moral system that denies theoretical oversimplifications and favors the 
abundance of the constraints of moral obligations. As such, the overall goal 
of my work involves mapping and recognizing different instances of moral 
complexity. This acknowledgment comes with several assumptions. Only 
through complexity can we make sense of what lies beyond the call of duty. 
Only through complexity can we give an account of how morality works 
from the first-person perspective. Only through complexity can we better 
promote the pursuit of a flourishing life.
PART I:
COMPLEXITY AS THE REQUIRED BACKGROUND OF 
MORALITY

CHAPTER I  
PRELIMINARY CLAIMS: A MATTER OF APPROACH
1.1 Why a Phenomenological Approach to Morality?
In Metaphysics, Aristotle provides one of the first definitions of practical 
philosophy, as follows:
It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. 
For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical 
knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical 
men do not study the eternal, but what is relative and in the present)7.
Clearly, from the very beginning, the study of practical acts (τα ἔργα8) 
was conceived as the study of things collocated in and relative to a time 
and a space (πρός τι κάι νῦν9). In other words, the agent’s moral experience 
is the sphere in which moral acts occur; thus, actions need to be studied 
accordingly. Only through an analysis of moral experience can we examine 
those acts that are distinctively practical. Immanence (the collocation within 
a space and a time) does not only play a major role in ethics but also a 
founding one.
More recently, the study of moral experience has been called 
moral phenomenology. For this reason, a certain understanding of the 
phenomenological approach will guide us through the present work. It should 
gradually become clear why moral phenomenology is the methodology 
that best fits my analysis. Nevertheless, let me try to clarify this point by 
answering another question first: what exactly is moral phenomenology? 
7  Aristotle, Metaphysics, a 2, 993 b 19–23, W.D. Ross (trans.), in R. McKeon (ed.), The Basic 
Works of Aristotle, New York, Random House, 1941, p. 712. 
8  Ivi, a 2, 993 b 21.
9  Ivi, a 2, 993 b 22.
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It has been pointed out that phenomenology is an ambiguous term10. 
Accordingly, with moral phenomenology, we can refer either to the moral 
philosophy of the phenomenological tradition led by Edmund Husserl or to 
a first-person study of the moral life experienced by a moral agent.
The former understanding of the term moral phenomenology refers to the 
extension of Husserl’s first philosophy (which aims at the comprehension of 
our preconceptual understanding of the world) to the realm of moral values. 
Within this phenomenological tradition, the author whose work takes on 
this challenge is Max Scheler. He claims that the cognition of moral values 
primarily begins with emotions and affects as they shape our experience of 
the world11, as stated in the very first lines of his essay Ordo Amoris:
I find myself in an immeasurably vast world of sensible and spiritual 
objects which set my heart and passions in constant motion. I 
know that the objects that I can recognize through perception and 
through, as well as all that I will, choose, do, perform, and accomplish, 
depend on the play of this movement of my heart. […] Whether I 
am investigating the innermost essence of an individual, an historical 
era, a family, a people, a nation, or any other socio-historical group, I 
will know and understand it most profoundly when I have discerned 
the system of its concrete value-assessments and value-preference, 
whatever organization this system has. I call this system the ethos of 
any such subjects12.
For Scheler, the ethos needs to be understood through the proper appreciation 
of the inner emotional states in order to find the classification according 
to which this system of values has been outlined. Scheler’s response to 
this issue is that everything is ordered by the degree of love and hate that 
reality presents13. Understanding the order of love will ultimately mean 
understanding human beings in themselves. The reason is that once we 
understand the model through which we characterize our understanding of 
the world, we also comprehend how human beings work, how we structure 
the reality within which it is possible to think, act, choose, will, and so 
on. The investigation of the model therefore leads to the understanding of 
10  U. Kriegel, Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues, «Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences», VII (1), 2008, p. 1. 
11  U. Kriegel, ivi, p. 3. 
12  M. Scheler, Ordo Amoris, in M. Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays, D. Lachterman (trans.), 
Evanston IL, Northwestern University Press, 1973, pp. 98–99.
13  M. Scheler, ivi, p. 99.
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the origin of such a model14. Phenomenology, so conceived, represents the 
favored methodology to understand the human being.
The second author that draws from the phenomenological tradition with 
a more ethics-oriented approach is Emanuel Levinas. Levinas refocuses 
the aim of the phenomenological project toward a discipline that identifies 
the core of the matter in the relationship with other subjects. He claims 
that this is the best way to find answers to the questions raised by the first 
philosophy. In Totality and Infinity, he defines ethics as the primary way to 
grasp the metaphysical truth15. This is because the other, and the subject’s 
relationship with it, is the place where such metaphysical truth is disclosed. 
The phenomenological experience of what is “other” than the subject reveals 
the transcendence of the subject itself. For this reason, this particular 
approach is relevant to the understanding of the metaphysical truth. Levinas 
is not primarily interested in ethics as a system of value or as a value theory. 
Instead, he is concerned with ethics mostly as the essential way to answer 
the metaphysical questions through the methodology outlined by the 
phenomenological tradition before him. 
The phenomenological approach to morality can be understood in various 
ways. A different approach from those mentioned above deals directly with 
the moral life of the agent in order to investigate how morality works. Roughly, 
this can be conceived as the first-person analysis of the moral experience of 
the subject. In other words, this approach tries to analyze “what it is like 
to do x”. An author who clearly expresses this approach (whose work has 
been mainly overlooked) is Maurice Mandelbaum, who published his book, 
The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, in 1955. Mandelbaum outlines 
a phenomenological approach that applies to the experience that an agent 
undergoes when she is confronted with a morally relevant situation16. Thus 
14  «Whoever has the ordo amoris of a man has the man himself. He has for the man as a 
moral subject what the crystallization formula is for a crystal. He sees through him as far as 
one possibly can. He sees before him the constantly simple and basic lines of his heart», in 
M. Scheler, ivi, p. 100.
15  «Already of itself ethics is an “optics”. It is not limited to preparing for the theoretical 
exercise of thought, which would monopolize transcendence. The traditional opposition 
between theory and practice will disappear before the metaphysical transcendence by which 
a relation with the absolutely other, or truth, is established, and of which ethics is the royal 
road», in E. Levinas, Totality and Infinity, Pittsburgh, PA, Duquesne University Press, 1969, 
p. 29. 
16  Mandelbaum’s work is influenced to some degree by the previous work of gestalt 
psychologist and philosopher Wolfgang Köhler (see W. Köhler, The Place of Value in a World 
of Facts, New York NY, Liveright, 1976). Mandelbaum’s book is in fact dedicated to Köhler.
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understood, phenomenology is not a direct outcome of the phenomenological 
tradition influenced by Husserl17. Rather, as clearly expressed in the following 
quote, Mandelbaum’s phenomenological approach starts from a first-person 
perspective:
Its essential methodological conviction [of the phenomenological 
approach] is that a solution to any of the problems of ethics must 
be educed from, and verified by, a careful and direct examination of 
individual moral judgments. In other words, the phenomenological 
approach holds that the proper basis for any moral generalization, 
and for the confirmation which we rightfully demand for such 
a generalization, are to be found in an examination of the moral 
judgments which men make18.
I think that from this quote, we can gather the two fundamental 
presuppositions of Mandelbaum’s project: a) an adequate moral theory 
must originate from a proper analysis of moral experience19,b) the moral 
experience of the agent corresponds to all the various moral judgments she 
forms20.
The first presupposition might be a misleading one. What he is saying is 
not that the phenomenological approach has an ultimate and exclusive role 
in the ethical inquiry. To claim this would be a major misunderstanding of 
Mandelbaum’s work. What he is claiming is that such an approach should 
serve as a starting point for an adequate moral investigation. Once we have 
endorsed such an approach and applied it to the study subject, then ethics 
would be in a position to confront or to be influenced by what he calls non-
ethical inquiries21, that is, other philosophical kinds of inquiries or other 
social sciences (such as anthropology, psychology, and sociology). 
To understand the second presupposition, it is important to consider 
which aspects of a judgment are relevant to Mandelbaum’s phenomenological 
17  He himself makes it clear in footnote 18 of the first chapter: «In using the term 
“phenomenological” I do not refer to the specific methods of the phenomenological school. 
I use “phenomenology” to connote any examination of experience or of experienced objects 
which aims at describing their nature rather than seeking to give an “explanation” of them. 
[…] What is included is every descriptive investigation of “the phenomenal world”, that is, of 
whatever is directly experienced by me or by others», in M. Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology 
of Moral Experience, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 1955, fn. 18, p. 313. 
18  Ivi, p. 31.
19  Ivi, p. 35.
20  Ivi, p. 40.
21  Ivi, pp. 31–32.
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approach and how he discriminates among different kinds of judgment. The 
reason why Mandelbaum focuses on moral judgments is not to revealed in 
their content22. He is not specifically concerned with what different agents 
deliberate (or at least not primarily) but how they form their judgments. 
Agents can eventually diverge a lot on the specific content of their judgments 
according to what they consider morally valuable. At the same time, a pure 
attitudinal approach that is abstracted completely from the content would 
end up being arbitrary and unconvincing23. What he attempts to propose is an 
approach that draws some relevant points from both approaches (contentual 
and attitudinal) and opens up for a third new way—a structural approach. 
The object of the study is then the peculiar relationship among the content of 
the judgment, the attitude of the agent, and the situation that confronts the 
agent who makes the judgment24. This allows us to determine the common 
features of our moral judgments and thus to study them accordingly. Stated 
in these terms, ethics can only be considered a discipline that begins from 
an adequate analysis of the first-person moral experience and that tries to 
interpret the relations that animate such experience.
I now outline the essential framework of Mandelbaum’s project. The three 
central chapters of his work are dedicated to a phenomenological analysis of 
the different ways that an agent judges from the moral perspective. Briefly, 
he draws a major distinction between direct and removed moral judgments. 
In the former judgment, the agent is directly involved in the situation, the 
one who makes the judgment and lives the moral experience from within. In 
the latter judgment, the one who is evaluating has no first-hand experience 
of the judgmental process. This means that the relationships among the 
relevant elements (content, attitude, and situation) are evaluated from without. 
We deal with judgments of this kind when we consider judgments made 
by others, our own judgments made in the past, and tentative judgments 
about future possible courses of action. Moreover, not all removed moral 
judgments belong to the class of judgments that are concerned with moral 
rightness and wrongness. We can also talk of removed moral judgments 
when dealing with judgments of moral worth. This other subclass of removed 
22  Ivi, pp. 35ff.
23  Ivi, p. 40.
24  «Therefore, instead of abstracting either content or attitude from the total situation, 
we shall first inquire into the manner in which a situation appears to one who makes a 
moral judgment; we shall then attempt to interpret the other two elements in terms of their 
relationship to this situation», ibidem. 
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moral judgment is concerned with the evaluation of the value of a person as 
a whole or of a specific character trait. Both judgments belong to the group 
of removed moral judgments (because they are not made directly by the 
agent involved) but with different specifications25.
From his analysis, Mandelbaum draws the interesting conclusion that all 
these judgments share a feature that combines them into the same genus26. 
This is the relation that is established between the agent and the situation in 
which he or she lives. In making a moral judgment, the agent perceives the 
fittingness (or unfittingness) of a certain course of action with the situation 
that she is facing. This relation can be explained as a harmony between some 
possible courses of action and the end that the agent is pursuing. If a certain 
act “leads to” or is “consonant with” a certain goal, that act fits the situation27. 
In the case of a direct moral judgment, for example, it then constitutes a moral 
obligation to act accordingly. This reveals what Mandelbaum calls reflexive 
demand. Once we comprehend the fittingness (or unfittingness) of a certain 
act, that act demands to be performed (or avoided). Besides, this demand is 
perceived as coming from outside of us, which makes it constitutively moral. 
In fact, other kinds of demands are generally perceived as coming from 
within us; for example, when we are hungry, we feel a demand to pursue a 
course of action that would feed us as delightfully as possible. The content 
and the manner of our delight are matters of personal preference. This 
feature distinguishes moral from non-moral choices; the former are urged 
by an objective demand, the latter by a subjective demand28. More specifically, 
the sort of claim that moral judgments generate stands as a demand that is 
felt as coming from outside of us. This grounds the perception of objectivity 
that typically characterizes moral performance.
I will devote some more pages later in this chapter to a deeper analysis of 
Mandelbaum’s articulation of moral experience. For now, my main concern 
with this view has been metaphilosophical, aimed at understanding the 
reasons why such an approach might hold advantages over others in dealing 
with ethical issues.
25  «A judgment of moral rightness or wrongness concerns the application of moral criteria 
to a specific action; a judgment of moral worth predicates a particular type of value (moral 
value) of a person, or of a trait of character exhibited by him. While both types of judgments 
are “removed”, that is, neither is made by the agent in the situation, there are differences 
between them», in M. Mandelbaum, ivi, p. 95.
26  Ivi, p. 181.
27  Ivi, p. 64.
28  Ivi, pp. 54–55.
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Two authors who have attempted to give new life to Mandelbaum’s 
work are Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons. In recent years, they have 
produced several articles that deal directly with Mandelbaum’s work 
and emphasize the importance of his thought. This attention appears to 
be especially relevant today, when we observe a progressing opening of 
philosophical research to other branches of sciences that study the human 
being from a different perspective. Mandelbaum himself was an opponent 
of that philosophical trend that tried to exclude from philosophical inquiry 
the influence of other social sciences, such as psychology, sociology, and 
anthropology29. His phenomenological approach could regain interest in 
light of the recent development undertaken in philosophy by appealing to a 
more empirically grounded subject. As such, this might be the first answer 
to the question posed in this section’s title, that is, a phenomenological 
approach to morality can be justified by the possibility to cooperate and 
research together with other subjects of scientific inquiry. 
Moreover, the phenomenological approach, as Horgan and Timmons 
underline30, gives rise to many fundamental questions regarding moral 
theorizing. I now present the two questions that I consider more pressing 
for the present work, questions about motivation and potential payoff, 
respectively.
Are there any reasons to believe that a phenomenological approach to 
philosophical questions in moral theory is superior to, or at any rate 
usefully supplemental to, other approaches? (motivation)
What results might one reach about philosophical issues in moral 
theory (including both normative and metaethics) on the basis of 
a phenomenological description of moral experience? (potential 
payoff)31.
Both these questions are further specifications of the question that opened 
this section: why a phenomenological approach to morality? The answers 
to all these questions require a much more specific project than this. 
Nevertheless, as I will make clearer in the second part of the present work, a 
29  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Realism, in I. Verstegen 
(ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism, London and New York, Routledge, 
2010, p. 106.
30  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, «Philosophical Issues», 
XV, 2005, pp. 56–77.
31  Ivi, p. 57.
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phenomenological analysis of some ethical issues is able to bring about some 
progress in moral research32. At this stage, I would like to give a general 
(but limited) answer that could justify the espousal of this approach. Moral 
philosophy is constitutively a normative subject (even if not exclusively so), 
that is, one that deals with the fulfillment (or unfulfillment) of actions with 
reference to a given idea of the good. Moral experience represents the setting 
where this process occurs. A study that takes care of understanding the 
relations between how actions are brought about and the context in which 
they are achieved seems to be of great importance (if not fundamental). 
Thus, moral experience does not only represent the setting of the moral 
life but also the place where the ultimate proof of the effectiveness of our 
theories can be found. These two features ground the motivation to pursue a 
phenomenological analysis. Moral experience is the setting of our moral life 
and the sphere where we can inspect the legitimacy of the moral progress 
for which we argue. A moral philosophy that does not consider these two 
aspects (which I take as implicit in its normativity) risks being disoriented 
and meaningless. This is the reason why a phenomenological approach 
(influenced to a certain degree by Mandelbaum’s work) characterizes the 
present work.
1.2 Moral Experience Expanded
Now that I have briefly sketched some features of phenomenological 
approaches, Mandelbaum’s in particular, I want to challenge one of its 
presuppositions, as underlined above. Specifically, the second presupposition 
of Mandelbaum’s work states that our moral experience can be fully 
described by judgmental acts. He writes as follows:
What characterizes this approach is the fact that it treats moral 
experience as a complete judgmental act. Not only are the attitudes 
which are present and the content which is affirmed to be considered, 
but it is crucial for such an approach to examine each of these in 
relation to the situation in which the judgment is made33.
I believe that Mandelbaum is certainly right in identifying the prominent 
role of moral judgment in our moral experience. Our everyday moral life is 
32  Another insight that supports such methodology can be found (other than in Mandelbaum’s 
work itself) in Horgan, Timmons, Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, pp. 72ff.
33  M. Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, p. 40.
31Preliminary Claims: A Matter of Approach
characterized by manifold judgmental acts. Mandelbaum claims that they 
fully express our moral experience because judgments better express the 
normativity peculiar to the ethical domain34. In other words, ethics is a 
normative study that deals with normative data. This means that each single 
datum studied shares the fact that it implies some reference to an “ought” or 
a “norm”. Mandelbaum claims that this peculiar kind of data can be found 
«within the realm of human judgments»; thus, he focuses on the normative 
judgments that agents make. This leads him to claim that moral experience 
fully corresponds to a judgmental act.
At the same time, it seems to me too superficial to claim that moral 
experience fully corresponds to a judgmental act. A blunt “No!” seems to be 
the most plausible answer to the question, “Is moral experience equivalent 
to a series of deliberations that lead to certain courses of action according 
to conscious or unconscious states of mind?” By deliberation, I mean the 
process of bringing about x by the evaluation of the reasons for x (i.e., a 
judgmental act, as Mandelbaum puts it). Additionally, this can occur, 
consciously or unconsciously. The former means that the agent is actively 
deliberating; he or she is aware of the ongoing process. The latter means 
that the agent is passively deliberating; he or she is unaware of the ongoing 
process, for example, when a certain judgment has become a habit, so the 
agent does x without actually considering the reasons for it. Nevertheless, 
if asked, the agent would be able to respond why he or she is doing x (be 
able to give an account of the relevant reasons for x). Mandelbaum seems 
aware of something very similar to this when he highlights the distinction 
between willed and spontaneous actions35. Willed actions are all those 
actions for which the agent feels responsible or better, where the agent acts 
according to an envisioned goal that he or she wishes to accomplish. In 
this way, the sense of responsibility for the act arises since the agent feels 
that these are his or her actions. The fact that the agent is acting by virtue 
of an end makes it possible for him or her to give reasons for acting in such 
manner. This is what distinguishes these actions from spontaneous actions, 
which instead are performed for no other reason than the fact that the agent 
did them. Besides, spontaneous actions are all those actions where the agent 
does not feel that he or she is acting in the first person. These can be of 
two kinds: reflex or habitual action. A reflex is when the action “happens” 
34  Ivi, pp. 41ff.
35  Ivi, pp. 46–50.
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to an agent instead of being consciously brought about by him or her. For 
example, when I receive an electrical shock on my hand, my hand jerks 
away without my willingness to do so. My action has no envisioned goal, 
and I do not feel responsible for it. Mandelbaum claims that the same is 
true of habitual actions, which include all those situations where the agent 
does x without consciously governing the action. For example, upon waking 
up, I follow a particular sequence in dressing, where I have no particular 
awareness of every single step. Again, no clear sense of responsibility is 
involved in this case, since the agent is unaware of the envisioned goal and 
the reasons for his or her acting. It is important to note at this stage that 
Mandelbaum points out that direct moral judgments (contrary to removed 
moral judgments) deal exclusively with willed actions36. Mandelbaum’s 
reason is that it is fundamental for a phenomenological analysis that the 
agent perceives the actions as his or hers. For Mandelbaum, only willed 
actions express the sense of responsibility that makes the phenomenological 
analysis possible. It is then clear why a reflex cannot count as a moral action 
from this point of view. It does not originate from a moral choice. Recall 
that for Mandelbaum, what differentiates moral choices from non-moral 
ones is that moral choices place a demand upon us to act. Accordingly, it 
seems less clear why all habitual actions cannot be considered in the same 
light. It is one thing to consider habitual actions that constitute our everyday 
routine (e.g., brushing our teeth or preparing breakfast). It is another matter 
to claim that all habitual acts lack the sense of responsibility or the moral 
demand that willed actions impose on us. For example, think of someone 
who has made a small donation to the same organization every month for 
25 years. The very first time, he or she experienced both demand and a sense 
of responsibility, but then, as time goes by, this action becomes a habit in the 
same way as brushing his or her teeth. Responsibility and demand may hide 
in the agent’s unconsciousness, but this does not mean that he or she cannot 
recall his or her reasons for making the donation. It is difficult to hold that an 
action such as a long-lasting regular donation cannot be considered a moral 
habitual action. As such, the agent who performs it should be able to give a 
phenomenological account of it through a direct moral judgment. It is even 
less clear why some other particular spontaneous acts are left outside the 
class of actions that can be objects of a phenomenological study (whether 
direct or removed). Mandelbaum states that some actions, such as grasping 
36  Ivi, p. 47.
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the hand of a child in danger, are included in the group of spontaneous 
actions. As such, they lack the awareness of the subject that allows for a 
phenomenological analysis. The agent reacts directly to the situation that 
confronts him or her, unaware of the self that originates the act. Rather 
than actions, “reactions” or “responses” are elicited, so they do not impose 
on the agent the sense of responsibility and the moral demand that make 
the phenomenological analysis possible. If so, such moral phenomenology 
would exclude a relevant and common part of our moral experiences. From 
the moral perspective, we happen to praise many instances of helping 
behavior even if they result from habitual behavior37.
My contention is that we can go even further with the line of 
argumentation that moral experience is not only concerned with conscious 
states of mind. Moral experience is actually broader than situations that 
involve a deliberation process (again, judgmental acts), be it conscious or 
unconscious. It seems to me that moral experience comprehends cases where 
normative judgments play no role. In other words, a process that involves 
the performance of some act is not necessary to trigger an experience that 
we would call moral. The point is that we can live a moral experience even 
when we are not engaging in any moral deliberation and consequently, not 
performing an act. To explain this assertion, I propose three situations or 
cases in which the formation of a judgment is not necessary to constitute a 
proper moral experience.
The first situation is meant to highlight a case of no-judgmental moral 
experience within Mandelbaum’s framework. Recall that for him, the first-
person moral experience begins with the demand (peculiar to moral choices) 
that the situation casts on the agent. We can argue that the perception of 
such a demand is already in itself a sort of moral experience even if no 
judgment takes place then (say because I am morally lazy or pretend to be 
morally indifferent). In the situation I am experiencing, there is no active 
deliberation but only a sort of passive perception of the fact that in front 
of me lies some moral possibility or moral worth. This does not require 
excluding the fact that most of the time, I react to this with a judgmental 
act. The relevant claim is that moral experience begins before the actual 
deliberation process. Thus, we can consider proper moral experiences even 
37  I will talk about this issue later in the present work when dealing with acts of 
supererogation, which, while originated by a certain degree of spontaneity, deserve a proper 
moral phenomenology. See pp. 160-165.
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in all those cases where I try not to listen to the perceived moral demand. 
For example, every time I look at the books on my desk, I feel a strong 
demand placed on me to work on my long-delayed paper and remember the 
upcoming deadlines. Nevertheless, I try not to think about it and to ignore 
the workload that would compel me to act. In this case, I do not respond to 
the demand of the situation with a judgmental act; rather, I just try to ignore 
such a demand. To express it better, I refuse to bring about the proper moral 
judgment by deliberately incurring a moral loss. I hold that this is already 
in itself an actual moral experience even if it lacks the relevant elements of 
Mandelbaum’s account of moral phenomenology (the response to a moral 
demand with an act).
The second interesting case is the role of empathy in moral circumstances. 
With this term, many authors have referred to different things. Nevertheless, 
a definition that currently seems widespread conceives it (in very general 
terms) as the ability to feel the same way as others do. This idea was quite 
relevant (even if with slight differences) for the work of the eighteenth-
century British sentimentalists, who referred to the popular notion of 
sympathy38. In particular, authors such as Adam Smith (and also David 
Hume) used to assign a proper role to sympathy in their moral accounts. 
The very first lines of Smith’s major work on morality, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, define sympathy as follows:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives 
nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or 
compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when 
we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. 
That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of 
fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, 
like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means 
confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel 
it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most 
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it39.
38  These pages are obviously not meant to be comprehensive, and a much more detailed work 
would be required. On the issue of sympathy and empathy, it is also worth pointing out the 
work of Max Scheler. See M. Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, P. Heath (trans.), North Haven, 
CT, Archon Books, 1970.
39  A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael, A.L. Macfie (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1976, p. 9. 
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More specifically, he continues:
Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-
feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning 
was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much 
impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any 
passion whatever40.
As Smith underlines, the empathic relation represents a fundamental and 
substantial kind of moral relation. More recently, many other authors have 
emphasized its relevance regarding moral motivation and more specifically, in 
caring-for-others situations41. Nevertheless, to understand my point, it is not 
necessary to grant to empathy such a major role in morality. Once we admit 
cases where empathy can play a certain role within our moral experience, 
we realize how this broadens our conception of moral experience42. In fact, it 
seems to me that empathy represents a particular way of relating with others, 
which does not necessarily involve a judgmental act. Most of the time, the 
way we perceive how the others feel is not a direct result of a deliberation 
but an immediate outcome. Nonetheless (as Mandelbaum argues), it would 
be hard to contend that we need to put empathy off the radar of moral 
experience for its lack of judgmental activity. When I understand how a 
friend feels after she has been affected by an injustice, it is not a matter of 
judgment; rather, I just experience it immediately by virtue of our long-
established relationship. This is already a proper moral experience before 
I form any judgment on why the deeds that have afflicted her are wrong 
or before I consider how I could effectively provide some help. The point 
here is that moral experience begins before (and is not instrumental to) the 
formation of moral judgment.
Moreover (and this leads us to the third case), empathy and in general, 
all kinds of moral relation, reveal another interesting way to expand moral 
experience beyond what it is merely as an expression of a judgmental act. In 
the preceding case, I have highlighted how when I empathize with a friend, 
I am living a proper moral experience. I would add here that as the agent, 
40  Ivi, p. 10.
41  In both these regards, see the work of the psychologist Daniel Batson, who has introduced 
the so-called empathy-altruism hypothesis. See C.D. Batson, Altruism in Humans, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2011. For further remarks on this topic in relation to acts of 
supererogation, see pp. 164-165 of the present volume.
42  I am aware that this claim would require a much larger project. Take these lines as hints 
that are strictly functional for my discussion of moral experience.
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I am not the only one who is doing so; the beneficiary of my act is living a 
moral experience, too. I hold that a proper first-person moral experience is 
such not only when I am the subject who performs a certain moral action 
(the agent). Additionally, we might have relevant cases of moral experience 
when the subject of the experience is the one who benefits from the moral 
action. If someone does something good (or bad) to me, I undergo a relevant 
moral experience even if a judgmental process does not necessarily originate 
this experience. This happens when I perceive myself as the beneficiary of 
something morally valuable (or even the target of a morally blameworthy 
deed). I do not think it is possible to explain this sort of moral experience 
within Mandelbaum’s theoretical framework, as he conceives moral 
experience as being fully judgmental. We might claim that it is possible to 
account for this sort of experience of the beneficiary under the category 
of removed moral judgments of moral worth. However, this is not a case 
where the beneficiary judges from outside the situation (i.e., removed from 
it). She is living it from within and is directly affected by it. It is true that 
she considers valuable what the other does for her, but she is not doing 
this by living outside the situation. She is directly experiencing the value of 
what it is going on between her and her benefactor. In other words, being 
the beneficiary of a moral act seems to represent a proper moral experience 
even if the subject of the experience is not the one who performs the action 
and makes the judgment about what to do. My claim is that Mandelbaum 
seems to have missed accounting for this possible moral experience.
Moreover, this case holds true if the agent benefits the subject of his or 
her acts by virtue of both a direct moral judgment and the empathic character 
of their relationship (in an immediate way, so to speak). If the latter is the 
case, undergoing a proper moral experience requires no judgmental act from 
either the agent or the beneficiary. This is so because the performer of the 
act does so immediately, and the beneficiary perceives this as immediately 
as the agent does it. I believe that we cannot fail to recognize that this is 
an actual moral experience. For example, think of the case of a terminal 
patient in a state where he or she is able to perceive the outer world but is 
unable to communicate. The patient is constantly the object of the treatment 
of the doctors (who do this because they judge on moral grounds that it 
is good to carry out their job) and also benefits from the care of his or her 
loved ones (who do this likely because they are in an empathic relationship 
with the patient). I believe that the doctors, the relatives, and the patient 
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himself or herself are all living a proper moral experience43 even if for 
different reasons—the doctors because of their direct moral judgment, the 
relatives because of their empathic caring, and the patient because he or 
she is broadly benefiting from the moral good brought about by the others. 
While these are all different instances of the moral domain, I claim that all 
three qualify as proper moral experience.
Finally, we have seen how the first-person phenomenological approach 
proposed by Mandelbaum could be broadened to provide a more exhaustive 
account of our moral experience44. Nevertheless, this is not necessarily a 
major downfall or something that would undermine the effectiveness of 
Mandelbaum’s approach. Understanding the limits of the phenomenological 
approach would allow us to apply it adequately and use it consistently. 
Moreover, this is not to deny the relevance of the analysis of the aspects that 
predominantly constitute our moral experience (i.e., moral judgments). The 
focus of this field of research has to remain on all those deliberations that lead 
an agent to act in a certain way by referring to an idea of right and wrong. 
At this stage, we need to acknowledge that the phenomenological approach 
needs to focus on judgmental acts since they constitute the large (but not the 
only) part of our moral experience. For this reason, moral phenomenology 
remains the approach to be preferred and that appears more promising as a 
starting point for moral theorizing.
1.3 Moral Phenomenology Discloses the Complexity of Moral Life
I now introduce some considerations about the features of our moral life 
that a phenomenological approach reveals. Consider the following example: 
Mary has a good friend named John, who lives nearby. She promised 
John that she would help him move out of his current apartment and 
bring all his belongings to his new place. When the day of the move 
arrives, she is about to go to John’s place when she receives a call from 
her long-time friend Juliet. They have not seen each other for a while, 
so Juliet invites Mary to go out for coffee. If Mary goes out with Juliet, 
she will not have time to help John that afternoon. Therefore, even 
43  Probably, at least in the case of the patient’s relatives, it is an experience that is much more 
than a merely moral one.
44  Another interesting and similar attempt to broaden Mandelbaum’s conception of moral 
experience can be seen in T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, 
«Philosophical Issues», XV, 2005, pp. 61ff.
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if she is filled with regret and would greatly enjoy Juliet’s company 
(more than helping John), she declines Juliet’s invitation. After all, she 
has made a promise to John and believes that keeping it is the right 
thing to do.
Later that day, Mary is at John’s new place, which happens to be much 
smaller than his former apartment. John struggles to make everything 
fit in the new place, so he decides to donate much of his belongings 
that are not necessary anymore. John’s friend Mark has a much larger 
house, which would have plenty of space for John’s furniture. John had 
previously promised Mark that he would receive all the surplus items 
from the move. However, Mary suggests that a fairer choice would be 
giving everything to the local prosocial organization in order to have 
all the goods redistributed to some people who have less. She believes 
that giving to those who have less in order to maximize the benefits of 
the donation is the right thing to do.
Situations such as these are common in our everyday lives. We happen 
to make moral judgments in different contexts, according to diverse 
backgrounds, and with various aims. As such, we recognize a plurality of 
variables regarding how we make moral deliberations. If we examine our 
moral experience through a phenomenological approach, we realize how 
complex45 our moral life is. Understanding the phenomenology of our 
common moral judgments reveals the manifold essence of morality. Moral 
experience ultimately discloses that the agent’s moral life, if considered as a 
whole and not specifically involving a single case, appears complex. I believe 
that such complexity is the result of two different features of our moral life: 
axiological pluralism and methodological pluralism. 
The first way of recognizing pluralism is by analyzing the content of 
our moral judgments. If we compare different moral judgments, we notice 
how we deliberate according to a variable set of what happens to be morally 
valuable in the given circumstances. What I mean by axiological pluralism 
is the fact that our judgments are based on values46 that vary their relevance 
from time to time. In other words, our judgments vary in their specific 
content. In the above-cited example, Mary decides to keep her promise, 
grounding her judgment on her respect for the promisee47. Respect (or 
45  I use “complex” as a non-technical term for now, meaning composite, heterogeneous, and 
manifold. I will provide more detailed specifications of this term in Chapter II.
46  This term will likely be misunderstood. What I mean here is simply that different 
fundamental ideals of morality might happen to be relevant in the particular case.
47  A Kantian line of argumentation could be even more specific, claiming that a promise needs 
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the autonomy of other moral agents) happens to be the value that appears 
especially important to Mary, given the circumstances. In that particular 
scenario, that value trumps all the others, assigning a prominent importance 
to keeping a promise. In contrast, when she suggests how to donate fairly, 
her focus changes. She is mainly concerned with the moral value of equality 
(or a certain understanding of utility, one might say). In this second situation, 
a different value takes priority over the others. This example shows how, in 
real-life situations, different moral values (one irreducible to the other) can 
vary in their moral relevance for the agent. My contention here is simple; 
the moral phenomenology of the moral agent highlights a plurality of 
moral values that happen to have variable moral priority. Moral experience 
is characterized by a pluralism of values, suggesting that we are not 
necessarily required to pick one of them as having a constant priority over 
the others. This idea aligns with the standard definition of moral pluralism 
as a framework of multiple, potentially ultimate moral ends that express a 
pro tanto priority over the others.
The second way of understanding the heterogeneity of morality is 
recognizing that we do not make all our moral judgments by following a 
unique and coherent methodology. There are different (at least two) ways 
in which we make moral deliberations, and their priority varies from time 
to time. What I call methodological pluralism is the fact that our judgments 
do not always follow the same path to provide a moral deliberation. Again, 
in the above-cited example, Mary decides to keep her promise by virtue of a 
moral claim derived from a deontological approach. At the same time, once 
she is confronted with the issue of a fair donation, she morally deliberates 
according to a consequentialist approach. Cases such as this reveal that 
according to the situation, one methodology for moral deliberation might 
trump another that is considered less efficient in dealing with the situation 
faced by the agent. The consequentialist approach might appear more apt for 
what is morally at stake in cases such as the fair donation of one’s belongings. 
Conversely, there happens to be cases, such as keeping a promise, where 
grounding our deliberation on a deontological framework appears to fit the 
circumstances better48. This is not to say that in a particular situation, the 
to be kept because of the respect for the autonomy of all other rational agents. Arguably, 
we might deduce from this argument that Kant’s ultimate moral end is individual freedom.
48  In certain cases, the choice of the relevant methodology might even exceed the limits of 
rationalist theories (such as the two reported in the example) to conform to a sentimentalist 
approach. I leave this issue aside for now, since it is not functional for my point to further 
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methodology that the agent endorses is the only one available to reach the 
same conclusion. There are ways to ground a promise on consequentialist 
approaches and ways to respect equality according to a deontological theory. 
Nevertheless, the choice among the feasible options is left to the agent, who 
will pick the most reasonable and efficient way to account for the relevant 
moral value. In one of the influential papers co-authored by Joshua Greene, 
he and his colleagues have made a claim similar to the present one49. Through 
an experimental inquiry, they have tried to show that a moral deliberation 
by the same agent is a combination of rational and emotional engagement. 
Moral judgment can be either impersonal or personal, according to which of 
the two elements is more influential. These entail two distinct mental events. 
The experiments conducted by Greene and his collaborators confronted 
the emotional responses that different subjects revealed in the analysis of 
different moral dilemmas compared with what they revealed in cases of non-
moral choices. What Greene and colleagues’ study shows is primarily the 
fact that our moral judgment is a combination of different factors (rational 
and emotive) and further confirms how it is ultimately complex. Moreover, 
their analysis has underlined how judgments, considered distinctively 
moral, can be of two kinds (at least) and how this is true even at the cerebral 
level. This conclusion resembles what I have defined here as methodological 
pluralism. However, my classification of pluralism aims at giving an account 
of a philosophical distinction (deontology and consequentialism in the 
above-cited example) rather than a distinction between psychological and 
cerebral activities.
My claim is that moral pluralism is structured (at least) at two levels: 
value-related and methodological levels. Amartya Sen implicitly alludes to a 
similar point when focusing on the idea of justice in cases of just allocation 
of resources50. He proposes a scenario where there are plural and competing 
reasons for justice, all of which are impartial in different ways. Suppose you 
have to choose which one of three children has to receive a flute about which 
they are quarreling. The first child is the only one who can actually play the 
flute. The second child is clearly the poorest and the one who has no toys to 
play with (the other two being clearly richer children). The third child is the 
articulate this specific issue.
49  J. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 
«Science», CCXCIII, 2001, pp. 2105–2108. The main claim of this paper and Greene’s 
subsequent works is that emotions play a major role in moral deliberation.
50  A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 2009, pp. 12–15.
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one who has made the flute after many months of work. Who should receive 
the flute if we have to make a just decision? This scenario points out that this 
question has no clear answer. Of course, different theories of justice would 
straightforwardly identify which one of the children ought to receive the 
flute51, but which of the three ways of deliberation we should follow remains 
an open question. Accordingly, we might end up making an arbitrary choice. 
This happens for two reasons:
I also want to draw attention here to the fairly obvious fact that the 
differences between the three children’s justificatory arguments do 
not represent divergences about what constitutes individual advantage 
[…], but about the principles that should govern the allocation of 
resources in general. They are about how social arrangements should 
be made and what social institutions should be chosen, and through 
that, about what social realizations would come about. It is not simply 
that the vested interests of the three children differ (though of course 
they do), but that the three arguments each point to a different type of 
impartial and non-arbitrary reason52.
The problem here is not only which of the moral values at stake takes priority 
over the others (be it hedonistic utility, economic equality, or autonomy). We 
also face the problem of which of the theoretical frameworks (granted that 
all three provide impartial results in their own ways) needs to be espoused 
to make the just choice. The phenomenology of cases such as this reveals 
the double layer of moral pluralism. Both axiological and methodological 
pluralism play a role in our everyday choices and as such, need to be 
considered when we analyze our moral choices.
Nevertheless, it is worth asking whether this pluralism revealed by a 
phenomenological approach is only apparent or substantial. Mandelbaum 
attempts to show that it is just apparent, arguing in favor of deontological 
monism instead. In fact, he straightforwardly dismisses consequentialism by 
identifying it as a moral approach that is hardly feasible when we are directly 
confronted with a situation that requires a moral deliberation. He claims that 
in cases of direct moral judgment, we do not regularly take into consideration 
consequences (even if this might be the case of removed moral judgments)53. 
51  As Sen underlines, the economic egalitarian would assign the flute to the poorest, the 
libertarian would offer it to the flute maker, and the utilitarian hedonist would give it to the 
person who can actually play the flute.
52  A. Sen, The Idea of Justice, pp. 14–15.
53  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, pp. 72–73.
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Briefly, he is not convinced that all cases of moral obligation rely on the 
calculus of consequences; rather, they are grounded on a certain feeling of 
incompleteness that the agent would perceive in cases of performance (or 
omission) of certain acts. Mandelbaum’s claim is particularly clear if we 
keep in mind that he is concerned with a phenomenological analysis of the 
moral experience. This leads him to focus on the perception of the relation 
of the fittingness of the performance (or the omission) of the act, rather than 
the considerations proposed by teleological approaches.  
In the present work, the point of major interest is Mandelbaum 
confronting Ross’ pluralism with his own theory. His interest in dealing 
with a theory such as Rossian deontological pluralism reveals Mandelbaum’s 
own awareness of the possible pluralist outcome that a phenomenological 
analysis could bring about. Nevertheless, he thinks (contra pluralism) that 
some sort of normative unity among different judgments can be found, and 
thus, Rossian pluralism needs to be rejected. In fact, Ross proposes a theory 
with a precise set of obligations that have a tendency to be binding on us 
(prima facie). However, no ordering principle or rule of thumb discriminates 
which one is more binding than the others. The determination of which of 
these duties is the actual duty is left to the agent in the contingent case; the 
stringency of the duties varies pro tanto. Mandelbaum agrees with the idea 
of variable stringency and compares it to fittingness, stating that this kind of 
relation determines the stringency of a particular obligation:
I should like to propose, in conformity with my previous analysis, that 
the ground of the stringency of a claim is the fittingness of answering 
to that claim, rather than to any opposed claim, in the situation which 
the agent confronts54.
Instead, what Mandelbaum finds problematic is the idea of prima facie 
obligations intended as the “tendency to be binding”. For Mandelbaum 
(being a monist), there exists one and only one obligation that binds us to 
the performance (or the omission) of the related act, namely the obligation 
that fits the situation. All other options lose any kind of bindingness, once 
they have been overridden by the actual duty. There is no thing such as the 
various duties’ “tendency to be binding”. Thus, it makes no sense to talk 
about prima facie duties; the only duty is the actual one, that is, the one 
that fits the situation55. It has been pointed out that the main difference 
54  M. Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, p. 76.
55  «In my opinion, a strictly phenomenological description reveals that what we take to be 
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between Ross and Mandelbaum in this regard is that the former thinks that 
other prima facie duties are outweighed by the actual duty, while the latter 
believes that the alternatives are “silenced”56 (they lose all their bindingness).
The key to Mandelbaum’s argument against the existence of a variety 
of duties (such as in Ross’ contention) is the distinction between regret and 
remorse. He claims that a proper phenomenological analysis would reveal 
that once we are confronted with different options, those that have been 
abandoned by virtue of the actual duty generate a form of regret. According 
to Mandelbaum, we feel regret when we contemplate something of disvalue 
that our act has brought about, whereas remorse is our feeling toward 
something that should not have been done57. Ross claims that even when a 
prima facie obligation is overridden in favor of another, it keeps its tendency 
to be binding. Nevertheless, if this were true, a sentiment more apt to the 
dismissal of a prima facie duty would be remorse rather than regret. If omitted 
duties keep a certain degree of bindingness, their omission would generate 
remorse rather than regret. The phenomenological analysis proposed by 
Mandelbaum reveals that this is not the case. The fact that we perceive only 
regret should reveal that the actual duty is indeed only one, the bindingness 
of the overridden options is just apparent (be it a misinterpretation of regret 
as remorse), and it therefore points out that there is no need to talk about 
prima facie duties. 
Mandelbaum’s reconstruction of the moral experience with an obligation 
might be considered sound in cases of relatively simple moral choices. We 
can recognize how his understanding of an obligation (as the result of a 
phenomenological analysis) is closely related to the idea of moral motivation. 
A duty is ultimately the one that happens to have more motivational power 
and provides the reasons that ultimately motivate us to perform (or omit) 
a certain act. Although this might seem correct for an approach to moral 
inquiry that is concerned with what the agent feels, we might wonder if 
this is still the case for much more complex moral choices. Let us think 
the more stringent of two irreconcilable moral demands is that demand which we still feel 
to be levelled against us after our initial, segmented view of our situation has been replaced 
by a new view of what constitutes its essential nature. Thus, what we judge to be really 
obligatory is not the “stronger” of two demands, but that action which is a fitting response 
to what we take to be the dominant element in the total situation which we face», ivi, p. 80.
56  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, p. 73.
57  M. Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, p. 80.
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of true moral dilemmas, for example58. In cases where the agent genuinely 
does not know which of the opposing options needs to be preferred, there 
seems to be no clear prevailing relation of fittingness to the situation (given 
that the reason why it is so is not due to some sort of epistemic lack by the 
agent). In fact, both options seem to fit the situation adequately, and thus, 
both propose a viable course of action. In such cases, it is harder to hold 
that only one of the two is the actual duty and that the other option loses all 
its bindingness. It is then not surprising that the agent who finally decides 
somehow (even randomly) what to do feels a certain moral loss for not 
having chosen the other course of action. I believe that this feeling is much 
more similar to moral remorse than mere regret, and this should reveal that 
after all, ignored options do not completely lose their bindingness (at least 
in the case of dilemmatic choices). If this argument is right, Mandelbaum’s 
critique of the Rossian approach is no longer valid.
Furthermore, we could argue that duties are not grounded merely on 
fittingness. Some moral obligations are true for an agent even if he or 
she does not adequately experience their fittingness to the situation. For 
example, think of the negligent schoolchild who does not want to do his 
homework. Does he recognize the fittingness of studying to the situation (in 
this case, caring about his future)? We might argue that he does perceive the 
fittingness, but this is not enough to make him willing to give up playing 
basketball with his friends for the whole afternoon in order to study. 
Think also of the relentless tax evader, who has a moral obligation (and 
not only that) to pay taxes even if she fails to appreciate the fittingness 
and the bindingness of such an obligation. Cases like these hint at the 
fact that fittingness is sometimes insufficient to lead agents to a certain 
action. Something similar is expressed in cases where we as agents ignore 
our obligations. For example, ignorance might affect our obligations and 
consequently our moral judgments59. Sometimes, we have obligations that 
we do not know of, and this does not allow us to perceive the fittingness that 
is proper to the situation. Even if unknown, the obligation remains. It should 
not be surprising that our moral experience is affected by our knowledge of 
58  I refer here to cases such as the one famously proposed by Sartre. This is a dilemma where 
a youngster does not genuinely know the right thing to do—whether to join the army to 
commemorate his brother who has been killed by the Nazis or to stay at home in order to 
take care of his ill mother.
59  See M.J. Zimmerman, Ignorance and Moral Obligation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2014.
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the situation. However, it is more problematic to claim that an agent does 
not have a certain obligation (as in the case of the ignorant agent who does 
not perceive the fittingness of the situation) due to a lack of knowledge. The 
case of the ignorant agent (similar to the negligent agent exemplified by the 
tax evader) reveals how the relation of fittingness is necessary albeit not 
sufficient to bring about a moral obligation successfully.
All these cases reveal that obligations are not grounded exclusively on 
the relation of fittingness to the situation. This kind of relation is essential to 
a proper experience of direct moral judgments when it comes to motivating 
the agent to act (or refrain from acting). Nevertheless, it is not fully accurate 
to claim that the actual duty is exclusively identified by the perception 
of what fits the situation. Some more complex situations might express a 
scenario that does not align with the theory outlined by Mandelbaum. This 
reduction of the role of fittingness in the formation of a moral obligation 
aims at restoring the idea of prima facie duties proposed by Ross and favors 
the sort of moral pluralism that seems to characterize the heterogeneous 
experience of the moral agent.
Mandelbaum argues in favor of monism because he thinks that (as in 
the case of direct moral judgments) all judgmental acts express normative 
unity by virtue of all being based on the relation of fittingness. However, 
this does not entirely explain why different judgments should all be part of 
the same group. They might have the same phenomenological structure (the 
feeling of fittingness), but this is not enough to explain why we perceive that 
fittingness (the content that grounds it) and how we develop the feeling of 
fittingness (the normative approach that triggers our moral deliberation). In 
fact, both the content of different judgments (which grounds the fittingness 
relation) and the methodology of the moral decision (which generates the 
fittingness) could vastly differ from one judgment to another. Horgan and 
Timmons summarize fittingness as follows:
An action is fitting to a situation when aspects of that situation 
provide reasons that make the action appropriate, and it is most fitting 
when the combination of reasons there are uniquely favor the action 
in question60. 
My claim is that we do not have to underestimate the fact that (as shown 
in the example above) reasons could be grounded on different values 
(axiological pluralism) and can be provided by different methodologies 
60  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory, p. 67. 
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(methodological pluralism). Even if all judgments originate a certain feeling 
of fittingness perceived by the agent, claiming that they do so consistently 
with moral monism seems to be an inappropriate reduction. Regarding the 
question, «Assuming that experiences of fittingness are what unifies our 
moral experiences, how interesting is this sort of unity? »61, we could answer 
that fittingness certainly expresses a sort of unity among different moral 
experiences. This unity is nevertheless limited to the phenomenological level. 
Once we try to delve deeper into the explanation of our moral decisions, 
we see that we lose that unity by virtue of the diversity of the contents 
that ground our experiences and the variety of methods of deliberation 
that set the perception of fittingness. For this reason, I believe that a 
phenomenological analysis is consistent with the claim that the complexity 
of the moral life is expressed at two levels: a) as the pluralism regarding the 
content of our judgments (values) and b) as the pluralism about the method 
through which we formulate our judgments. The very essence of morality 
appears to be manifold and heterogeneous, which is why I refer to it as moral 
complexity62. For now, this is the relevant preliminary claim of this work; 
the phenomenological approach discloses a moral experience characterized 
by some sort of moral pluralism63.
The approach of moral complexity underlines that we need to acknowledge 
the fact that our moral lives are much more manifold and diverse than we 
would like them to be. Moral phenomenology, as far as it is concerned with 
the first-person moral experience, discloses such complexity of our ordinary 
moral lives. The awareness of this feature should point out why there is no 
need to oversimplify our moral theories in search of an ultimate and unified 
end. If our moral experience does not appear simple, there seems to be no 
good reason to think that our theories need to be such. This is especially 
61  Ibidem.
62  I leave this claim unwarranted for now. The entire Chapter II is dedicated to providing a 
better understanding of this issue.
63  «It would seem that when it comes to the mere phenomenology of moral experience 
in concrete cases (involving deontic judgments), such experiences do not comport with 
monism—rather, moral experiences of being obligated, for instance, seem to be evoked by 
a variety of factors that vary from one circumstance to another. The factors involved in 
feeling an obligation of gratitude, for example, differ from the factors involved in coming 
upon someone who is in need of help. Indeed, a virtue of versions of ethical pluralism 
(featuring a plurality of prima facie duties which collectively attempt to specify a small set 
of underlying features in virtue of which actions have the deontic status they do have) is 
that they are faithful to much concrete moral experience», in T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Moral 
Phenomenology and Moral Theory, p. 66.
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true for the inquiry in moral philosophy, which needs to focus on the agent 
who deliberates how to act morally, rather than on the theory to which 
the agent should conform oneself. It seems to me that this line of thought 
regarding the peculiarity of moral philosophy is well described by Arthur 
Schopenhauer in his Early Manuscripts:
A theoretical philosopher is one who from the representations of all 
classes can furnish a copy in concepts and hence for his faculty of 
reason (Vernunft), just as the painter copies on canvas what he has seen, 
the sculptor in marble, and the poet in pictures for the imagination 
(which, however, he gives only in the seed of the concepts from which 
they have first sprung). A so-called practical philosopher, on the other 
hand, is one who does the opposite and controls his actions according 
to concepts; thus just as the former transfers life into the concept, does 
the latter carry concepts over into life. […] The theoretical philosopher 
enriches his faculty of reason and gives it something; the practical 
philosopher takes something from his faculty of reason and lets it 
serve him64.
Borrowing this distinction from Schopenhauer, we could say that the 
approach of moral complexity reminds us of the priority of life (the moral 
life, we could add) over concepts. This motto highlights the task of those 
dealing with the understanding of moral deliberation. It should not be 
surprising that this task is of great importance for our ordinary lives, and 
as such, giving the proper account of the first-person moral experience is a 
challenge that cannot be easily dismissed.
1.4 Why Is Moral Pluralism So Important?
Moral pluralism is the theoretical framework that takes into account 
more than a single and unique source of morality. In other words, pluralism 
is the moral approach that considers more than a single ultimate moral end. 
Moreover, pluralists hold that these ultimate ends might come into conflict, 
generating what we call a “moral conflict” or eventually, where a preferable 
outcome does not seem possible, a “moral dilemma”65. Pluralism has to be 
64  A. Schopenhauer, Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes: Volume I Early Manuscripts (1804–
1818), Oxford, Berg, 1988, p.122.
65  Many relevant authors of the 20th century have leaned toward a pluralist account of 
morality. In different degrees, authors such as W.D. Ross, I. Berlin, B. Williams, and T. Nagel 
all belong to this group. In applied ethics, the bioethical framework outlined by Beauchamp 
and Childress is another good example of moral pluralism.
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distinguished from the approach called “moral prioritism”66, which allows 
many sources of morality without considering the possibility of moral 
dilemmas. In fact, prioritists hold that dilemmas can be explained away by a 
precise ordering of the principles that rule the moral structure67. Finally, to 
complete this rough sketch of moral frameworks, we can distinguish (at the 
two opposite ends of the moral gamut) between “moral particularism” and 
“moral monism”. Particularists claim that there are no apt moral principles to 
help us in moral deliberations. Furthermore, moral principles might mislead 
the moral agent in recognizing the relevant moral reasons that the situation 
exhibits. The recognition of moral reasons is the only source of morality, 
and reasons may vary greatly according to the situation68. In contrast, 
monists hold that morality can be ruled by principles69, which occurs due to 
a unique principle or source or an ultimate end that coherently manages to 
outline our moral dimension. Monist theories can vary a lot on what they 
take to be morally relevant as the founding principle, and as such, they can 
express divergent responses to the same issue70. In fact, these distinctions 
are based on the number of principles that a moral theory allows and on 
how such a theory manages its principles. In other words, these differences 
exclusively draw on the structure of moral theories. Nothing has been said 
about the differences in the content of the principles or in the methodology 
that animates the principles. For example, two pluralist theories, while 
structurally identical, might vary in what they take to be part of the set of 
relevant moral principles. Likewise, two monist theories, while structurally 
identical, might vary in how the single principle should work71. The following 
66  In the breakdown of the taxonomy of different moral frameworks I refer to B. Gaut, Moral 
Pluralism, «Philosophical Papers», XXII, 1993, pp. 17–40.
67  For example, John Rawls proposes a conception of justice based on two principles (the first 
based on basic liberties and the second on equal opportunities and the fair distribution of 
goods), with the first one always taking priority over the second (the so-called lexical order). 
See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 1971, §11.
68  J.P. Sartre, J. McDowell, and more actively, J. Dancy have argued in favor of this view. 
69  Pluralists and prioritists share this claim, too. Together with monists, they all belong to 
the group of moral generalists, believing in the possibility to generalize from the particular 
situation a set of moral principles (or a single one). Clearly, generalists stand jointly in 
opposition to particularists.
70  The influential and dominant moral theories developed in the 18th century can all be 
ascribable to moral monism. As part of this group, Kantian ethics and utilitarianism have 
probably generated the broadest and most articulated debate in the normative ethics of the 
last couple of centuries. 
71  Think of the well-known distinction between deontology (adherence to one’s duties) 
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table shows how we can summarize different moral approaches based on 
their identification of the relevant moral sources72.
Moral Structures
Theory Description
Particularism No moral principles at all
Pluralism A set of moral sources that can come into conflict, generating 
moral conflicts
Prioritism A set of moral principles that never come into conflict due to a 
precise ordering system
Monism A single and unique moral source
I now focus on a confrontation of moral pluralism with the alternative moral 
frameworks. In fact, the previous section has revealed how pluralism seems to 
be the moral framework that better faces the outcome of a phenomenological 
analysis of our moral experience. As defined by John Rawls, pluralism is 
consistent with a moral life that presents a variety of moral principles that 
occasionally generate moral conflicts:
Once we reach a certain level of generality, the intuitionist maintains 
that there exist no higher-order constructive criteria for determining 
the proper emphasis for the competing principles of justice. While the 
complexity of the moral facts requires a number of distinct principles, 
there is no single standard that accounts for them or assigns them 
their weights. Intuitionist theories, then, have two features: first, 
they consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to 
give contrary directives in particular types of cases; and second, they 
include no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these 
principles against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by 
intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right73.
First, remember that Rawls refers here to pluralism by the name of 
intuitionism, using the term with a broader understanding than usual74. The 
and consequentialism (consideration of the act’s consequences). In this regard, another 
interesting methodological distinction is that between the agent-relative theory and the 
agent-neutral theory introduced by D. Parfit and T. Nagel. See p. 75 of the present volume.
72  It would be inappropriate to distinguish them by their acknowledgment of moral principles. 
While most of these theories endorse at least one principle of morality, this term might be 
misleading in the case of particularism, which, while having no precise principle or duty, 
certainly does have sources of morality (reasons).
73  J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Original Edition, p. 34. 
74  Ibidem. 
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reason for this is an issue related to the “priority problem”. In fact, Rawls 
defends the prioritist view and criticizes pluralist theories for dealing with 
the choice among the many principles by mere intuition. He holds that this is 
the only way that pluralists can pick one of the competing principles rather 
than another. Thus, he tries to undermine the plausibility of moral pluralism 
by claiming that a way of prioritizing principles not only exists but is also 
necessary because people would otherwise fall outside the perspective of 
justice as fairness defending principles on particular interests. At the same 
time, a method to prioritize principles is available, given the existence of a 
variety of them. Rawls believes that we can rank them according to the notion 
of the so-called lexical order, which entails that the agent always fulfills 
the first principle before considering the next one. Subordinate principles 
cannot be brought about if the superior principles are either satisfied or 
do not apply75. However, it could be pointed out that a strict serial order 
of the principles of this kind, even if it would go well with the majority 
of cases, could eventually produce counterintuitive results. If this were the 
case, a prioritist view of this kind would lose its original advantages over 
pluralism. Berys Gaut, who claims that prioritism might allow suspicious 
and unreasonable outcomes, makes a similar point. For example, think of a 
case where, in order to comply with the respect for someone’s liberty (such 
as the right to participate in a specific governmental decision), a society 
gives up a major economic benefit for a large number of people76. The 
fact that principles are so strictly prioritized makes it harder to deal with 
peculiar cases where it would be reasonable to allow a different order of 
principles. Nevertheless, this should not degenerate into the claim that the 
lack of a priority rule would allow principles to be confronted by virtue of 
particular interests (as Rawls seems to believe). Pluralists can easily argue 
that adequate discrimination between principles does not have to reflect 
particular interests and inequalities of power and this does not need to be 
done by mere intuition. They can apply the same principle that prioritists do 
without thinking that it is always the case. What differs from one approach 
75  «This is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we 
can move on to the second, the second before we consider the third, and so on. A principle 
does not come into play until those previous to it are either fully met or do not apply. A serial 
ordering avoids, then, having to balance principles at all; those earlier in the ordering have 
an absolute weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones, and hold without exception», ivi, 
p. 43.
76  B. Gaut, Moral Pluralism, p. 22.
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to another is the belief that a certain priority rule is comprehensively true of 
all moral deliberations77. Thus, pluralism still holds some advantages when 
following a priority rule would give rise to particularly counterintuitive 
results. In such a situation, a pluralist system might simply establish that a 
given priority rule does not apply in the relevant circumstances.
It has been pointed out that pluralism brings about some advantages that 
are consistent with a widespread version of commonsense morality. Gaut 
expressly highlights these advantages, as follows78: a) While recognizing the 
existence of a variety of principles, pluralism does not require us to pick one 
of them to have priority over the others. This might happen to be a difficult 
rather than arbitrary move. b) Pluralism explains the phenomenology of 
moral dilemmas in which we are confronted with two conflicting moral 
demands. Other moral frameworks struggle in explaining away the fact that 
such a phenomenon happens. c) Pluralism gives an account of the fact that 
we, as moral agents, do not perceive our role as unitary. We can arrive at 
morally relevant reasons by virtue of our role in society, in our family, or 
in a group of relatives or generally, by many different facts about ourselves. 
This heterogeneity of the moral life is better explained by moral pluralism 
while being quite consistently in accord with common-sense morality. This 
appears important because any inquiry in the field of morality does not 
start from a blank page. We are, without exception, already influenced by a 
variety of moral values originating from different traditions that we freely 
choose and inherit. The best way to systematize all of them is to allow a 
plurality of sources from which morality springs.
Since a phenomenological analysis reveals the need for a variety of 
principles to make sense of moral experience, prioritist theories represent 
the most tempting alternatives to moral pluralism. However, as shown, 
pluralism still holds some advantages over those theories (such as the 
possibility to drop a counterintuitive priority rule). It is now worth turning 
to a brief analysis of the advantages of moral pluralism over the other two 
highlighted moral frameworks: particularism and monism.
Although particularism would be in accord with the heterogeneity of 
moral experience, it would leave some theoretical gaps, which will make 
us prefer pluralism. In fact, particularists argue that the morally relevant 
properties are many (as pluralists do). However, they also claim that moral 
77  Ivi, p. 28.
78   B. Gaut, ivi, pp. 35ff.
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principles are not useful tools of morality; rather, they can misguide our 
judgments since they are generalizations that do not take care of particular 
cases. As such, moral principles have to be thought of as crutches, which can 
help us in walking but can also lead us into error. My claim is that in the case 
of pluralism, principles are more similar to running shoes than to crutches. 
They make us proceed faster in moral matters even if we do not recognize their 
benefits or do not realize that we benefit from them. In contrast, particularism 
is all about recognizing the moral reasons that the specific situation offers, 
regardless of the contribution of principles. Nevertheless, pluralism allows 
the appreciation of the situation, too, since none of the principles has an 
exhaustive and absolute priority over the others. Provisional priority of 
a principle over the others has to be gained according to the particular 
case. While this allows pluralism to avoid the counterintuitive results of a 
generalist theory, it still permits moral principles to provide some help in 
the appreciation of the relevant moral reasons. The main disadvantage of 
particularism is that it leaves the agent with no tools other than his or her 
moral sensibility for reasons. This might end up being too vague in complex 
situations or when the agent is not particularly experienced or used to the 
present situation. The mere ability to recognize certain reasons for action 
might not be enough. If this is the case, particularism might be vulnerable to 
the charge of being relativistic. If no principle can aid the decision, the moral 
agent will arbitrarily choose what to do. The fact that pluralism does not 
discharge the importance of principles, while holding that they have to be 
tested in the particular situation, supports the suitability and the advantages 
of this theoretical framework. Therefore, the real advantage of pluralism 
over particularism is that while holding that morality is characterized by a 
variety of factors (including contingent ones), it can still accommodate the 
grounds to provide adequate moral reasons.
Choosing pluralism over monism seems to have many advantages, 
too. In fact, if we take moral experience as it appears, moral pluralism has 
more overall justifying potential than monism. This is true in different 
regards: a) Pluralism is the theoretical approach that better responds to the 
complexity of moral life and the heterogeneity of its sources, as disclosed 
by a phenomenological analysis. b) It goes well with what commonsense 
morality holds about the different moral roles and moral sources that the 
same agent has79. c) Pluralism (unlike monism) can explain the existence 
79  To a certain degree, this refers to the preexistence of rules, values, traditions, and teachings 
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and the phenomenology of moral conflicts and dilemmas80. d) Monism 
struggles to make sense of complex moral concepts in a way that pluralism 
does not81. All these elements particularly favor pluralism over monism 
(and generally over all other theoretical options). These claims have much 
in common with the thought of Isaiah Berlin, who states that the belief of 
realizing an “ultimate harmony” in the field of morality is a fallacy. Although 
ethics is essentially complex, we can only try to soften the collision between 
its elements by looking for compromises and establishing contingent and 
temporary priorities82.
In conclusion, moral pluralism is important because it represents the 
theoretical framework that better addresses the explanatory needs required 
by the complexity of our moral lives. This is the most compelling reason 
to favor pluralism as the most attractive moral theory—its ability to give 
an account of the phenomenology of the first-person experience as a 
complex system. Rawls rightly acknowledges how proponents of moral 
pluralism take their theory as the answer to the complexity of moral life83. 
This answer is necessary to make sense of our moral experiences and to 
aid the decisional processes that challenge all moral agents. A complex 
(plural) moral approach is the answer that we seek when reflecting on how 
to explain the dynamics involved in the decisional process, as observed 
from the first-person moral standpoint. Even better, this moral framework is 
relatively similar to a widespread version of commonsense morality. In brief, 
pluralism entails the idea that from a moral perspective, a subject cannot 
be considered a single, coherent, and unitary agent. The different roles we 
fulfill and the various sources of morality that can influence us bring about 
a moral life that is ultimately complex. Even from a theoretical standpoint, 
we need to take on this explanatory challenge, which is what I call “the need 
that already characterize our moral lives before any theoretical framework applies.
80  In fact, the alleged existence of a unique moral source should not entail any insolvable 
moral conflict. 
81  As we will see extensively on the second part of this work, the peculiar case of the concept 
of supererogation represents a good example of this evidence.
82  I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2013, 
pp. 17–18.
83  «The intuitionist believes to the contrary that the complexity of the moral facts defies 
our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and necessitates a plurality of competing 
principles. He contends that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to triviality, 
as when it is said that social justice is to give every man his due, or else lead to falsehood and 
oversimplification, as when one settles everything by the principle of utility», in J. Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice: Original Edition, p. 39.
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for moral complexity”. Our moral lives require such theoretical depth to be 
interpreted:
[…] our moral values are rooted in our view of what are the salient 
facts about ourselves, in our self-understanding, which is socially 
conditioned. We view ourselves as standing in several salient 
relationships: as friends, lovers, sons or daughters, parents, colleagues, 
fellow-men, and co-inhabitants of the earth with many different sorts 
of beings. Each of these parts of our self-conception is expressed by 
a set of duties we have. We also think that it is important that we 
can feel pain and suffer, but also that we can exercise our autonomy 
in choosing our life-plan (in which suffering may be acceptable if 
it is necessary for great achievements) – and also that we have to 
live together with people in communities, constituted by inherited, 
shared values. Each of these facts is salient in our view of ourselves, 
but only the pluralist is in a position to allow that such a complex self-
understanding can find appropriate expression in the realm of values 
as a plurality of principles84.
84  B. Gaut, Moral Pluralism, p. 36.
CHAPTER II 
WHAT IS MORAL COMPLEXITY?
2.1 Moral Complexity: A Matter of Structure
In the first place, moral complexity is neither a new theoretical 
framework of morality nor a new moral theory. Rather, moral complexity 
is intended to be a moral approach originating from the analysis of the 
heterogeneous sources of morality, as revealed by moral phenomenology. 
As such, morality is a complex subject composed of complex elements. Only 
through the analysis of this complexity can we grasp what stands behind the 
moral experience of the moral agent. Now, from this point of view, moral 
complexity is primarily the study of the already existent moral framework 
that assists us in identifying ultimate moral ends and consequently supports 
our moral deliberations. This task will be considered completed only 
inasmuch as it is committed to the recognition of how our moral reasoning 
works in ordinary life. As far as it is relevant for practical philosophy, this 
matter needs to be concerned with how things are from the moral agent’s 
perspective. A theorization that tries to affect our moral experience through 
the oversimplification of how things appear is contrary to this approach. 
Such an approach that ensures the complexity of morality is widely shared 
by pluralists, as is the case of David Ross, who writes:
[…] it is more important that our theory fit the facts than it be simple, 
and the account we have given above [pluralism] corresponds (it 
seems to me) better than either of the simpler theories with what we 
really think […]85.
85  W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 19.
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As far as it is intended as the study of what ought to be done, moral 
philosophy needs to maintain the priority of life over concepts. Thus, in the 
present chapter, I focus on outlining the structural features that make our 
moral life so authentically complex. However, it will not be surprising if this 
study will be of some help in highlighting the content, rather than just the 
mere structure, of what is of ultimate moral relevance.
The first step toward understanding moral complexity is to take the 
difficulties that characterize our moral life (roughly tough choices), not as 
something we need to explain away through a moral theory, whose task is 
to make difficulties fall silent. Hard choices are not necessarily unsolvable; 
they simply remind us that morality could be characterized by challenging 
moments. Such choices might become even more challenging when hard 
choices become moral dilemmas and thus unsolvable. The reason why this 
happens is the ultimately complex nature of morality. Here is where morality 
reveals its complex essence and the manifold moral experience—this (as I 
have underlined in the previous chapter) should lead to the acknowledgment 
of pluralism. 
In this regard, moral monism holds the opposite belief; moral conflict can 
be avoided if we pledge allegiance to a single ultimate moral end. Proponents 
of monist theories expect to explain away all the conflicts by appealing to the 
principle they endorse or the value they take to be of supreme importance. In 
this way, the problem of dealing with moral dilemmas would be apparently 
solved. Additionally, the major monistic traditions, inspired by the works 
of Immanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill, highlight a 
distinctive problem that pluralism faces. They maintain that pluralist theories 
struggle to carry out the proper moral justification of a moral act. The fact 
that the many sources of morality can be in conflict, while holding their 
incommensurability, is perceived as an obstacle that cannot be overcome. If 
there is no apparent way to discriminate between conflicting options, how 
would the agent ground moral justification? Michael Gill underlines this 
belief shared by monists:
What I think Mill and Kant took to be the insurmountable problem 
for pluralism is that it is not able to account properly for moral 
justification in cases in which ultimate moral ends come into conflict 
with each other […]. If pluralists hold that both of two ultimate ends 
are on the bottom floor of moral justification, they will also have to 
hold that there is no more fundamental moral end that tells us why 
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we ought to act on one of those ends rather than the other when they 
conflict86.
I think that these claims make it possible to summarize the dispute between 
monism and pluralism according to two main issues: the existence of moral 
dilemmas and how moral justification needs to be managed. Both these 
issues acquire a certain relevance in the sphere of commonsense morality, 
too. Although it is interesting to note that commonsense morality favors 
monism on the issue of moral justification87, at the same time, it endorses 
pluralism on the issue of moral dilemmas. The following table illustrates 
the relation between structural frameworks and two of the central issues of 
moral philosophy:
Monism, Pluralism and commonsense morality
Moral Dilemmas Moral Justification
Monism Dilemmas do not exist. 
They can be explained 
away by the single 
ultimate source of 
morality.
We need a reliable tool to 
justify a certain course of 
action in cases of moral 
conflict.
Pluralism Dilemmas exist. They are 
expressions of the multiple 
sources of morality.
No single principle can 
consistently discriminate 
between conflicting 
options.
       Shared by commonsense morality
I believe that the game between monism and pluralism has to be played 
primarily on these two issues. While according to commonsense morality, 
it appears as a 1–1 draw, research on moral philosophy needs to find a 
tiebreaker on this matter. On one hand, as long as monism would be able 
to give a satisfactory account of the phenomenology of moral dilemmas, it 
would affirm its superiority88. On the other hand, if pluralism would be able 
to provide a satisfactory procedure for moral justification, it would fully 
take care of the moral complexity of our moral experience.
86  M.B. Gill, Humean Moral Pluralism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 130.
87  Gill agrees with this claim. See ivi, p. 131 and p. 138.
88  I have briefly underlined in Chapter I why this is not the case.
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Monism is right in claiming that generally, moral justification requires 
the appeal to a single source of morality89. This is the reason why this claim 
is so appealing to commonsense morality. However, it would be wrong 
to think that moral pluralism could not arrange moral justification in the 
same way. After all, the real task of moral pluralism is outlining which of 
the many available moral sources takes priority over the others. Although 
this provisional priority is only applicable to the present situation, it still 
counts in favor of a single moral source. As such, moral justification can be 
grounded on the single source that is provisionally relevant to the agent. 
While it might happen to be complicated, this process represents the real 
advantage of pluralism over monism in the area of moral justification. 
Pluralism (contra monism) claims that we are not required to always use 
the same moral source, which is important for two reasons: a) It avoids 
counterintuitive results90. b) It offers the agent the possibility to adjust to the 
situation. These two claims represent the first step toward the appreciation 
of pluralism over monism.
As outlined above, the argument in favor of the singularity of the 
moral source proposed by monist theories is based on the issue of moral 
justification91. This appears clear when we consider John Stuart Mill’s 
preliminary assertions in his work, A System of Logic:
There is, then, a philosophia prima peculiar to Art, as there is one which 
belongs to Science. There are not only first principles of Knowledge, 
but first principles of Conduct. There must be some standard by which 
89  However, this is not always the case. Think of those cases where we do x by virtue of 
two independent non-conflicting reasons. For example, I make a donation because I want 
to reduce injustice, and it makes me feel better. I would call this a case of conjunctive 
justification. Moreover, in other cases, the performance of x, while justified by a certain 
principle a, would also be justified by another principle b. For example, I could keep a 
promise out of respect for the other agent or because it is better to keep promises for the 
convenience of society. In this case as well (which we could call disjunctive justification), 
moral justification does not necessarily require a single principle but either of the two. This 
distinction would certainly require a dedicated and more detailed work.
90  Monist theories have traditionally been charged of producing counterintuitive results 
when faced with particular circumstances. Kantian ethics struggles with cases such as 
the “murderer at the door” (see I. Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy, in I. 
Kant, Practical Philosophy, M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, 
pp. 605–615), while consequentialism generally struggles with cases such as the one of the 
“drowning partner” (see B. Williams, Persons, Character and Morality, in B. Williams, Moral 
Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981).
91  To examine this issue in more depth, see Chapter 7, Formal Monism, in M. Gill, Humean 
Moral Pluralism, pp. 128–139.
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to determine the goodness or badness, absolute and comparative, of 
ends, or objects of desire. And whatever that standard is, there can 
be but one; for if there were several ultimate principles of conduct, 
the same conduct might be approved by one of those principles and 
condemned by another; and there would be needed some more general 
principle, as umpire between them. Accordingly, writers on Moral 
Philosophy have mostly felt the necessity not only of referring all 
rules of conduct, and all judgments of praise and blame, to principles, 
but of referring them to some one principle; some rule, or standard, 
with which all other rules of conduct were required to be consistent, 
and from which by ultimate consequence they could all be deduced 92.
Mill’s argument is based on the need for a single principle to make moral 
justification feasible. Formally93, a moral theory has to be grounded on a 
unique principle to make it possible to outline the right course of action. 
Mill claims that otherwise, it would be impossible to understand which act is 
the right one. However, as I have already emphasized, the fact that a theory 
allows many principles is not the same as claiming that all of them play a 
relevant role in the given situation. The point is to understand which of the 
many principles is actually the relevant one, but this is a question of priority 
rather than justification. The concern of monists is that pluralists would 
bring about this task with a certain degree of arbitrariness94. This is the main 
reason why Mill has introduced the principle of utility, and here is where the 
need for formal monism seeks a substantial answer. As moral agents, we all 
need a standard that helps us discriminate among the many options:
If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, utility may be 
invoked to decide between them when their demands are incompatible. 
Though the application of the standard may be difficult, it is better 
than none at all; while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming 
independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere 
between them; their claims to precedence one over another rest on 
little better than sophistry, and, unless determined, as they generally 
are, by the unacknowledged influence of consideration of utility, 
afford a free scope for the action of personal desires and partialities95.
92  J.S. Mill, A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive, New York, Harper & Brothers 
Publishers, 1904, pp. 657–658.
93  Gill distinguishes between formal monism (the claim that morality needs a single principle) 
and substantive monism (the claim that morality needs a specific principle). See M. Gill, 
Humean Moral Pluralism, p. 128.
94  Later, I will further discuss how pluralism can handle this task. See Section 2.3.
95  J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 2001, p. 26.
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As Mill argues, to have a single principle, it would necessarily be very 
general. This is the case of the principle of utility or the “greatest happiness 
principle”; the right thing to do is the one that tends to promote happiness, 
that is, pleasure and absence of pain. Now, to determine the right course 
of action once we, as agents, are confronted with a situation of conflicting 
obligations, we would be required to calculate the utility of the options. 
Due to the generality of the principle, it seems far from obvious how to 
accomplish this task. How do we measure happiness? How do we compare 
different kinds of pleasures? It seems to me that this procedure would 
require the same degree of moral sensibility (or arbitrariness as the case 
may be) as pluralism requires. It is a mistaken belief that moral justification 
is much more reliable and less arbitrary under a single general principle 
than under a variety of sources or a set of principles. As long as the single 
principle of morality has such a high degree of generality, it would require 
an equal degree of sensibility to be applied to a particular case. This leads 
a monist theory such as utilitarianism to be subjected to the same criticism 
of arbitrariness that it tries to avoid. I believe that this fact undermines the 
argument that moral justification would require the greatest happiness 
principle. Moreover, it would cast some doubts on the idea that morality 
would formally require only a single principle.
Although he proposes a substantially different monism, Kant certainly 
agrees with Mill’s formal monism. Indeed, while he is not explicit on why a 
moral theory has to be formally monist, in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals, he repeatedly claims that morality is substantially monist:
The present groundwork, however, is nothing more than the 
identification and corroboration of the supreme principle of morality, 
which by itself constitutes a business that is complete in its purpose 
and to be separated from every other moral investigation96.
He reiterates:
When I think of a hypothetical imperative as such I do not know in 
advance what it will contain, until I am given the condition. But when 
I think of a categorical imperative I know at once what it contains. 
For since besides the law the imperative contains only the necessity 
of the maxim to conform with this law, whereas the law contains no 
condition to which it was limited, nothing is left but the universality of 
96  I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2012, p. 7.
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a law as such, with which the maxim of the action ought to conform, 
and it is this conformity alone that the imperative actually represents 
as necessary. There is therefore only a single categorical imperative, 
and it is this: act according to that maxim through which you can at 
the same time will that it become a universal law97.
The argument implicitly states that since the only thing required by the 
categorical imperative is to universalize the maxim of the action, there can 
only be a single objective principle. To be moral then, a subjective principle 
(the maxim of the action) should conform to the only objective principle (the 
categorical imperative). However, it has been argued how such a feature of 
Kantian ethics might leave open the possibility of a pluralistic interpretation 
of the theory98. Thomas Hill claims that to admit such Kantian pluralism, we 
first need to recognize some common features shared by all pluralisms: a) 
the presence of many principles99, b) the incommensurability of values100, c) 
the right that is independent of the good101, and d) the theory’s undogmatic 
and permissive character102. Does Kant’s theory possess any of these 
features? Briefly, Hill states the following points: a) Kant’s ethics does not 
admit dilemmas, holding that the categorical imperative is the higher-order 
principle that would help solve them. b) Kant thinks that rational moral 
agents have an inherent dignity (they are all ends in themselves); as such, 
his theory seems fundamentally committed to the incommensurability of 
values. c) Kant puts the right prior to the good; principles of the right are 
derived from rational reflection rather than any reflection on goodness. 
d) While Kant seems dogmatic on a personal level, his theory reveals the 
opposite attitude; since it starts with the rational agent’s abstraction from 
the particular dimension, the theory sets aside the matter of what particular 
values are preferable. According to Hill, points b) and d) especially represent 
the features that lend a possible pluralist character to Kant’s theory. The 
fact that all agents have an intrinsic dignity (point b) gives rise to the fact 
97  Ivi, pp. 33–34.
98  This interpretation does not apply to those ethical theories that are traditionally classified 
as pluralism with a strong Kantian influence. The works of John Rawls and Robert Nozick 
fall under this category, although it might be emphasized how it would be more accurate to 
further specify their degree of pluralism (for example, Rawls can be considered a prioritist 
rather than a pluralist). 
99  T.E. Hill, Kantian Pluralism, «Ethics», CII (4), 1992, p. 743.
100  Ivi, p. 747.
101  Ivi, p. 748.
102  Ivi, p. 749.
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that they are incommensurable103. The incommensurability of values (as 
we have seen) is a typically pluralist feature. Moreover, Kant’s standpoint 
on formality of the moral law prevents him (at least on a theoretical level) 
from any moralistic constraint of the content of maxims (point d). After 
all, the categorical imperative requires only the universality of the maxim. 
According to this understanding, Kant’s theory would be in a certain way 
permissive, undogmatic, and nonjudgmental. As Hill puts it:
[…] because Kantian ethics starts from the idea of rational agents 
abstracting as far as possible from particular cultural commitments 
and preferences, arguments from it should tend to support a relatively 
open society with liberties protected and diversity permitted. Cultural 
diversity would not be glorified as valuable for its own sake, but it 
would not be suppressed for the purpose of promoting the general 
happiness104.
Although these features represent an interesting pluralistic insight and 
align well with the well-known liberal tendency of moral pluralism, it is 
not enough to fully consider Kant’s theory pluralistic. A conception of 
pluralism that includes only one of the four features emphasized by Hill 
is too weak and non-comprehensive. These four features cannot simply be 
considered four different “understandings” of moral pluralism. They need 
to be taken together to form the set of features that a theory necessarily 
comprises to be considered pluralistic. As such, Kantian ethics falls short in 
many basic elements of pluralism and thus cannot properly be conceived as 
a pluralistic theory. Consequently, Kant’s theory shares with other monistic 
theories all the shortcomings I have highlighted regarding the recognition 
of the phenomenology of moral dilemmas, the acknowledgment of the 
multiplicity of the sources of morality, and the explanation of the nature of 
moral complexities.
These reflections on the nature of the different moral frameworks 
represent the main purpose of what I call the approach of moral complexity. 
While favoring a pluralistic account of morality, the attention to moral 
complexity leads to the unveiling of and the focus on the structure of moral 
thought. It is helpful to resort to some images in order to understand this 
point. Generally, moral monism thinks of morality as having a pyramidal 
103  Ivi, p. 756.
104  Ivi, p. 760.
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structure105. All moral decisions are made according to a framework that 
draws value entirely from a single and ultimate source of morality. In 
contrast, pluralism presents a much more complex picture. The many 
sources of morality require us to think of it as a network of interrelated 
points. Principles, norms, values, special obligations, and so on, all play 
roles in our moral lives when we make moral decisions. Their roles cannot 
be reduced to a single source of morality; otherwise, we would not make 
sense of the complexity that characterizes the experience of the moral agent. 
All the elements that constitute the structure of morality are ideally placed 
on the junctions that comprise the moral network. Each element stands 
in a variable relationship with the other elements, creating an evolving 
web that constitutes a complex system. This would also mean that every 
element would be affected to some degree by the change in another. For 
example, if I decide to foster beneficence as the primary moral value in the 
situation I am facing, this will accordingly result in a different set of moral 
recommendations. This is ultimately the understanding of morality that I call 
moral complexity—the idea that morality is composed of a variety of sources 
that come into different relations according to the given situation. As such, 
based on the relational status of the relevant elements of morality, it might 
be easier for hard choices (or even moral dilemmas) to arise. The contingent 
situation thus redefines the balance of the whole structure. However, this is 
not the only factor that plays such a role. Social context, tradition, education, 
and exemplary figures all affect the balance and the relations among the 
elements of our moral system. In a system of this kind, making a moral choice 
is supported by the ability to understand the different priorities that the 
elements gain in the contingent case. Accordingly, the agent acknowledges 
what has the overriding moral relevance and understands the adequate 
course of action. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to think of this process as 
the varying precedence of a single element over the others. This would entail 
that one of the elements would play the provisional role of overriding the 
others, recalling a pro tanto pyramidal structure. Unfortunately, while this 
might occur, it is not always the case. Our moral experience often appears 
more complex than this. Sometimes, more sources claim their relevance106, 
and it is hard to find a balance. Most of the times, indeed, a moral choice 
105  To a certain degree, the same can be said of prioritism, too.
106  This feature will become extremely helpful in the second part of this work, where I will 
address the explanation of complex moral concepts, such as that of supererogation.
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springs from what appears to be the right compromise among all the sources 
involved. In these terms, the image of the pro tanto pyramidal structure is 
not representative of the balance among the sources of the moral network 
that we constantly seek.  
As anticipated above, the evidence of such a structure of morality can be 
appraised in a peculiar case of moral choice—the moral dilemma. Bernard 
Williams holds a famous position in this regard, which seems to me extremely 
relevant for the present work. The existence of moral dilemmas is displayed 
in the phenomenological analysis of the moral experience of the agent who 
faces a choice between conflicting obligations. Williams claims that the fact 
that the agent experiences regret (as a form of moral residue) for the moral 
loss generated by the option that he or she has disregarded is a confirmation 
of the existence of true moral dilemmas107. Accordingly, the role of an ethical 
theory is not necessarily that of trying to smooth conflicts and attenuate 
uncertainties. Moral conflicts should neither be considered pathological108 
nor perceived as a malfunctioning of our moral framework. Acknowledging 
this aspect is the first step toward the acceptance of moral complexity. Along 
with Williams’ position, I would additionally claim that moral dilemmas are 
not only real and undeniable, but they also ultimately reveal the complex 
structure of morality. Without the multiplicity of the sources of morality, 
such phenomenological evidence of dilemmas would not be explicable. A 
pyramidal structure of morality would require us to generalize up to the 
point where the dilemma simply recedes. The phenomenological approach 
shows how this is not always the case. The dilemmatic influence (in the 
form of regret) remains even if the choice between the alternatives has been 
made. I suggest that this could be taken as a hint of the actual structure of 
morality. I believe that if we understand morality as a network of many 
interrelated sources of reasons for action, the phenomenology of moral 
dilemmas becomes understandable and coherent with the background 
theory. Dilemmas arise when the agent considers more than a single moral 
source and does not know how to balance them adequately (given that such 
a balance truly exists). Ultimately, then, moral dilemmas reveal that morality 
is structurally much more complex than most of our moral theories would 
107  See B. Williams, Ethical Consistency, in B. Williams, Problems of the Self, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1973.
108  B. Williams, Conflict of Values, in B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, pp. 80–81.
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want us to concede. The approach of moral complexity aims at understanding 
and taking care of such a distinctive structural feature of morality.
2.2 Toward an Understanding of Complexity: Charles Larmore
It is difficult to establish the precise origins of what can be considered 
the approach of moral complexity. Certainly, the debate of the English-
speaking philosophical tradition in the twentieth century is characterized 
by a multitude of authors who have tried to address this issue. Among them, 
David Ross, Isaiah Berlin, Stuart Hampshire, Bernard Williams, Thomas 
Nagel, and Charles Larmore stand out. All these authors have the common 
inclination to emphasize that the agent’s moral experience is ultimately 
complex, and as such, it cannot be oversimplified in favor of whatever moral 
framework. The approach of moral complexity is thus the belief that we, as 
moral agents, are not required to conform to the moral theories that have 
greatly characterized (and partly still do) moral philosophy over the last three 
centuries109. The opposite theoretical move seems more adequate; it is theory 
that has to conform to our moral experience. As we have seen in Chapter I, 
some phenomenological features that characterize a moral agent lead to the 
espousal of a pluralistic (complex) system of morality. The endorsement of a 
pluralistic structure of morality is, to a certain degree, another feature that 
combines the thought of these authors. This is what I have called the “need” 
for a theoretical framework that acknowledges moral complexity. Therefore, 
this need can be satisfied by the appeal to the degree of theoretical depth 
that pluralism can extensively grant. Different moral sources can eventually 
clash with one another, but rather than being a problem to solve, it is the 
very essence of our moral lives. We need to keep this essential complexity 
intact if we want to give a truthful account of morality. Isaiah Berlin’s words 
forcefully remind us of this important prerequisite of any moral inquiry:
These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and 
what we are. If we are told that these contradictions will be solved 
in some perfect world in which all good things can be harmonized 
in principle, then we must answer, to those who say this, that the 
meanings they attach to the names which for us denote the conflicting 
values are not ours. We must say that the world in which what we see 
109  I implicitly refer to the rise of the great monistic traditions from the 18th century to the 
present days.
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as incompatible values not in conflict is a world altogether beyond 
our ken; that principles which are harmonized in this other world are 
not the principles with which, in our daily lives, we are acquainted; if 
they are transformed, it is into conceptions not known to us on earth. 
But it is on earth that we live, and it is here that we must believe and 
act. […] I can only say that those who rest on such comfortable beds 
of dogma are victims of forms of self-induced myopia, blinkers that 
may make for contentment, but not for understanding of what it is to 
be human110.
If a study of morality wants to give an account of how human beings 
are, it needs to reconstruct complexity adequately. In contrast, if this 
acknowledgment fails, moral agents will try to conform to a morality that is 
simply imposed on them. Moral complexity wants to avoid this distortion, 
and to do so, the espousal of a pluralist system seems the best option overall.
The focal point on which moral complexity is grounded is the 
heterogeneity of the sources of morality. As such, morality is complex 
because it comprises sources of different kinds, which play various roles and 
are effective on different levels. As I have emphasized, morality is a network 
of sources, rather than an ordered pyramid. This means that the fact that the 
sources differ in kind explains why they can eventually come into conflict. 
Thomas Nagel argues in favor of this thesis111. He claims that we have five 
fundamental kinds of value, and as such, value appears “fragmented”112. 
By value, Nagel means a source of morality, that is, values are sources of 
moral reasons to act. It would be problematic to place these sources in an 
absolute order where a certain value x is always more stringent than value 
y. Nagel’s point is that moral reasons are constitutively different in kind, 
which highlights the fundamental difference of their sources. Additionally, 
this explains the nature of unsolvable moral conflicts; as long as a moral 
agent feels the pull of different kinds of reasons, moral conflict is inevitable. 
The fragmentation of value is explained by a famous distinction between the 
110  I. Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2013, 
p. 14.
111  T. Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in T. Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 128–141.
112  «Obligations, rights, utility, perfectionist ends, and private commitments – these values 
enter into our decisions constantly, and conflicts among them, and within them, arise in 
medical research, in politics, in personal life, or wherever the grounds of action are not 
artificially restricted. What would it mean to give a system of priorities among them?», ivi, 
p. 131.
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kinds of reasons that Nagel reexplores. On one hand, reasons can be agent-
centered (or personal) when they deal with who the agent is. Reasons of 
this kind include special obligations and private commitments. On the other 
hand, outcome-centered (or impersonal) reasons deal with what generally 
occurs113. Reasons of this kind include utility and perfectionist ends. Roughly, 
we can understand these two classes of reasons as springing from diverse 
points of view114,  which makes them ultimately different. Thus, value appears 
fragmented and gives rise to possible moral conflicts. For example, think of 
the famous case of the drowning partner; imagine yourself in a situation 
where you can save from drowning either your beloved partner or two 
strangers, and you are not able to save both. Whom would you save? If we 
look at this case through the two classes of reasons that Nagel distinguishes, 
we face a possible moral conflict: a) We certainly have an agent-centered 
and personal reason to save whoever is in a special relationship with us. 
b) Likewise, we have an outcome-centered and impersonal reason to save 
the higher number of possible victims115. Cases of this kind show how it is 
possible to be affected by different kinds of reasons that can eventually come 
into conflict. As Nagel argues, from the perspective of moral complexity, 
value is fragmented.
It is then worth asking the following questions: Is it possible to systematize 
the many heterogeneous sources of the good? If so, how do we actually deal 
with them? In his works, Charles Larmore has offered some insightful answers 
and at the same time, an interesting picture of the structure of morality and 
its nature. In this latter regard, Larmore’s view is based on a conception of 
Reason as a faculty that we express by being more or less responsive to the 
reasons that are present. He claims, «Rationality is the capacity to reason, 
113  While in this article, Nagel refers to these kinds of reasons as agent-centered and outcome-
centered, the distinction has been drawn based on a different terminology elsewhere. In 
a previous book, Nagel himself discusses subjective/objective reasons (see T. Nagel, The 
Possibility of Altruism, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970). Derek Parfit is the 
one who introduced the now-popular and widespread distinction between agent-relative 
and agent-neutral reasons (see D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984).
114  This reference to the different points of view will later be extremely relevant for the 
explanation of the concept of supererogation. Something similar can be found in J. Dreier, 
Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t, in M. Byron (ed.), 
Satisficing Maximizing: Moral Theories on Practical Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, pp. 131–154. 
115  Note that outcome-centered reasons become increasingly pressing if you add a large 
number of possible victims to be overlooked in favor of the partner. 
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and reasoning consists in responding to reasons»116. Reason thus involves 
«receptivity to reasons»117, which ultimately motivates the agent to act. 
Larmore takes advantage of a typically Kantian terminology to distinguish 
between Vernuft (Reason intended as a faculty) and Gründe (reasons intended 
as what grounds a belief or an action)118. These two elements make possible 
a conception of the moral experience based on a moral agent who reflects 
on the given situation to acknowledge the moral reasons to act. Reflection 
is a cognitive process (the exercise of Reason) that aims at the acquisition of 
knowledge of how things are and what reasons for belief and action exist. 
Motivation thus (contra the Humean tradition that assigns a fundamental 
role to desires) comes from knowledge alone. The truth that a belief carries 
within itself involves a commitment to think and act accordingly. If I believe 
that it is raining, I have a good reason to take an umbrella, whether or not 
I desire to do so. As such, beliefs are not motivationally inert; thus, moral 
judgments are, after all, beliefs about the existing reasons for action119. It 
is interesting to note at this point how the Kantian distinction between 
theoretical and practical Reason is fundamentally unnecessary; according to 
Larmore, «there is a single faculty of reason whose exercise may be styled as 
“theoretical” or “practical” depending on whether its subject matter is belief 
or action»120. The kind of activity that Reason reveals is the same in its two 
connotations and in truth, given the motivational power of beliefs, a much 
intertwined one.
Morality therefore involves attending to the moral reasons that the 
agent recognizes in a particular situation. To make sense, this practice needs 
to be grounded on a moral realist framework that considers moral reasons 
as relational, normative, and real facts. Indeed, moral reasons consist of a 
certain relation (counting in favor of x) between some features of the world 
and a certain possible course of action (or belief)121. Reasons are not physical 
(like a chair and a table are); rather, they might be based on some features 
116  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 
135.
117  Ivi, p. 109.
118  This lexical explanation of the terms can be found in C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni. Il soggetto, 
l”etica, la politica, Turin, Rosenberg & Sellier, 2008, p. 69.
119  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 78–79. This is not to say that beliefs are the 
only motivationally capable aspects of human agency. Desires can also play a motivational 
role. 
120  Ibidem. 
121  C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, p. 71; C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 128. 
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of the physical world. Rain gives rise to a reason that counts in favor of 
bringing an umbrella, but rain, while it grounds the latter, is not a reason 
in itself. The relation between rain and bringing the umbrella is the actual 
reason. At the same time, reasons are not psychological, either. They do not 
correspond to a certain psychological state of mind. I might really want to 
use my new umbrella, but if it is not raining, there is no reason for me to use 
it. Nonetheless, reasons are real. Precisely, they are the links between some 
features of the physical or the psychological world and the possible actions 
of an agent. This is why Larmore defines this peculiar relation as normative 
in kind, or better, reasons are not considered physical or psychological but 
normative facts122. As we have seen, it is a sort of fact that entails a certain 
course of action. If I have a reason to pay someone back, then I ought to do 
so. The existence of a reason comes with its normativity. It would be correct 
to consider Larmore an externalist who agrees with Bernard Williams’ 
understanding that “there is a reason for A to φ” as external rather than the 
opposing internal view that “A has a reason to φ”123. It is thus not surprising 
how this view of reasons as not having physical or psychological features in 
themselves (while relationally dependent on them) expresses a sort of “soft” 
platonism. While Larmore does not refer to a platonic dimension of the 
forms, he in fact claims that «[reasons] constitute an intrinsically normative 
order of reality, irreducible to the physical or psychological facts»124. Reasons 
form a peculiar part of reality (one that is often neglected)—the normative 
domain.
Given this understanding of the faculty of Reason as “responsiveness to 
reasons” and the conception of moral reasons as normative facts, it appears 
clear how Larmore’s moral rationalism entails two further negative claims. 
Briefly, these are a) a critique of the Kantian understanding of the ethics of 
autonomy and b) a critique of naturalism, the metaphysical position that 
limits reality to what natural sciences study. 
What Larmore criticizes about a typically Kantian approach to ethics is 
the conception of human freedom intended as the self-legislation of Reason125. 
122  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, ibidem.
123  See ivi, p. 126.
124  Ivi, p. 129.
125  Larmore’s critique of autonomy (intended as the Kantian Autonomie) is the core argument 
of The Autonomy of Morality. Moreover, it is an issue extensively covered in C. Larmore, A. 
Reanut, Débat sur l”Éthique. Idéalisme ou réalisme, Paris, Éditions Grasset & Fasquelle, 2004. 
See also C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, pp. 69–71.
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Reason is not a faculty that constitutes its own reasons for action and that 
involves a moral agent who ought to conform to the moral law by virtue 
of this self-legislation (as Kant believes). Rather, Reason is the faculty that 
performs the role of recognizing those reasons that we consider good and 
exist apart from the agent. In this sense, morality is something autonomous, 
and its authority is not granted by the agent’s self-legislation. This does not 
mean that Larmore criticizes the understanding of autonomy intended as 
the necessity for a moral agent to recognize moral reasons apart from any 
influence from the other agents or from an institution126. What he claims is 
that the foundation of ethics is not necessarily the self-legislating Reason; 
rather, morality is something that is impossible to conceive from outside or 
in a sort of pre-moral stage. Morality is something we live in and that makes 
sense in its own terms and speaks for itself once we are confronted with 
it. Morality constitutes the appreciation of a certain dimension of reality, 
rather than founding our own reasons for action apart from the empirical 
dimension (as Kantian ethics typically entail). This is why Larmore wants to 
shift our attention from the Kantian “ethics of autonomy” (the morality of 
self-legislation) to the “autonomy of morality” (a morality that can only be 
recognized as the domain of the moral agent). Briefly, Larmore states:
The ethics of autonomy needs to be jettisoned, and in its stead belongs 
what I have called the autonomy of morality – by which I mean, 
obviously enough, not that morality is self-legislating (that would 
be nonsensical), but that morality forms an autonomous, irreducible 
domain of value, into which we cannot reason ourselves from without, 
but which we must simply acknowledge127.
As it appears clear, the whole idea of morality that Larmore offers is deeply 
grounded on a more general issue—the criticism of naturalism. Indeed, 
the conception of Reason as responsive to reasons, the idea of reasons as 
normative facts, and the critique of Kantian autonomy all rely on a clear 
metaphysical point. Specifically, reality is broader than the totality of physical 
and psychological facts, it is not normatively mute, and as such, it cannot 
be understood as naturalism is. Only the understanding of reality as having 
a normative dimension (different from the physical and the psychological 
ones) makes possible a conception of Reason as responsiveness to reasons. 
This faculty intends that a moral reason be something that needs to be 
126  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 111.
127  Ivi, p. 122.
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acknowledged in the normative dimension of reality, rather than being 
grounded on the self-legislation of an agent.
Naturalism, the metaphysical position that has dominated modern 
thought, is the major view responsible for a morality that does not allow any 
conception of moral reasons as part of the real world. A broader conception 
of reality that takes into consideration its normative dimension is ultimately 
capable of affirming the autonomy of morality. Nevertheless, the normative 
dimension (the dimension of reasons), being concerned with the relation 
(“counting in favor of”) between some facts of the world and the possible 
acts of the agent, greatly depends on the other dimensions. Without the 
physical and the psychological dimensions, there would be no normative 
dimension, either. If it is not raining, I would have no reason to bring an 
umbrella but a reason not to do so. The normative dimension then strictly 
depends on how the facts are in the other two dimensions. Nevertheless, 
the fact that reasons are present, whether or not the agent recognizes them, 
leaves no doubt about their being part of a non-naturalistic conception of 
reality. The fact that I do not realize that it is raining does not mean that I do 
not have a reason to take an umbrella. Reality is broader than what we are 
naturalistically aware of, and this comprehensive understanding of reality 
includes the normative dimension of reasons that exist independently of the 
agent.
Finally, this metaethical background is functional in the definition of the 
moral perspective in general. Larmore identifies the moral standpoint as the 
ability of seeing another’s good in itself as a reason for action128. Morality 
means acting for the good of another without any interest other than this 
fact. The interest in another’s good becomes so basic (as in the case of my 
own personal good) that it does not require any further justification. Thus, 
the moral perspective brings about the following understanding of morality:
Morality consists in seeing in another’s good a demand on our 
attention that is as direct, as unmediated by ulterior considerations, as 
the concern we naturally feel for our own. The ability to look beyond 
our own interests, whatever they may be, and to take an interest in 
another’s good simply because it is his or hers – that is the essence of 
moral thinking129.
128  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 73–74 and pp. 88–89; C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, 
p. 28 and pp. 65–66; C. Larmore, Reflection and Morality, «Social Philosophy and Policy», 
XXVII (2), 2010, pp. 8ff.
129  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, pp. 73–74. 
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Larmore points out that the biblical maxim “love thy neighbor as thyself”130 
expresses well this moral attitude toward others. The reason why this maxim 
becomes important for a moral perspective of this kind is its unmediated 
character and spontaneity in pursuing the good of another. This fact is a 
sufficient reason to act morally, and most importantly, not something we 
can understand from an external standpoint. Indeed, we do not come to 
appreciate the others’ good due to a sound argumentation in its favor (from 
outside a moral perspective, so to say). Morality directly places its demands 
on an agent who acknowledges the importance of others’ good, apart from 
his or her personal interests and desires. In this sense, “morality speaks for 
itself”; the moral point of view also appears clear and unmediated131. Once 
we recognize a moral reason for action, we are already reflecting from the 
moral perspective. 
Now that I have delineated the bigger metaethical picture, I can analyze 
Larmore’s position about the structure of a normative system. Specifically, 
how does this metaethical background manage at a normative level the 
moral complexity that we have seen as typical of our moral experience? In 
Patterns of Moral Complexity132, Larmore offers an interesting interpretation 
of a moral system and ultimately, of how moral reasoning works. As I 
have tried to highlight in Chapter 1, moral experience is characterized by 
a multitude of sources and dynamics that are further complicated by the 
circumstances in which the action takes place. While acknowledging this 
fact, Larmore does not give up the very possibility of moral theorizing, as 
other authors have done in the past133. He highlights three understandings of 
moral complexity, that is, three aspects in which morality (and consequently, 
political philosophy) needs to exceed the traditional and inappropriate 
130  Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 19:19, 22:39; Mark 12:31; James 2:8. Larmore rightly stresses that 
this maxim is quite different from the well-known golden rule (“Treat the others as you 
would like the others to treat yourself”). In fact, this entails a sort of reciprocity between the 
agent and the subject of his or her actions. Larmore’s critique of the Hobbesian approach 
attacks this aspect as an untenable moral perspective. C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, 
pp. 76–79.
131  «When we acknowledge the authority of moral claims, despite the allure of contrary 
desires and independently of appeals to our own interests, we are commonly said to be 
listening to our conscience. The call of conscience is in this sense none other than morality 
speaking for itself, and that is why it stands in need of no higher validation», ivi, p. 105.
132  C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987.
133  For example, see B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, London and New York, 
Routledge, 2011.
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theoretical oversimplifications134: a) the essential role of moral judgment in 
the exercise of virtue, b) the liberal ideal of political neutrality, and c) the 
heterogeneity of the sources of morality. I now want to focus on the third 
dimension135.
It has been said that morality speaks for itself in showing its intrinsic 
authority and importance. Additionally (and more importantly), «If 
morality speaks for itself, it does not always speak with a single voice»136. 
This is an important truth to be recognized; morality comprises a realm of 
irreducible values coming from different sources. This is the reason why 
they eventually come into conflict, generating the so-called moral dilemmas. 
Larmore highlights three different principles that characterize our moral 
experience and make morality essentially complex. A moral principle is a 
tool for deciding on the morally good thing to do, which guides our action 
accordingly. Moreover, a moral principle gains its authority as long as a) it is 
rational, that is, we have good reasons (recognized by the faculty of Reason) 
to endorse and accept it137, and b) it reflects a specific and irreducible way 
of moral reasoning138. By virtue of these two aspects, the three principles of 
morality are identified from the moral standpoint; they constitute what we, as 
moral agents, take to be morally relevant. If we look at our moral experience, 
we realize how these principles are equally important and irreducible to one 
another. Specifically, we distinguish139 among the following aspects:
a) “The principle of partiality” points out those obligations that arise 
from the respect for an agent’s particular desires or special relations with 
others. 
b) “The principle of consequentialism” requires that we do whatever 
will produce the most good or the least evil overall. 
c) “The principle of deontology” demands that we never do things of a 
certain sort to others.
These three principles primarily differ in kind. The first principle is clearly 
concerned with the empirically relevant aspects of an agent’s moral life. If 
a friend of mine were in need of my help, I would feel that I ought to act 
134  C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 151. 
135  I will deal with the other constitutively moral issue (the fundamental role of moral 
judgment) in the next section of this chapter.
136  C. Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality, p. 88.
137  Ivi, p. 109.
138  C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, p. 37.
139  C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, pp. 132–134; C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, p. 37.
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in a certain way, specifically so by virtue of our relationship. This sort of 
partiality constitutes this kind of obligation. In contrast, the principles of 
consequentialism and deontology are universal (or “impartial”), that is, they 
support categorical obligations. A categorical obligation is one that applies 
independently from empirically conditioned desires. 
Furthermore, to highlight their differences, it would be helpful to 
refer to a terminological distinction that I have introduced in Chapter I—
methodological pluralism and axiological pluralism. It appears clear how the 
three principles differ in the ways that they determine the morally right thing 
to do. They are methodologically different. The principle of partiality takes 
care of our specific affections, the principle of consequentialism examines the 
outcome of our acts, and the principle of deontology is concerned with the 
nature of our acts. In explaining why we have specifically three principles, 
Larmore points out that they express three different and irreducible kinds of 
moral reasoning. An interesting explanation of this picture of how morality 
works is that they reflect three different kinds of relations in which we 
possibly stand with others140. Partiality is based on our special relationships 
with those who share our interests, commitments, and affections. This 
sort of relation generates a series of sui generis moral requirements. For 
example, think of the moral dimension of parenthood and friendship. These 
obligations are such by virtue of the fact that my friend Bob is exactly Bob. 
These relations are not special because they are necessarily better, from a 
moral perspective, than other kinds of relations. They are special because 
they are not established with anybody else. Differently, other moral relations 
are not based on the fact that we relate with particular individuals but 
because we relate with fellow human beings as such. This way of treating 
others impartially can be expressed in two ways: by consequentialist and 
deontological means. According to Larmore, once we acknowledge that the 
others have their own good, which deserves to be pursued, we ought to 
treat them in a consequentialist way, trying to bring about the most good 
(or least evil) possible. Nevertheless, this is not the only way of treating 
others by virtue of our respect for their own good. At the same time, we 
would act in such a way that we would treat or never treat them in a certain 
manner. This typically deontological way of behaving means caring for the 
others’ rights that we would regard in a certain way. By virtue of the respect 
for others’ good as such, a moral agent has some obligations (generated by 
140  C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, p. 38.
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the correspondence with certain rights) that ought to be respected. Another 
famous distinction between consequentialism and deontology, explained 
in terms of relations, is introduced by Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit141. 
While deontology is understood as providing agent-relative reasons (where 
the reference to the agent is fundamental), consequentialism provides 
agent-neutral reasons (which are true besides any reference to the agent). 
However, according to Larmore, the distinction expressed in these terms 
fails to recognize that consequentialism also entails a certain reference to 
the agent of the act. Namely, «just as I have a (deontological) duty to give 
you the book if I promised to do so, so I have a (consequentialist) duty to 
relieve your pain if I am the one best able to do so»142. The relativity of 
the agent, rather than distinguishing between the two approaches, is what 
assimilates them. Both point out the importance of seeing the others’ good 
as valuable in itself and as related to the agent. This is an essential feature of 
the moral point of view.
This is what Larmore intends by the “heterogeneity of morality”—the fact 
that moral reasoning is not uniform but fundamentally varies. Moreover, he 
claims that this heterogeneity is not governed by a precise order or a strict 
priority of a principle over another (as a sort of Rawlsian lexical order). This 
makes Larmore a moral pluralist to the full extent; moral sources, while 
heterogeneous, cannot be ordered a priori but gain their priority according 
to the situation. Obviously, this does not exclude the possibility that different 
sources lead to different directions. Indeed, as pluralist systems usually 
entail, moral conflict is possible by virtue of the multiplicity of the sources 
and their non-prioritization. We might add that a moral dilemma, in the 
Larmorian understanding of a moral system, is the conflict between two 
ways of moral reasoning. It is easy to find examples of the clash between the 
principles of consequentialism and deontology in our everyday life. The first 
way of facing such conflicts is the suspension of judgment, waiting for further 
information that might explain away the conflict. If this is not possible or is 
simply not the case, it will highlight the potential non-eliminability of moral 
dilemmas. This fact reveals an interesting truth of morality:
So when we find that heeding both sorts of ultimate moral commitments 
is at odds with the way the world is, when we cannot do what they 
141 See footnote 29. For an analysis of the difference between the two impartial ways of 
morally treating others, see C. Larmore, The Patterns of Moral Complexity, pp. 144–150.
142 Ivi, p. 146. 
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tell us we ought to do, we cannot entertain revising their authority 
or suspending judgment. We have to live with the fact that we have 
obligations we cannot honor. Our possibilities in the world are then 
too narrow for what we know we ought to do143.
What I have called methodological pluralism is Larmore’s main concern 
when explaining the heterogeneity of morality. Morality is characterized 
by three different sorts of moral reasoning, all equally valid, important, 
and irreducible to one another. Nonetheless, I think that we can emphasize 
some further aspects of moral complexity in terms of what I have named 
axiological pluralism. In other words, the sources of morality not only differ 
in how they arrive at determining the right thing to do, but they also differ 
in why they do so. For example, a typically consequentialist approach is 
concerned with the general outcome of acting by virtue of caring for 
human flourishing. Humanity as a whole deserves to live well (live happily 
according to certain traditions), and acting morally means improving 
this status. In contrast, deontology claims that certain acts can never be 
performed (or omitted) out of respect for others’ freedom144. This means that 
acting morally means caring for the status of a fellow human being as such. 
Differently, the principle of partiality underlines the moral relevance of our 
special affections toward others and our particularistic desires. As such, 
this principle works by virtue of the importance of individual flourishing. 
In sum, the three principles are concerned with different morally relevant 
aspects of our lives. At the same time, claiming that all three are valid and 
indispensable parts of our lives means that the good is represented by a 
variety of values that we have to acknowledge. By virtue of all these, two 
Larmorian mottos appear decisive and incisive: “morality is heterogeneous”, 
and “morality does not speak in a single voice”. Nevertheless, heterogeneity 
might be a misleading term145 if understood as undermining the unity of 
morality. Indeed, while morality is expressed in different ways, it remains 
143 Ivi, p. 150.
144  In a certain sense, this means respecting others’ autonomy. I do not refer to the Kantian 
notion of the self-legislation of moral Reason (Autonomie) as criticized by Larmore. The 
contemporary widespread understanding of the autonomy of the moral agent refers to 
the fact that he or she has the opportunity to deliberate, free from any influence of others 
(whether an institution, an ideology, or another person). In this sense, autonomy means that 
a moral agent is free to deliberate and to make his or her moral choices. Larmore’s criticism 
does not involve this second understanding of autonomy. See C. Larmore, Dare Ragioni, pp. 
69–70.
145  C. Larmore, Reflection and Morality, p. 25.
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one and unified. Although undoubtedly, a Larmorian system of morality is 
a clear example of moral pluralism, a further characterization needs to be 
highlighted. In fact, this pluralistic system and the three related principles 
of morality reflect a distinct attitude; moral goodness springs from a unique 
moral standpoint. In other words, they are all different and equally plausible 
ways of seeing in another’s good a reason for action. While the morally 
right thing to do can be achieved through different paths, moral goodness 
is unique. Normatively, this system is characterized by the pluralism of the 
right and a sort of monism of the good. The different moral sources share the 
same starting point, the consideration of the others’ good from the moral 
point of view. In this sense, Larmore’s pluralism can be more precisely 
identified as the heterogeneity of the sources of a single good rather than a 
specific pluralism of values. While it is true that morality does not speak in 
a single voice, the speaker is always the same one. While the sources of the 
good are manifold and different in kind, they all form the basis of the same 
good. By virtue of all these aspects, Larmore affirms that the greatest mistake 
of monistic theories has been the belief of being exclusive, at the level of 
the right (a claim that I fully share). On the contrary, instead of believing 
in the exclusive validity of a single principle, we need to acknowledge the 
existence of different kinds of moral reasoning. At a normative level, this 
approach of moral complexity is well summarized by this passage:
Finally, instead of supposing that the structure of morality must 
be in the end either deontological or consequentialist, and instead 
of assuming that either all or none of our moral obligations are 
categorical, we should recognize that the ultimate sources of moral 
value are not one, but many146.
As it has been said, morality does not speak in a single voice.
2.3 Facing Complexity with Less Hardship: The Role of Moral 
Judgment in Moral Justification
First of all, some terminological distinctions are required. As we have 
seen, practical Reason is the faculty that acknowledges the existing reasons 
to act in a certain way. However, morality is not straightforwardly the mere 
acknowledgment of what rules and principles point out (as some of the 
146  C. Larmore, The Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 151.
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monistic traditions tend to claim). While it might happen that a principle or 
a rule tells us exactly what to do according to the underlying reasons, most 
of the times, this is simply not the case. Morality is much more than a hard 
science whose results are precise and reproducible. It is a subject that requires 
a certain degree of interpretation and reflection for a proper application, 
and this sort of operations involves the faculty of moral judgment. It is one 
thing to know and acknowledge that we have reasons to do x (the role of 
practical Reason); it is another matter to know how to bring about x (the 
role of moral judgment). Sometimes, the given circumstances require almost 
no need for judgment; for example, you have promised to buy your child ice 
cream, and you are now in front of an ice cream parlor. Other cases are much 
more complex than this. For instance, think of a case where your friends 
have been so kind as to organize a surprise birthday party for you. You 
certainly acknowledge that you have good reasons to show gratitude, but 
the question is to understand how to do so adequately. Should you simply 
say “thank you” or buy everybody a round of drinks? The cases where we 
ought to express gratitude, courage, generosity, and similar moral virtues 
require a certain degree of moral judgment. Thus, moral judgment does 
not have the same role as that of practical Reason. Aristotle has been the 
forerunner of this understanding of moral judgment (φρόνησιϛ)147. Whoever 
expresses mastery in the use of moral judgment is considered wise. In Book 
VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, we read: 
On the subject of wisdom, we may get what we need once we have 
considered who it is that we call “wise”. Well, it is thought characteristic 
of a wise person to be able to deliberate well about the things that are 
good and advantageous to himself, not in specific contexts, e.g. what 
sorts of things conduce to health, or to physical strength, but what 
sorts of things conduce to the good life in general. An indication of 
this is that we also call those in a specific field wise if they succeed in 
calculating well towards some specific worthy end on matters where 
no exact technique applies. So in fact the description “wise” belongs in 
general to the person who is good at deliberation148.
Moreover, moral judgment differs from systematic knowledge (e.g., the hard 
sciences) or technical expertise (e.g., craftsmanship):
147  Here, I consider the translation of φρόνησιϛ as “moral judgment”, although it has also been 
translated as “practical wisdom” or “prudence”. I prefer “judgment” because it better entails 
the deliberation process typical of φρόνησιϛ.
148  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1140 a24–a33, in S. Broadie (ed.), C. Rowe (ed. and trans.), 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
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It remains therefore for it [φρόνησιϛ] to be a true disposition 
accompanied by rational prescription, relating to action in the sphere 
of what is good and bad for human beings149.
By virtue of this understanding of the function of moral judgment, we 
can conclude that it plays a major role in moral justification, that is, the 
actualization and the application of a moral reason to action. Judgment is 
not necessarily the source of the justification in itself, since practical Reason 
is the faculty that highlights the existing moral reasons. Nevertheless, as 
I have emphasized in the previous section, morality does not speak in a 
single voice, and listening to it might be puzzling and disheartening at 
times. Here, moral judgment plays a fundamental role in determining which 
of the available sources of morality is responsible for the identification of 
moral reasons. Moreover, moral judgment is responsible of the application 
of reasons to action. In general, moral judgment is the faculty of moral 
interpretation, whether it is the comprehension of how to apply a reason 
to action or the discernment between conflicting moral sources. As I will 
point out later, in a complex moral system, the latter feature is especially 
important.
At this point, I have already sketched three fundamental features 
of moral judgment: a) It is always rendered in the context of a particular 
moral experience150. b) It deals with the interpretation of moral principles 
or generally, of moral reasons. c) It is essential for the identification of the 
relevant moral source and for its application (moral justification). Let us 
analyze these three features in further detail.
Moral judgment is a faculty that needs to be exercised in experience. 
This claim is fully in line with the Aristotelian understanding of φρόνησιϛ. 
Moral agency is undertaken in the experience of our moral lives; as such, 
moral judgment is the faculty entitled to reconsider each particular case 
in order to deliberate on the right thing to do. Moral agency cannot be 
determined a priori once and for all151. This feature of morality has often been 
149  Ivi, 1140 b5–b7.
150  It does not need to be the actual or present situation. When we reflect on what to do 
morally, we picture ourselves in some potential scenario to understand what we would do. 
In this regard, in Chapter I, I have discussed Mandelbaum’s removed moral judgments.  
151  «[…] things in the sphere of action and things that bring advantage have nothing stable 
about them, any more than things that bring health. But if what one says universally is like 
this, what one says about particulars is even more lacking in precision; for it does not fall 
either under any expertise or under any set of rules – the agents themselves have to consider 
the circumstances relating to the occasion, just as happens in the case of medicine, too, and 
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neglected by many philosophical traditions; for this reason, it represents 
one of the aspects where Larmore highlights the need for a more complex 
vision. Since morality is inevitably characterized by experience, we need to 
reassign the leading role of practical Reason and moral judgment. Larmore’s 
“soft platonism” about the nature of moral reasons underlines the non-
eliminability of experience from any discussion about the nature of morality. 
Reason is the faculty that acknowledges reasons from how matters stand in a 
non-naturalistic conception of reality (not limited to the attention of natural 
sciences). As such, Reason reads experience. Similarly, moral judgment is a 
faculty that is exercised in the experience and developed through practice in 
the experience152. This is the “Aristotelian insight” of the first dimension of 
moral complexity; we need to reestablish the centrality of moral judgment 
as it responds to the peculiarities of the given situation153.
What is the role of moral judgment? I have briefly highlighted that 
another relevant feature of this faculty is that it deals with moral principles 
and more generally, with moral reasons. Nevertheless, it would be reductive 
to talk of judgment as the faculty that merely identifies what rules and 
principles point out154. Although sometimes, rules and principles suffice by 
themselves to pinpoint the right thing to do, most of the cases present a 
much more complex scenario. We have already analyzed how cases such as 
being grateful might confront the agent with a scenario that requires much 
more than the acknowledgment of the moral reasons for showing gratitude. 
Even if the agent recognizes the reasons to be grateful, how shall gratitude 
be realized successfully? Judgment is thus the faculty that deals with rules, 
principles, and generally, moral reasons, and it is concerned with their 
satisfactory application155. As Larmore emphasizes, this is the centrality of 
moral judgment that we need to reestablish if we want to take into account 
of navigation», Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1104 a5–a10. 
152  Remember that for Aristotle, moral judgment is a faculty that is not given but developed 
through education and examples from the community of the polis. See Aristotle, Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1179 b30f. 
153  «Reacting against what he perceived to be Plato’s belief that virtue consists solely in 
the knowledge of general principles, Aristotle protested that moral action depends on the 
exercise of judgment in applying these principles to particular circumstances. Judgment 
itself, he stressed, is not an activity governed by general rules; instead it must always respond 
to the peculiarities of the given situation», C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 15.
154  The main philosophical traditions in moral philosophy have had the tendency to reduce 
the role of judgment to a mere auxiliary of rules and principles. See ivi, p. 5.
155  Ivi, p. 7.
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the complexity of our moral experience. In a clear Aristotelian spirit, taking 
care of the application of a rule means being aware that the expression of 
virtue consists of avoiding any excessive or deficient behavior156. This sort 
of operation requires an understanding of moral judgment (φρόνησιϛ) as the 
faculty that manages the application of moral reasons. It is interesting to note 
how this understanding of judgment resembles the concept of fittingness 
that is central to Mandelbaum’s phenomenological view. As analyzed in 
Chapter I, fittingness is the relation between an appropriate course of action 
and the end that the agent is pursuing157. I believe that the ability to bring 
about this sort of relation is precisely the role of the faculty of judgment. If 
I recognize that I have a reason to do x and this reason does not come with 
enough evidence of what I have to do to fulfill it, moral judgment comes in 
and tries to establish a relation of fittingness between what I have to do and 
the course of action that would satisfy this need. Here, I want to highlight 
again how moral judgment is the faculty of moral interpretation, that is, it is 
responsible for interpreting the situation and understanding which course 
of action fits it, according to the agent’s moral reasons. In this sense, the 
activity of judgment goes beyond what rules and principles strictly tell us 
by trying to understand how to adjust them and make them effective in the 
given circumstances158.
Finally, a further feature of moral judgment that needs to be underlined 
is a particularly relevant aspect when we consider the moral justification 
of an act (especially within a complex moral system). It appears clear how 
moral judgment in a complex system plays at least a twofold role. I have 
previously stressed the first one; once practical Reason has done its job by 
acknowledging the existing moral reasons, moral judgment is in charge 
of applying them to the situation. This application might require a greater 
or lesser role of judgment according to how much the reasons are explicit 
about what to do. However, in a pluralist system, the agent might happen 
to have more than a single reason to act, and on top of that, these reasons 
might eventually come into conflict. I think that in the situation of a conflict 
156  This is an operation that requires some adjustments. «This much, then, shows that the 
intermediate disposition is to be praised in all circumstances, but that one should sometimes 
incline towards excess, sometimes towards deficiency; for in this way we shall most easily 
hit upon what is intermediate, and good in practice», Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109 
b24–27. 
157  M. Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, p. 64.
158  C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, pp. 8–9.
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between reasons, we can identify the second role of moral judgment—
adjudicating which of the different sources of morality has to be finally 
considered. Larmore himself acknowledges this further role of judgment:
Of course, we do possess higher-order moral principles such as utility, 
or Kantian universalizability, one of whose tasks is to adjudicate moral 
conflicts. But many times the verdicts rendered by these higher-order 
principles for a particular case diverge, and then – because there are 
no higher rules to be invoked and because no absolute ranking of 
these principles is plausible – judgment may have to direct us how to 
choose159.
This understanding of moral judgment guarantees that even if the situation 
becomes increasingly complex and conflicting, we do not need to give up the 
opportunity to grasp a reasonable decision. Once we abandon the idea of a 
monistic structure of morality in favor of a pluralistic framework, we realize 
that moral conflict is a recurring phenomenon in our moral experience. 
Although not all conflicts are solvable (some become dilemmatic indeed), 
moral judgment can guide us through the heterogeneous world of morality160.
The question of moral justification is a focal one for a pluralist system. 
The issue becomes even more pressing in the resolution of moral conflicts 
(something that pluralist systems frequently face). As I have underlined 
in Chapter I, the difficulty of a clear-cut procedure for moral justification 
represents the major criticism that supporters of moral monism raise against 
pluralists. The argument is if we have to abandon the unique moral standard 
that makes moral commensurability possible, how do we adjudicate conflicts? 
I believe that the best answer to this problem is broadening our idea of the 
reasonable resolution of a conflict. When no further consideration can be 
drawn from our moral reasons in order to resolve the conflict, it does not 
necessarily mean that what we decide to do161 is irrational or arbitrary. Once 
we arrive at the point of a moral conflict, moral judgment can still provide a 
reasonable choice about what to do. However, the only way to accommodate 
this point is to broaden our idea of what makes a moral act the outcome of a 
reasonable deliberation. In this terms, moral deliberation cannot be strictly 
conceived as the outcome of moral reasons because sometimes, this is not 
possible due to their coming into conflict. When this occurs, moral judgment 
159  Ivi, p. 9.
160  Ivi, pp. 10–11.
161  This applies granted that we ultimately need to act and cannot benefit from the suspension 
of judgment.
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plays a fundamental role. Nagel shares this idea of the reasonable resolution 
of moral conflicts: 
The fact that one cannot say why a certain decision is the correct one, 
given a particular balance of conflicting reasons, does not mean that 
the claim to correctness is meaningless. […] What makes this possible 
is judgment – essentially the faculty Aristotle described as practical 
wisdom, which reveals itself over time in individual decisions rather 
than in the enunciation of general principles. It will not always yield 
a solution: there are true practical dilemmas that have no solution, 
and there are also conflicts so complex that judgment cannot operate 
confidently. But in many cases it can be relied on to take up the slack 
that remains beyond the limits of explicit rational argument162. 
We need to push rational deliberation as far as possible, but once we become 
involved in a moral conflict, we do not need to give up the possibility of 
identifying a reasonable course of action. In these cases, judgment is the 
only viable option left to arrive at a reasonable decision when the situation 
complicates the tradeoffs between different moral sources. 
The peculiar aspect of judgment is that it is a faculty that needs to be 
developed through time and experience. For this reason, Aristotle underlines 
the importance of education and habituation of the youth, who need to live 
in a society that nurtures their moral character163. We are used to saying that 
with experience, we become wiser and it becomes easier for us to find a moral 
justification of our acts. The complexity of morality might be discouraging 
at times, but judgment facilitates facing it but does not necessarily make it 
easy. This allows us to manage complexity with less hardship; the work of 
a qualified and experienced faculty of moral judgment can guide the agent 
through the adversities of moral experience164.
In sum, moral justification in a complex moral system is granted by 
the combined work of two faculties (practical Reason and moral judgment) 
in a three-step process: 1) Practical Reason acknowledges the existing 
moral reasons from the moral perspective. 2) Moral judgment picks the 
162  T. Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, pp. 134–135.
163  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179 b30f.
164  In this regard, I think that we can find many interesting insights in moral exemplarism. 
In particular, the work of Linda Zagzebski appears very promising to me. See L.T. Zagzebski, 
Exemplarist Moral Theory, New York, Oxford University Press, 2017. I have focused on the 
role of moral exemplarism in our moral judgment in S. Grigoletto, Facing Moral Complexity. 
The Role of Moral Excellence in Guiding Moral Judgment, «Teoria», XXXIX (2), 2019, pp. 239–
258. 
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most relevant source of morality by interpreting the situation. 3) Moral 
judgement defines the most efficient application of the reasons to the given 
circumstances. While the acknowledgment of moral reasons delivered by 
practical Reason is obligatory (otherwise, we would be unable to reflect 
from the moral standpoint), the dual role of judgment is optional. Moral 
reasons can sometimes be straightforwardly clear about what to do and why 
it should be done; thus, there is no further need for the moral interpretation 
provided by judgment. In the same way, if moral reasons happen to be clear 
about the course of action that needs to be undertaken, there would be no 
conflict among the sources of morality, and the interpretive role of judgment 
would be unnecessary. On the contrary, sometimes, the situation might be 
so complex that the agent would face a true moral dilemma, making moral 
judgment useless. 
The approach of moral complexity entails the acknowledgment of how 
a suitable moral framework requires the centrality of moral judgment in 
the justificatory process. This approach does not make morality a subject 
that merely governs human agency with a set of rules deliberated a priori. 
Morality springs from the combined work of different faculties and the 
interpretation of the heterogeneous sources of morality. This process is 
something that necessarily takes place in our everyday moral experience.
PART II:  
SUPEREROGATION IN NORMATIVE ETHICS:  
DEFINITION, JUSTIFICATION,  
AND NEW PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER III 
SUPEREROGATION: WHY, WHAT, AND HOW
3.1 Why Supererogation?
In this second part, I focus primarily on the analysis of some of the 
major problems related to the concept of supererogation. As it will hopefully 
become clear at the end, the reason for this shift in the argument is that 
supererogation exemplifies well the complexity typical of morality. In this 
way, I define supererogation as a complex concept that can be successfully 
supported by a complex system. As such, in the present work, supererogation 
and moral complex systems stand on an interdependent and mutual relation. 
I take supererogation as a good expression of the ultimately complex 
nature of moral thought and at the same time, a moral complex system as 
the framework that better satisfies the requirements of the justification of 
the concept of supererogation. Most importantly, both the concept and the 
system rely on a preliminary assumption; moral complexity is something 
given in the phenomenological analysis of our moral experience. From the 
phenomenological perspective, the moral life of the regular agent appears 
heterogeneous and fragmented. Consequently, pluralism appears to be the 
normative structure that better acknowledges this complexity. Likewise, 
supererogation represents a complex concept that further expresses such 
complexity.
I have already dedicated the first part of this work to the analysis of the 
need for a complex moral system. It is now worthwhile to briefly explain the 
necessity of a moral category such as supererogation. For now, it is enough 
to broadly conceive a supererogatory act as morally good but not morally 
required. Supererogation is thus the category of the good that stands above 
(or beyond) the category of the morally obligatory. Therefore, why would 
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we need such a category? In her well-known article165, Susan Wolf argues 
that moral perfection is not the proper ultimate moral goal. Perfection in 
the moral sphere (or “moral sainthood” as Wolf calls it) prevents the agent 
from benefiting from several other valuable things in life. Briefly, this is the 
main argument: if a woman dedicates her entire existence to morality, it will 
be impossible for her to appreciate many other valuable non-moral things 
in life. If taken to the extreme, morality prevents the agent from living a 
valuable life because it annihilates the possibilities of benefiting from other 
goods. For example, a man who devotes his time entirely to feeding the 
hungry will surely not spend much time learning how to play the piano 
or reading an enjoyable novel166. This limitation of the other non-moral 
aspects of life can negatively affect the overall consideration of what living 
a good life is. The life of a moral saint will lack many non-moral valuable 
aspects that, according to common sense, constitute a life lived well. It is 
not simply the fact that a moral saint will miss some important aspects 
of a well-rounded life. The point is that those deprivations will concern 
something valuable (although not from a moral point of view); the moral 
saint will be deficient in some valuable aspect of life167. Moreover, according 
to Wolf, something is particularly problematic with this constitutively moral 
extremism. She claims that while every sort of idealistic extremism might 
entail some sacrifice in other aspects of life, the moral saint represents a 
case where these deprivations are brought about in a questionable way. We 
might think that someone who devotes his or her entire life to becoming the 
greatest pianist on earth or to breaking the world record on the 100-meter 
dash would incur the same sort of deficits in several valuable aspects of 
his or her life. Accordingly, any sort of extremism of a single value would 
appear to be as problematic as the case of the moral saint168. However, Wolf 
emphasizes how the most problematic features of value extremism are typical 
of the moral saint169: a) Different from other sorts of extremisms, the moral 
saint seems to give up many valuable things, not by virtue of a personal 
choice (such as in the case of the musician or the Olympic athlete) but by 
virtue of a moral imperative (and thus perceived as an external constraint). 
b) The aspects of life that the moral saint gives up are not neglected as a 
165  S. Wolf, Moral Saints, «The Journal of Philosophy», LXXIX (8), 1982, pp. 418–439.
166  Ivi, p. 421.
167  Ivi, p. 426.
168  Ivi, p. 423.
169  Ivi, pp. 423–424. 
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result of a tradeoff but because it seems that the saint lacks some sort of 
ability to perceive and recognize their value. Let me further explain these 
two points. Wolf thinks that if our ultimate concern is always moral, it will 
result in the loss of value (or the incapability of recognizing it) of any non-
moral good. As such, always picking the moral good over the other non-
moral goods is not the consequence of a tradeoff between fully recognized 
values. All non-moral values (by virtue of the espousal of moral perfection 
as the ultimate standard) are not values in the end. Then, the moral saint 
is not someone who chooses what to do but someone who listens to an 
imperative (the only kind of value allowed) about what one needs to do. As 
such, the moral saint’s perspective is undesirable. In this specific problem of 
the moral saint, I disagree with Wolf. I believe that the relevant objection to 
moral perfection is that any extreme of a single value (be it moral or non-
moral) will generate a loss in the achievement of other values and will thus 
jeopardize the well-roundedness of the single person. It might be true that 
the exclusive evaluation from the moral standpoint would fail to consider 
many valuable things in life. However, the same applies to the professional 
athlete who considers all the aspects of his or her life from the “athletic” 
point of view, which deems valuable only the things that are functional for 
a better athletic performance. In fact, this leads to cases where athletes use 
performance-enhancing drugs. These athletes simply fail to consider the 
value of things other than those that appear relevant from the “athletic” 
standpoint. Since this specific point of view is the only one that matters, 
the use of performance-enhancing substances appears permissible as long 
as it improves their abilities or speeds up their achievement of certain 
goals. The real problem of this course of action is that such athletes fail to 
consider other points of view (such as the moral one). It seems to me that 
the exclusive consideration of any point of view might lead to the same 
problematic failure of appreciating other values important for the flourishing 
of well-roundedness. This does not seem to be a constitutive moral problem. 
Any extreme might turn out to have bad side effects, although it is not the 
exalted value to be bad in itself. The real problematic fact that is derived 
from these attitudes is the loss of the well-roundedness that is so important 
to the common-sense understanding of a life lived well. It is interesting to 
note here that this idea of well-roundedness of a life lived well resembles the 
Aristotelian conception of a virtuous life. For Aristotle, the expression of a 
virtue is the mean between scarcity and excess of a certain valuable aspect:
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[Moral virtue] is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess 
and the other deficiency, and that it is so because it is such as to aim 
at what is midway in emotions and in actions, has been sufficiently 
stated. That is why it is no easy task to be virtuous. For in everything 
it is no easy task to find the middle170.
A life characterized by some kind of excess (or deficiency) seems to miss 
something valuable. In this respect, I share the central point of Wolf’s 
argument; the extreme of a value (or its maximization at all costs) cannot be 
taken as the ultimate standard of a moral theory. 
However, it is important to emphasize that Wolf does not think that moral 
sainthood is a bad thing in itself; moral saints are extremely praiseworthy 
for the way they conduct their lives. Claiming that moral perfection cannot 
be considered the standard to which we need to conform does not limit the 
possibilities of bringing about the good171. Saying that moral perfection is 
not the most efficient ideal for a life lived well does not mean that from 
the moral point of view, moral sainthood cannot be eventually considered 
praiseworthy. This possibility of evaluation can be explained by the adoption 
of multiple points of view. The moral point of view is not the only one from 
which the agent evaluates. According to Wolf, there is the point of view of 
individual perfection from which we decide what it means to live a good life. 
From this standpoint, morality constitutes a valuable but non-comprehensive 
feature of our lives. In these terms, morality has no priority over other kinds 
of evaluation; the idea of living a life well is shaped by the perfectionist point 
of view and as such, from outside the moral perspective172. The moral point 
of view is not the ultimate evaluative standard, which makes it possible for a 
person to be «perfectly wonderful without being perfectly moral»173.
As I have stated, although I completely agree with Wolf on the 
inadequateness of moral perfection as the ultimate moral standard, I believe 
that she did not give a satisfactory account of how supererogation needs to be 
conceived. The adoption of two different points of view fails to acknowledge 
how supererogation has to be understood as the “moral beyond” from within 
the moral perspective and not merely from without. Let me explain this 
point. Wolf thinks that if one follows all the way through the moral point of 
170  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1109 a21-26, in J. Barnes, A. Kenny (ed.), Aristotle’s Ethics. 
Writings from the Complete Works, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2014.
171  S. Wolf, Moral Saints, p. 432.
172  Ivi, pp. 437–438.
173  Ivi, p. 436.
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view, one can only aim at moral sainthood. If we do not want to be in this 
problematic situation, we need to set aside the moral and evaluate from some 
other alternative all-things-considered point of view. Accordingly, always 
following the moral standpoint becomes the supererogatory thing. However, 
it seems to me that this misses the point, or rather, it leaves halfway done 
the task of playing down the reach of morality in our lives (a task for which 
supererogation has been introduced). I think that we need to understand 
supererogation from within morality in order to redefine the limits of the 
morally obligatory174. Deciding how to live a life well is the ultimate task 
from the moral perspective; there is no need to assign this task to some 
other point of view175. In these terms, we also understand why morality is 
not an external source of constraints (an understanding of morality that 
would betray its nature) but a personal endorsement that leads us to live 
a good and enjoyable life. What Wolf states is that supererogation consists 
of always evaluating from the moral point. This consideration is aimed at 
limiting the reach of morality (at least according to her understanding of the 
moral point of view). However, the proper understanding of the category of 
supererogatory acts tries to highlight how this task can be achieved within 
the moral domain. The moral point of view does not require us to go all the 
way up to moral perfectionism. This would be supererogatory, indeed. This 
concept stands as the very limitation of the forces of bringing about as much 
good as possible. While this would be a praiseworthy course of action, it 
cannot be considered an obligatory one, which is true even from the moral 
point of view.  
Jonathan Dancy presents a similar attack to Wolf’s conception of 
supererogation as based on two distinct points of view (moral and non-
moral). Wolf’s supererogation is a misunderstanding of what this peculiar 
moral concept should represent:
It is not that there can be actions which have the highest moral value 
but which are morally permitted not to perform. Wolf is not a strong 
supererogationist. […] For her, the supererogatory action is one we 
are morally required to perform, but this requirement is not visible 
from the point of view of individual perfection176.
174  This is a task that I will directly try to accomplish in Chapter V.
175  This is not to say that viewpoints that differ from the moral perspective do not exist. The 
point at issue here is that the moral perspective is sufficient for a satisfactory interpretation 
of supererogation and most of all, of what it means to live a life lived well.
176  J. Dancy, Moral Reasons, Hoboken, NJ, Blackwell, 1992, p. 135.
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In these terms, someone who is not on the way to moral sainthood turns out 
to be a defective moral agent from the moral point of view. However, this is a 
major misunderstanding of the role of the concept of supererogation, which 
conversely, wants to acknowledge the fact that someone who is not a saint 
is not necessarily morally defective. Supererogation is the moral category 
of the morally good but optional. Wolf thinks that the optionality relies on 
the espousal of the moral point of view. The supererogatory act is instead 
something whose optionality needs to be understood within the moral 
sphere. There is no need to draw on the existence of two different points of 
view, one inside and one outside morality. As Dancy puts it, there is no need 
to accept a perspective “other than that of morality” to recognize that our 
moral theories do not necessarily aim at the moral perfect life177.
In conclusion, I believe that the concept of supererogation is important 
because it provides our moral theories with a theoretical depth that would 
be problematic to miss. David Heyd beautifully claims that «the good is 
open-ended in a way that the bad is not»178, and I think that taking into 
account this feature of morality means, first and foremost, setting the proper 
space for supererogation. If the morally good has no limits (open-ended) 
and morality places no boundaries to which extent we are obliged to bring 
about moral goodness, our moral systems would always be condemned to 
set never-reaching goals. The concept of supererogation works to prevent 
this from happening. Moral goodness can be approached in (at least) two 
ways. It is one thing to claim that we are required to aim for moral goodness 
to its full extent. This appears as an undesirable outcome of morality. It is 
another matter to hold that morality sets some ideals for which we should 
aspire as much as possible. This seems to be a plausible inclination instead. 
At this point, it should be clear that the issue is the rather popular idea 
that the good needs to be maximized. In fact, if we take moral requirements 
as dealing with the maximization of the good, the life of the moral agent 
would be frustrating at best. If the morally good is open-ended and we are 
required to maximize the good, morality will be transformed into an endless 
run. To avoid this unpleasant scenario, we need to leave some moral room 
for the category of supererogation, thus mitigating the reach of our moral 
177  Ivi, p. 137.
178  «[…] the extremely good cannot be required, but the extremely bad (vicious) is the prime 
target of prohibition», in D. Heyd, Supererogation, E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (winter 2019 edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/
entries/supererogation/>.
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obligations. This operation will ultimately mean clearly distinguishing the 
morally good (open-ended) from the morally right (morally obligatory). 
Thus, supererogation is grounded on the conceptual space granted by the 
distinction between the morally good and the morally right. A theory that 
identifies the good with the right would be too narrow and after all, a truly 
moralistic one. This is the downside of all those theories that conform to the 
motto “good–ought tie-up”. In fact, to avoid the problematic scenario where 
all good things are at the same time obligatory (rather than simply desirable), 
we need to limit the reach of moral obligations. We need a category of morally 
good acts that lies beyond duty; otherwise, moral perfection will become 
the standard to which our theories would need to conform. As someone 
may think, this operation will not reduce the contribution of morality to the 
minimalistic standard of the right. In fact, in this way, morality will still deal 
with the broader category of the morally good but in a different fashion. In 
this regard, moral excellence springs from the agent’s gratuitous caring for 
others, beyond the mere boundaries of the obligatory. This is the true spirit 
of a moral act as perceived from the moral point of view. Reducing the reach 
of the morally obligatory will not decrease the purport of morality in our 
lives. On the contrary, a less demanding category of the right will open up 
the possibility for the genuinely praiseworthy moral good that lies beyond. 
This is ultimately the moral “less is more”. The less demanding the category 
of the right is (the limitation of moral obligations), the more possibilities 
of gratuitously caring for others become open to the moral agent (the 
possibility of supererogation). 
3.2 What is Supererogation? The History of a Definition
The concept of supererogation has a rather recent history in the 
course of philosophical inquiry. James Urmson was the first contemporary 
author who recognized the philosophical urgency of giving the proper 
theoretical space to this concept. In his seminal article entitled Saints and 
Heroes179 (published in 1958), he deals with the category that lies “beyond 
the call of duty” (interestingly enough, he does not even mention the word 
“supererogation”). In these terms, sainthood and heroism are categories 
(far from having any intrinsic religious implication) that clearly represent 
179  J. Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in A. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy, Seattle, 
University of Washington Press, pp. 198–216.
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a moral behavior that cannot be strictly required of the moral agent. 
In particular, Urmson tries to underline how a schematic and rigorous 
classification of the categories of the moral worth of actions (as characterized 
by the understanding of the deontic logic of his time)180, according to the 
broader category of moral permissibility, is unable to give an account of the 
actions of saints and heroes. He emphasizes that as long as we differentiate 
among the obligatory (what we ought to do), the permissible (or the morally 
indifferent), and the forbidden (what we should not do), there is no space for 
those morally worthy acts well exemplified by saintly and heroic behavior. 
Supererogation is not morally indifferent yet not morally obligatory. A 
three-fold partition of morality, which acknowledges the obligatory as the 
only category of positive moral worth, will certainly fail to acknowledge the 
moral relevance of supererogatory acts. Urmson then concludes that, given 
the undeniable existence of acts of this kind in our everyday lives, moral 
theories have to take into account the importance of this category of action 
and leave it some conceptual space. Along these lines, the issue regarding 
the theoretical relevance of supererogatory acts has evolved and given rise 
to the contemporary debate that remains lively.
In the years following Urmson’s paper, a noteworthy attempt to solve 
the “problem of supererogation”181 has been offered by Roderick Chisholm 
in a series of articles published in the 1960s182. To move on from the original 
three-fold classification of moral acts and to support both the optionality 
and the moral worth of supererogation, he suggests expanding the degree 
of complexity of the conceptual scheme of ethics. Following the example of 
some authors before him183, Chisholm offers a scheme that considers both the 
performance and the non-performance of an act (commission and omission). 
This first feature underlines how supererogation is a moral category that 
180  Remember the influential article by G.H. Von Wright, Deontic Logic, «Mind», LX (237), 
1951, pp. 1–15.
181  These terms usually refer to the impossibility to understand supererogation through the 
categories of the early deontic logic. 
182  R. Chisholm, Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics, «Ratio», V, 1963, 
pp. 1–14; R. Chisholm, The Ethics of Requirement, «American Philosophical Quarterly», 
I (2), 1964, pp. 147–153; R. Chisholm, E. Sosa, Intrinsic Preferability and the Problem of 
Supererogation, «Synthese», LVI, 1966, pp. 321–331.
183  In particular, he focuses on the similarly aimed works of Alois Höfler, Alexius Meinong, and 
Ernst Schwarz. See A. Höfler, Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen zwischen Abhängigkeitsbeziehungen, 
Sitzungsberichte der kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien, CLXXXI, 1917, pp. 
1–56; A. Meinong, Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-theorie, Graz, 1894; E. 
Schwarz, Über den Wert, das Soll, und das richtige Werthalten, Graz, 1934.
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evaluates a specific kind of act, rather than a certain disposition or behavior 
of the agent. It is always the specific act that is considered more than duty 
requires, rather than a certain way the agent is or behaves. Moreover, his 
classification of moral acts is based on the moral worth of the performance 
(or the non-performance) of the given act. Accordingly, an act can be good, 
bad, or morally indifferent (that is, neutral184). Finally, combining this three-
fold classification of the value with the performance or the non-performance 
of the act gives rise to nine possible descriptions of moral acts. In this way, 
Chisholm tries to highlight what the previous approach of deontic logic 
failed to acknowledge—the optionality of supererogation and, at the same 
time, its moral worth. Plainly, Chisholm holds the following:
I have said that to determine the moral status of any particular act 
we must decide (a) whether its performance would be good, bad or 
neither good nor bad, and (b) whether its non-performance would be 
good, bad or neither good nor bad185.
To clarify this point, it is helpful to use a schematic illustration of the various 
possibilities. See the following table186:
P NP Kinds of acts
1 bad bad Totally offensive
2 bad neutral Offense of commission
3 bad good Forbidden
4 neutral bad Offense of omission
5 neutral neutral Totally indifferent
6 neutral good Supererogatory omission
7 good bad Obligatory
8 good neutral Supererogatory commission
9 good good Totally supererogatory
184  The choice of using the terms “good” and “bad” is not free from possible criticisms, as 
pointed out by Michael Stocker: «he must not try to define “good” and “bad” in terms of 
each other – or, what is the same thing, in terms of some third concept such as ought to be. 
Doing so simply collapses the definition of “obligatory” into that of “good” and it further 
allows (requires) the fatal interpretation of “permitted”», M. Stocker, Professor Chisholm on 
Supererogation and Offence, «Philosophical Studies», XVIII, 1967, p. 93.
185  R. Chisholm, Supererogation and Offence: A Conceptual Scheme for Ethics, p. 12.
186  Bad, neutral and good refer to the moral worth of the act. On the top of the diagram, P 
stands for performance, and NP denotes non-performance. This scheme can be found in ivi, 
p. 12.
96 Supererogation: Why, What, and How
This scheme points out the full spectrum of moral acts from the perspective 
of deontic logic. The richest moral theory would be the one that would be 
able to accommodate all of them. A defective moral theory would fail to 
acknowledge the majority of these categories. Specifically, acts 6, 8, and 9 
are those dedicated to identifying the different ways that make it possible 
to go beyond the call of duty. The totally supererogatory act is one whose 
omission and commission are both good. Chisholm himself refers to it as 
a «state of blessedness»187. Correspondingly, supererogatory commission 
and supererogatory omission define those acts whose performance (or 
non-performance) is good and whose non-performance (or performance) is 
neutral (morally indifferent). They both share the status of being optional 
(whether omission or commission) and morally good in case they are carried 
out (whether omission or commission). This more refined classification 
saves supererogation from being considered morally indifferent, assigning 
its performance (or non-performance) to the more adequate category of the 
morally neutral (i.e., optional). Interestingly enough, this schematization 
highlights the existence of a category that is antithetical to supererogation—
offense188. As such, this concerns those acts whose commission (or omission) 
is bad and whose omission (or commission) is morally optional. Alleged 
examples of these kinds of acts are taking too long to leave a restaurant 
table, knowing that someone is waiting, or refusing to tell a friend where he 
or she can buy that jacket that he or she has been urgently looking for.
While this scheme of ethics is appealing for its logical symmetry and 
explicative power, it is worth asking whether it goes too far in delineating 
some apparently unusual moral categories. Particularly, this applies to the 
categories that describe the so-called offenses. Is it ever the case that we can 
bring about some venial bad thing without being morally reprehensible (i.e., 
morally blameworthy but not morally forbidden)? It seems that, morally 
speaking, the categories of the good and the bad do not work symmetrically. 
As we have seen in the previous section, while it makes sense to conceive a 
category of the good that does not limitlessly require the agent to promote 
the good, the same cannot be said of the category of the bad. The avoidance 
of actively bringing about some instance of the bad is obligatory, that is, 
187  Ivi, p. 11.
188  This is later referred to as “suberogatory”. See J. Driver, The Suberogatory, «Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy», LXX, 1992, pp. 286–295; P. McNamara, Supererogation, Inside and 
Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common-Sense Morality, in M. Timmons (ed.), Oxford 
Studies in Normative Ethics (Vol. 1), New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 202–235. 
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the bad is forbidden to any degree. The way that morality appears to work 
is that of negatively forbidding the bad and positively promoting the good. 
In these terms, the promotion of the good does not necessarily enter the 
sphere of requirements (as the concept of supererogation testifies). On the 
contrary, the negative prohibition of the bad (“do not do x”, “it is never 
the case to bring about y”, etc.) always belongs to the sphere of moral 
requirements. This feature of morality explains why we struggle so much to 
find convincing examples of offenses intended as morally blameworthy but 
not morally forbidden. If we keep in mind that these categories explicitly 
deal with the evaluation of acts, there seems to be nothing of intrinsic moral 
disvalue that should not be morally reprehensible at the same time. It is 
difficult to conceive an example of a morally bad act that is per se excusable. 
Commonly, the commission of morally bad acts might become excusable 
by virtue of the performance of some other proportionally greater morally 
good act. In this case, the offense is just a side effect of some other morally 
good act189 and never a moral act that is excusable per se. Taking too long in 
leaving a restaurant table is always morally forbidden if deliberately done 
for no good reason. The same can be excused only by virtue of some other 
moral act that is judged as proportionally greater. For example, think of a 
case where I am chatting at the table with my best friend whom I have not 
seen in ten years. A proportionate delay in leaving the table, while negative 
for those waiting in line, might be excused. It seems to me that the fact that 
this offense can be conceived at best as a side effect of some other good act 
undermines whatever conception of offense as an independent category of 
an act, which is considered per se morally optional despite its morally bad 
connotation190.
The conceptual symmetry between supererogation and offense might be 
broken when we realize that there is no “offensive” counterpart of the heroic 
or the saintly kind of supererogation. While supererogation’s optionality and 
value are well exemplified by acts that greatly exceed the demands of moral 
laws, the same cannot be said of the antithetical category of those acts that 
189  In this regard, I refer to the interesting doctrine (or principle) of the double effect. See A. 
McIntyre, Doctrine of Double Effect, in E.N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
(spring 2019 edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-
effect/>.
190  Another interesting explanation of offense has been offered by the introduction to the 
idea of inconsiderateness. See E. Ullmann-Margalit, Considerateness, «Iyyun», LX, 2011, pp. 
205–244.
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while exceptionally bad, are morally excusable191. This point underlines the 
typical asymmetry of morality. In this regard, let me recall this illuminating 
passage from Heyd:
By its nature, a moral system does not leave patently bad action as 
morally permissible. In that respect, good and bad, the virtuous and 
the vicious, are not symmetrical from the deontic point of view: the 
good is open-ended in a way that the bad is not. The extremely good 
cannot be required, but the extremely bad (vicious) is the prime target 
of prohibition192.
Upon a deeper reflection on the categories proposed by the broader 
approach of deontic logic suggested by Chisholm, the same category of the 
totally supererogatory (as its offensive counterpart) appears less plausible. 
Similar to offenses, it seems problematic to find a satisfying example of 
a supererogatory act whose performance and non-performance would 
be both good193. In these terms, the two categories would be logically 
possible but factually empty. Moreover, it has been claimed that the totally 
supererogatory is problematic because it would coincide with the morally 
indifferent since it is indifferent (to the achievement of a supererogatory 
outcome) to whether the agent does x or y. I do not think (as Heyd does194) 
that this is the real point at issue. In fact, the so-called totally supererogatory 
acts are not morally indifferent since they will bring about some moral good 
indeed (either x or y). Rather, the aspect of these acts that is characterized 
by (non-moral) indifference is which one, among the options, the agent 
decides to perform. Again, it is indifferent to whether he or she does x or 
y since this will have equally good consequences no matter what he or she 
decides. I think that the real problem with this category of supererogatory 
acts (other than their factual emptiness) is their failure to be actual instances 
of supererogation. Specifically, an act of supererogation is characterized by 
191  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, p. 128.
192  D. Heyd, Supererogation, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 
2019 edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/supererogation/>. 
I acknowledge that the issue of suberogation would require a much deeper analysis than 
these few lines. I leave this task to a future and more specific work.
193  The fact that Chisholm himself can do without the two extreme categories of the totally 
supererogatory and the totally offensive in a later article written with Ernest Sosa is an 
indication that they can be overlooked. See R. Chisholm, E. Sosa, Intrinsic Preferability and 
the Problem of Supererogation, «Synthese», LVI, 1966, pp. 329–330.
194  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 123n.
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the fact that the agent might freely decide not to bring about any instance of 
the good. Cases of totally supererogatory acts seem to have lost this freedom 
of performance (and non-performance), given that the agent will somehow 
bring about some good (he or she is “condemned to the good”, so to speak). 
These acts (which we might call blessed acts for lack of a better term) fully 
lose their optionality, so (as I will later show with a fuller definition of the 
concept) they lose the special moral connotation that assigns a moral value 
to them.
At a more general level, the problem of supererogation and deontic logic 
reveals an interesting truth. From the outset, deontic logic was conceived 
as a system based on permission, and as such, it was concerned with rights 
and duties. In this regard, Millard Schumaker has made a compelling remark 
about the problem of supererogation195. It has been assigned too wide a 
scope to deontic logic since it cannot give an account of the whole range 
of acts relevant to morality. The fact that it cannot differentiate between 
supererogation and the morally indifferent is a clear example of this. The 
reason for this limit is that from the standpoint of permission, these two 
categories cannot be distinguished. The morally relevant cannot be reduced 
or subsumed to what is relevant to the deontic schematization of acts. We 
can avoid this by acknowledging that morality is much more than a subject 
based on permission. Therefore:
[…] deontic logic is not the logic of morality; it is instead the logic 
of rights and duties, the logic of right conduct; and that is neither 
required nor forbidden is therefore shown to be indifferent only with 
respect to rights and duties; it is not necessarily indifferent to morality 
itself. The fact of supererogation, then, reveals that there is more to 
morality than right conduct […]196.
This explains why every definition of supererogation that tries to define it 
along with the categories of deontic logic of that time, fails to acknowledge 
its moral status together with its moral optionality.
The most important and, at the same time, fascinating aspect of the 
concept of supererogation is its being a phenomenon that reminds us how 
the good exceeds the right in many ways and degrees. This fact is particularly 
important since it focuses on a fundamental theoretical distinction for the 
195  M. Schumaker, Deontic Morality and the Problem of Supererogation, «Philosophical 
Studies», XXXIII, 1972, pp. 427–428.
196  Ivi, p. 428.
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vast majority of the moral theories: the axiological level and the deontic 
level. These are “the two faces of morality”:  one refers to goodness, ideals, 
and virtues; the other refers to rights, duties, and obligations. As I have 
underlined above, the former is open-ended in a way that the latter is not, 
and this explains the possibility to go beyond the sphere of requirements 
in pursuing moral goodness. The relevance of these two levels of morality 
gives rise to terminologies that distinguish between the minimal standard of 
ethics (minimal ethics) and some other ideal or broader category (maximal 
ethics). However, it would be wrong to consider these two categories as 
separate subjects—one more rigorous and notably identifiable with a 
legalistic conception of morality, and the other dedicated to the promotion 
of goodness and the aspiration for moral ideals. They simply represent 
the two faces of the same moral subject; in other words, they signify the 
different degrees of achievement of the normative dimension of our lives. 
The former is the level of the moral requirement, which is expected by all 
moral agents. The latter is the level of moral goodness, which is simply 
desirable of all moral agents. Ultimately, morality cannot be merely reduced 
to its deontic aspects; the good is vastly broader than the right, and the 
concept of supererogation reminds us of this.  
In the following paragraphs, I present David Heyd’s definition of 
supererogation197. While it would certainly be possible to improve 
the definition in different ways, I take this to be the most exhaustive 
interpretation of the relevant aspects of the concept. Specifically, according 
to Heyd, supererogation is defined by four features, as follows:
an act is supererogatory if and only if (1) It is neither obligatory nor 
forbidden; (2) Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction 
or criticism – either formal or informal; (3) It is morally good, both 
by virtue of its (intended) consequences and by virtue of its intrinsic 
value (being beyond the call of duty); (4) It is done voluntarily for the 
sake of someone else’s good, and is thus meritorious198.
These four conditions all highlight relevant aspects of supererogation. In 
sum, they are optionality, the moral non-imputability in case of omission, 
the value of the act’s consequences and its intrinsically good status, and the 
altruistic character of the act. The definition presents the first two conditions 
197  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982.
198  Ivi, p. 115.
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in negative terms (defining what supererogation is not), while the latter two 
are formulated in positive terms (stating what supererogation is). 
At this point, it is important to stress that from this definition, we can 
derive how supererogation is a moral concept primarily concerned with acts, 
rather than with agents, character traits, or other morally relevant aspects 
of moral experience199. Moreover, the composite nature of this definition 
expands the reach and overcomes the limits of those definitions that describe 
the concept in a restricted way by the asymmetrical opposition of two 
terms, that is, “a supererogatory act is…to do, but…not to do”200. Expanding 
the definition in this way allows departing from the dimension of deontic 
logic and taking care of the non-deontic aspects of supererogation (e.g., the 
altruistic character of these acts). 
Let us analyze more specifically the four conditions of supererogation. 
The first condition tries to underline the optionality of such acts according 
to the category of permission. As such, it remains within the conceptual 
framework of deontic logic; here, when the obligatory as opposed to the 
forbidden is considered, supererogation finds its collocation right in 
between them, in what is permissible. However, this is not enough if we 
want to avoid reducing the supererogatory to the permissible, a category 
that primarily includes the morally indifferent. Clearly enough, while 
maintaining the condition of being permissible, supererogation is not 
morally neutral. Deciding to walk back home on street a rather than on 
street b is morally permissible and, at the same time, morally indifferent 
per se. In contrast, letting someone go ahead in the line at the supermarket 
because he or she has very few items is morally permissible and, at the 
same time, an act of kindness, intrinsically morally valuable. Supererogation 
entails that not conceding one’s own position in line is morally permissible 
as well. Supererogatory acts are peculiar, permissible acts since, contrary 
to some other kind of acts in their class, they maintain a certain degree of 
moral value (possibly a very significant one).
To avoid reducing supererogation to the morally indifferent, it is 
important to further define supererogation’s permissibility. Hence, the 
second condition underlines how supererogation is ultimately morally 
optional201; thus, its omission does not deserve any sort of moral criticism 
199  Ibidem.
200  Ivi, p. 117.
201  The term optional (contrary to permissible) denotes that act x is not necessarily deprived 
of its moral value. Thus, «[…] while according to (1) supererogatory acts are permissible, 
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or reproach. The terminological shift from permissible to optional makes 
a huge conceptual difference since it allows the moral value of these acts 
to not lose its importance. A further sort of asymmetry of morality is 
revealed in this aspect of supererogation. The great praiseworthiness that 
is attributed to the performance of these acts is not paired with a similar 
degree of blameworthiness in case the agent refrains from doing them202. 
Supererogation being what lies “beyond the call duty” means that it can 
consequently be considered “beyond the reproachable”.
The third condition deals with the moral status of supererogatory acts, 
assigning to them a special moral value. As the definition states, this value 
originates from two different sources: the intended consequences and being 
beyond what is required. The intended consequences must bring about some 
good, but since it would be inaccurate to reduce supererogation to a merely 
consequential concept, this is not enough. Additionally, supererogation has 
an intrinsic value due to its optionality (i.e., going beyond the call of duty). 
Since the willingness to do the supererogatory act means aiming at some 
extra good, it follows that the given supererogatory act x is per se worth 
some degree of moral value. Thus, this particular aspect grants the peculiar 
meritorious nature of supererogatory acts—the willingness to achieve some 
extra (optional) good by virtue of its consequences. This reveals that the value 
of supererogation relies on the combination of two moral features. In other 
words, the combined nature of supererogation’s value blends deontological 
and axiological elements203. As Heyd himself acknowledges, the dual nature 
of the moral value of supererogation is heterogeneous, and thus:
This dual source of moral value explains why supererogation requires 
a theory which blends both axiological and deontological elements. 
(2) makes them optional […] an act is permissible if despite its negative value (bad, wrong, 
undesirable) or because of its neutral value, it is not forbidden. On the other hand, an act is 
more naturally described as optional if despite its positive value (good, right, desirable) or 
because of its neutral value, it is not compulsory», ivi, p. 116.
202  It has been noted that this feature of supererogation reminds us of the characterization 
of Christian evangelical counsels by the fact that their omission is not blameworthy as long 
as the agent respects the precepts. Briefly, «[…] one ought to follow the counsels only if one 
seeks certain goals or ideals. But these ideals, though highly praised, are not obligatory, and 
failure to adopt them is by no means wrong», ivi, p. 130. For an example of this aspect, see 
the episode about the rich young man in Matthew 19:16–22 and Luke 10:17–22.  
203  As it starts to appear clear, this fundamental element will be particularly relevant for the 
later part of the present work, where I will try to give an account of supererogation by virtue 
of a moral pluralist system. See Chapter V in particular.
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Neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism alone is sufficient to account for 
supererogation […]204.
We need to specify some further important features of these two sources of 
moral value. Specifically, the consequences that assign a moral value to the act 
need to be intended. This rules out all those optional good deeds unforeseen 
by the agent from the assignment of moral praise. If I decline a job offer by 
virtue of accepting a more interesting one, I do not have to be praised if 
the job offer I refuse will benefit another person. The same scenario greatly 
changes if I decline the job offer because I want someone else to benefit from 
it (whether or not I am considering another job offer). The intention behind 
the performance of the act plays a crucial role in its praiseworthiness. This 
also means that the failure to satisfactorily perform an act of supererogation 
does not necessarily affect its moral status. For example, if someone jumps 
into the water to save a drowning stranger and in the attempt, drowns 
oneself, the failure to bring about the actual supererogatory act (saving the 
stranger) does not undermine the value of what one has done. As long as the 
agent intends the desired good consequences205, the act maintains its moral 
value.
Furthermore, if a supererogatory act gains part of its moral value from 
being optional (i.e., more than duty requires), this means that there is a 
logical dependence between supererogation and duty. To explain this fact, 
Heyd has introduced correlativity and continuity as the two conditions 
that specify the relation between these two moral categories206. The former 
emphasizes that we cannot have the concept of supererogation without 
the correlation to some kind of duty that is opportunely surpassed by the 
performance of optional good deeds. If there is no level of requirement, it is 
logically impossible to conceive a category that is beyond any requirement207. 
The latter concept, continuity, states that although supererogatory acts are 
differentiated from duties in their being beyond them, they still share with 
obligations the same kind of moral value. Specifically, the morally good 
that gives value to supererogation is the same one that we attach to the 
204  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 131.
205  Ivi, p. 133.
206  Ivi, p. 5.
207  «Correlativity means that acts of supererogation derive their special value from being 
“more than duty requires”; i.e. they have meaning only relatively to obligatory action», 
ibidem.
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performance of a moral duty. In other words, supererogatory acts and moral 
obligations are both evaluated from the same moral point of view, the only 
difference being the degree of moral requirement. Expressed another way, 
«there is a common and continuous scale of values shared by supererogation 
and duty»208. The relations of correlativity and continuity logically entangle 
supererogation and duty. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this relation is 
asymmetrical in kind. Duties can be conceptually conceived even without a 
proper classification of supererogatory acts. Although if we endorse such an 
anti-supererogationist theory, it could cause an agent to take on extremely 
demanding duties, it would be hard to argue that duties cannot exist in such 
a theoretical framework. On the contrary, any theory of supererogation 
can only be grounded on a proper concept of duty. Supererogation without 
a qualified relation to duty cannot conceptually exist, while duty is 
conceptually self-sufficient.
In conclusion, the fourth condition brings in two more features 
fundamental to the definition of a supererogatory act: voluntariness and 
altruistic character. These features provide an additional connotation to the 
kind of moral worth that supererogation typically involves. If supererogatory 
acts are performed accordingly, moral merit ought to be assigned to their 
agent. This reveals how this condition underlines the aspects that make the 
agent morally meritorious (different from the third condition whose main 
focus is the moral status of the act)209.
First of all, to generate moral merit, a supererogatory act needs to 
be performed voluntarily by the agent. This means that the agent is free 
from any kind of pressure to act accordingly and free from any concern to 
refrain from doing so. In contrast, if this would not be the case, it would 
undermine the moral goodness of the act’s optionality (its being beyond 
the call of duty, as shown in the third condition) and ultimately, the merit 
of the agent. The freedom to perform or not perform the supererogatory act 
x is functional for both the moral status of the act and the agent himself or 
herself. Furthermore, the agent has to act altruistically, that is, the outcome 
of one’s act must primarily benefit someone other than oneself210. This 
208  Ibidem.
209  Ivi, p. 136 and p. 139.
210  At this point, it is important to stress how the required altruistic character of 
supererogation is far from being taken for granted in the contemporary debate. In particular, 
see G. Mellema, Beyond the Call of Duty: Supererogation, Obligation and Offence, Albany, NY, 
State University of New York Press, 1991, pp. 19–20; J. Kawall, Self-Regarding Supererogatory 
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feature further specifies the character of the consequences mentioned in the 
third condition. The beneficial consequences must be other-regarding211. As 
such, as long as these two elements (voluntariness and altruistic character) 
are respected, the fourth condition claims that the agent deserves to be 
considered morally meritorious212.  
At this point, it is worth specifying an important distinction that 
Heyd introduces to clarify the status of the agent, that between motive 
and intention213. As I have emphasized, supererogation requires altruistic 
intentions, which differ from requiring altruistic motives. In fact, the agent 
might find a self-interested motive to act to benefit others. However, this does 
not prevent the act from having all the features that make supererogation 
morally good. In this context, a self-interested motive to behave in a particular 
way is not problematic for the status of the act. As Heyd highlights:
One may act heroically in order to gain fame, to soothe one’s conscience 
(haunted by guilt feelings), or out of moral self-indulgence. High-
minded motives are not a necessary condition for supererogatory 
action as so many theorists tend to believe. Although the motives 
of supererogatory acts may be self-regarding, the intention must be 
other-regarding214.
As long as selfish motives do not affect the moral-goodness-conferring 
elements (optionality, intended good consequences, voluntariness, and 
altruistic character), there is no reason to require high-minded motives for 
supererogatory acts.
Actions, «Journal of Social Philosophy» 34 (3), 2003, pp. 487–498; A. Archer, Supererogation 
and Intentions of the Agent, «Philosophia», XLI, 2013, pp. 447–462. A deeper analysis of 
this point will unfortunately take me off-topic in the present work. Here, I just assume that 
the altruistic character of supererogation (following Heyd’s position) is the most accurate 
description of its acts. I have dedicated some space to the issue elsewhere. See S. Grigoletto, 
Why Proximity Matters for the Concept of Supererogation, «Ethics & Politics», XIX (1), 2017, 
pp. 291–307.
211  Supererogatory acts typically (even if not necessarily) involve some sort of sacrifice by 
the agent. The act might thus have some non-beneficial consequences that primarily affect 
the agent himself or herself. 
212  «An act is said to be meritorious only if it earns merit for its agent. Unlike the attributes 
of permissibility and moral goodness, which apply to acts independently of their agents, 
“meritorious” is conceptually linked to persons (like “intentional” or “benevolent”)», D. 
Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 139.
213  For clarification it is important to provide a brief, but finer distinction between these two 
terms. Being thirsty justifies the act of drinking. This is what motivates this course of action. 
The act of drinking is then specifically intended at grabbing a glass of water and bringing it 
up to your mouth.
214  Ivi, p. 137.
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Finally, the altruistic qualification of supererogation rules out any 
possible utilitarian evaluation of the act’s outcome. Indeed, the good altruistic 
consequences are not necessarily the best ones. The foreseen sacrifice of 
the agent (typical of this kind of act) might involve a loss in terms of the 
general degree of happiness. Nevertheless, this is (as we have seen) what 
makes supererogation of special moral value215. This necessity of altruistic 
intentions, introduced with the fourth condition, makes supererogation’s 
value not utilitarian in kind.
Much more could be said to further specify and refine the aspects of this 
definition of the concept. Nevertheless, I explicitly want to limit this analysis 
to a plain exposition of Heyd’s definition. I think that at this point, it is 
already possible to show those aspects of supererogation that will become 
functional, in the following chapters, for the argumentation in favor of a 
normative foundation of the concept. In particular, recall that supererogatory 
acts deeply rely on the theoretical acknowledgment of the different levels that 
constitute the structure of ethics. In the present section, I have emphasized 
how morality has two fundamental levels of understanding. We can refer to 
the two faces of morality in different ways: the deontic and the axiological, 
minimal ethics and maximal ethics, or the right and the good. Supererogation 
is a conceptual consequence of this important distinction, and as such, it 
can serve as a proof of that. Similarly, in the entire first part of this work, I 
have aimed to point out how the very nature of moral experience (in moral 
decision making) is far from being a unitary matter. These expressions of the 
complexity typical of morality should serve as reminders of the necessity of 
acknowledging the actual nature of the moral domain.
3.3 How is Supererogation Possible? The Acknowledgment of Moral 
Complexity
In this section, I focus on the theological origin of the concept to pay 
attention to those theoretical elements that have grounded the concept from 
its genesis. In the present work, embracing a complex approach to morality 
aims at recreating, on a philosophical level, the theoretical depth that has 
given rise to the concept of supererogation. The etymology of supererogation 
is found in the Christian tradition and goes as far back as the parable of 
215  Ivi, p. 132.
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the good Samaritan in the Gospel according to St. Luke216. More precisely, 
the theoretical background that makes sense of supererogation as a concept 
is derived from the later distinction between precepts and evangelical 
counsels, as outlined by Christian theology. I now dedicate some pages to a 
brief sketch of this theological background.
 Traditionally, the distinction between precepts and counsels refers to 
a well-known passage of the Gospel: the narrative about the rich young 
man’s encounter with Jesus 217. Here, when asked how to live by aiming at 
eternal life, Jesus distinguishes between two paths to salvation. The first 
path is concerned with the precepts of the Decalogue, of which Jesus recalls 
five218, plus the so-called rule of love («You shall love your neighbor as 
yourself»). These are expected from anyone who has Christian charity as 
the fundamental value of a life lived well. The rich young man acknowledges 
having lived according to all of these precepts; nevertheless, he further asks, 
«What do I still lack?» The young man is then looking for an additional way 
of achieving a virtuous existence according to the Christian doctrine. Jesus 
thus answers by introducing the way of perfection to salvation, a route that 
is not required of everyone219, the path of the evangelical counsels.
The distinction introduced in these pages of the Gospel will later fit the 
classical and fundamental Christian distinction between the Old Law and 
the New Law, as later outlined in the theological tradition. As it appears 
especially clear from the work of St. Thomas Aquinas, such a distinction 
is particularly relevant for the Catholic doctrine of a life lived well. Briefly, 
according to Aquinas, the law is divided into five different kinds220. One is 
the Divine Law, which, combined with the Divine Grace, aims at leading 
us toward virtues and goodness. Oppositely, temptations influence us to 
216  Luke 10:25–37. The Vulgate version of the Bible translates a line of the dialogue between 
the Samaritan and the innkeeper (line 35) as follows: «[…] et quodcumque supererogaveris 
ego cum rediero reddam tibi […]». Strangely enough, the etymological origin of the word has 
nothing to do with the passages that describe the Samaritan’s decision to stop and rescue 
the stranger (the actual supererogatory act). Actions such as this represent the typical act of 
supererogation, sometimes referred to as “good Samaritanism”.
217  Matthew 19:16–22. The distinction is also explicit in a passage of the Pauline epistles (I 
Corinthians 7:25).
218  Matthew 19:18–19.
219  The way of living the counsels has to be understood within the sphere of optionality. Jesus 
introduces it with an “if” clause: «If you would be perfect […]», Matthew 19:21. 
220  See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 91, The Summa Theologica of Saint 
Thomas Aquinas translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province revised by Daniel J. 
Sullivan, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952.
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commit sins in accordance with vices. Within this general schema, precepts 
and counsels constitute the Divine Law, as outlined in the Scriptures. 
In particular, on one hand, the Old Testament transmits the Old Law by 
means of the Decalogue of Moses, which prescribes what to do in the form 
of precepts. On the other hand, the New Testament is the bearer of the 
New Law, by means of the teachings and the life of Jesus Christ, whose 
message brought us the counsels. Aquinas clearly highlights this distinction, 
underlining the difference between the two notions:
The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a 
commandment implies necessity, while a counsel is left to the choice 
of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which 
is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and 
not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore 
understand the commandments of the New Law to have been 
given about matters that are necessary to gain the hand of eternal 
Happiness, to which end the New Law brings us immediately, but that 
the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end 
more assured and expeditious221.
Therefore, the commandments are binding and clearly prescribe what to do 
(e.g., «Honor thy father and thy mother») and what not to do (e.g., «Thou 
shalt not kill»). In contrast, counsels do not prescribe anything in particular 
other than the achievement of some extra good; thus, their performance 
is considered optional and left to the will of the agent. Generally, counsels 
rely on the avoidance of three things: external wealth, carnal pleasures, and 
honors. 
Notably, Aquinas points out that the most important thing for a Christian 
is having God as the main end in life. Accordingly, this leads the virtuous 
believer to the road of charity toward Christian perfection. This is the main 
point of a Christian life, aiming at God by expressing charitable behavior222. 
This is what justifies the obligatoriness of the precepts (or commandments), 
the fact that their observance leads to the true Christian existence by 
expressing that charity typical of whatever is directed toward the love of 
God. Failing to follow the commandments means failing to appreciate the 
221  T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 108, a. 4, ivi, p. 336.
222  «[…] in itself and essentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity, 
principally as to the love of God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are 
the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law», T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 
II–II, q. 184, a. 3, ivi, p. 631.
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true Christian existence, and ultimately, it means not heading toward God. 
Differently, the purpose of the counsels is not to impose an obligation to 
refuse all material goods, for example, in order to gain eternal life. This would 
certainly be a valuable way of living a Christian life, but it remains optional 
and left to the free choice of the individual. The most important thing is 
keeping God as the primary end of a life lived well. Since the abandonment 
of material goods could facilitate this task, it is a desirable but discretional 
achievement223. The counsels do not prevent us from committing sins (this 
being the direct purpose of the commandments) but facilitate the path to 
Christian perfection by avoiding those circumstances where walking on the 
road of charity becomes more difficult (while not impossible). This explains 
how the fact that counsels lead us to perfection “more speedily” does not 
mean that they do better than what precepts do “more slowly”. Instead, this 
means that if we follow the counsels, we can walk more easily on the road 
of charity toward the love of God and our neighbors. The difference between 
precepts and counsels relies on the fact that the former helps us avoid all 
those behaviors that are contrary to charity, while the latter simply facilitates 
this task224. This also explains why counsels are not strictly required; having 
an easier path to God is a desirable but free choice. As we have seen above, 
this is the same free choice that Jesus gives to the rich young man:
If you wish to be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor 
and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me225.
Here, contrary to what I have just outlined, it seems that perfection is gained 
only by the repudiation of material goods and thus by following a counsel. 
223  «Nevertheless, for man to gain the above-mentioned end, he does not need to renounce 
the things of the world to attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end 
in them; but he will attain more speedily to that end by giving up the goods of this world 
entirely. And so the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose», T. Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, I–II, q. 108, a. 4, ivi, p. 336. See also S. Vecchio, Precetti e consigli nella teologia 
medievale, in S. Bacin, Etiche Antiche, Etiche moderne, Bologna, il Mulino, 2010, pp. 223–242.
224  «In other words, the precepts are intended to remove things which are contrary to 
charity, while the counsels are meant to remove things that hinder acts of charity», D. Heyd, 
Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 21.
225  Matthew 19:21. This passage, specifically «Then come, follow me», has been widely 
considered the origin of the doctrine of a consecrated life. While before the Vatican II 
Council, the understanding of this particular religious experience was considered a better 
Christian existence and a faster way to salvation, things have greatly changed since the 
publication of the council’s decree on the adaptation and renewal of religious life (Perfectae 
Caritatis). As St. Thomas Aquinas has already emphasized, both ways of living a Christian 
life (consecrated or not) are perfectly capable of leading to eternal salvation.  
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Aquinas clarifies this argument accurately. The focal point that constitutes 
the perfection of the young man’s life is following the Lord (i.e., having God 
as the primary end), and this is something that the precepts make possible. 
The counsel of selling all our material goods and giving the proceeds to the 
poor is the path that more easily leads us to loving God and thus on the road 
of charity226. In this circumstance, selling our material goods is a way of 
redirecting our own lives toward God more easily, away from those goods 
that might prevent us from doing this by misdirecting our lives to material 
attachments. Almost a millennium ago, the words of Clement of Alexandria 
underline, once again, this aspect of the ultimate end of the Christian life:
“Sell what belongs to thee.” And what is this? It is not what some 
hastily take it to be, a command to fling away the substance that 
belongs to him and to part with his riches, but to banish from the soul 
its opinions about riches, its attachment to them, its excessive desire, 
its morbid excitement over them, its anxious cares, the thorns of our 
earthly existence which choke the seed of the true life227.
The material goods represent a problem if someone misunderstands the place 
and the importance they ought to have in a Christian life. External wealth is 
not something bad per se, but since it might distance oneself from a life lived 
according to charity, it is preferable to follow the counsel of poverty.
As Aquinas’ work reveals, the 13th century was animated by a theological 
debate on these particular issues. In particular, the questions about a life 
lived according to humility, poverty, chastity, and obedience was one of the 
major points at issue due to the emerging clerical class of mendicant orders. 
The nature of these expressions of consecrated life is deeply based on the 
distinction between precepts and counsels. At this precise time, the concept 
of supererogation finds its most substantial theorizations in the theological 
sphere. The members of the newborn orders of friars were called upon to 
give an account of the “way of perfection” according to which they dedicated 
their religious existence against the charges of the rest of the clergy. In this 
scenario, the words of St. Bonaventure, a member of the Franciscan order, 
226  «In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as being the way to perfection by the 
words, Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor; and something else is added in which 
consists perfection, when He said, And follow Me», T. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 
184, a. 3, ivi, pp. 631–632.
227  Clement of Alexandria, The Rich Man’s Salvation, 11–2, in Clement of Alexandria with an 
English translation by G.W. Butterworth, London, W. Heinemann-Harvard University Press, 
1953, pp. 291–293.
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explain the degrees of charity that can constitute the life of a Christian. In 
particular, in his Apologia pauperum contra calumniatorem, he makes ample 
use of the concept of supererogation, pointing out how strictly following the 
counsels (typical of the mendicant orders) is a supererogatory (optional, we 
would say) choice228. Precepts and counsels represent two distinct degrees of 
achieving a life in the light of charity. While both lead to eternal salvation, 
the latter is known as the way of perfection, expected only from those who 
decide to live a life beyond the merely required.
Unsurprisingly, within this moral framework of a Christian conception 
of a life lived well, we can find a multitude of fascinating examples of 
supererogation. For example, think of the life lived by St. Teresa of Calcutta 
and the saintly act of St. Maximilian Maria Kolbe. Cases such as these clearly 
represent a life lived according to the evangelical counsels, exemplifying 
the acts of an agent who goes “beyond the call of precepts”, so to speak. In 
particular, it is this aspect of the Christian conception of a life lived well that 
inspires and theoretically supports the practice of the indulgences that were 
much criticized by Protestant movements in the Reformation era. According 
to this doctrine, the extraordinary good deeds of the saints can be redirected 
to the forgiveness of the sins of others. As Pope Paul VI has underlined in 
the apostolic constitution Indulgentiarum Doctrina:
There reigns among men, by the hidden and benign mystery of 
the divine  will, a supernatural solidarity whereby the sin of one 
harms the others just as the holiness of one also benefits the others. 
Thus the  Christian faithful give each other mutual aid to attain 
their supernatural aim229.
Holy behavior (that lies beyond ordinary required practices) can be shared 
for the benefit of the people of God. It appears clear how such a practice 
relies on a theoretical specification of the many levels of achievement of 
morality within the Christian tradition. Someone who has underperformed 
or underachieved in certain regards can benefit from the overachievement 
of others.
228  «Scientium est igitur, quod radix, forma, finis complementum et vinculum perfectionis 
caritas est […] Ipsa vero caritas triplicem habet statum: unum quidem infimum, in observantia 
mandatorum legalium; secundum vero medium, qui constat in adimpletione spiritualium 
consiliorum; tertium autem supremum, in perfruitione sempiternalium iucunditatum. […] 
Secunda est perfectio supererogationis […]», in St. Bonaventure, Apologia pauperum contra 
calumniatorem, cap. III, no. 2.
229  Paul VI, Indulgentiarum Doctrina, 1967, no. 4. 
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The first important conclusion to be drawn from this analysis of the 
theological origins of the concept of supererogation is related to the necessity 
of a morally complex approach. Moral complexity, intended as an approach 
that grants the multilevel nature of morality, is fundamental in order to give 
an account of these theological conceptual distinctions that represented 
the fertile background that introduced the concept of supererogation in 
its original theoretical framework. As such, we can refer to the distinction 
between precepts and counsels (and not just this one) as a sort of “Catholic 
complexity”230, where the grounding idea is that of a system based on 
multiple levels of understanding, normativity, and possible achievements. 
If we do not give an account of this aspect in “secular” morality as well, 
there is no way that we can properly justify the concept of supererogation. 
Moral complexity is thus the acknowledgment of the two necessary levels 
of normativity that constitute the essence of morality—the axiological and 
the deontic. The adoption of a complex moral system is a promising answer 
to the question of how we can give an account of supererogation in a moral 
system. The absence of such a complex approach to morality can lead to 
the undesirable identification of the axiological level with the deontic one. 
The flattening of the levels of morality results in a moral theory that aims 
at the maximization of the good, where every good act is, at the same time, 
required of the agent. Consequently, such a system (as I further highlight 
in the next chapter) will not leave any theoretical space for the concept of 
supererogation.
While the distinction among the many levels of morality is a necessary 
condition of supererogation, it is not in itself a sufficient one. Complexity 
is the metaethical background condition of a process that takes place at 
the normative level. I have previously defined the structure of morality as 
230  It might be inappropriate to call it “Christian” complexity, given a different understanding 
of the moral sphere that the Protestant tradition has offered. During the Reformation, the 
strong opposition to the theory of supererogation (and to the doctrine of indulgences that 
is grounded on it) was the occasion to draw a clear distinction between the ethics of the 
two different traditions. Referring to the thought of Martin Luther, David Heyd summarizes 
the Protestant opposition to supererogation as follows: «No human being, not even a saint, 
can do all that is strictly required by duty, let alone hope to go beyond that. The way to 
salvation is not through “works” but through divine grace alone. Even the most dramatic 
acts of martyrdom and self-sacrifice, which served the Catholics as paradigm examples of 
supererogation, are strictly speaking obligatory», D. Heyd, Supererogation, in E.N. Zalta 
(ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2019 edition), 
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/supererogation/>.
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being better represented by an imagined web of interrelated levels, rather 
than that of an ordinated pyramid that culminates in a precise value or 
ideal. As I further analyze in Chapter V, supererogation springs from the 
normative pulls originating from the interaction between two levels of the 
moral web. Most of the time, this phenomenon is brought about by the 
interaction between the axiological and the deontic levels. By virtue of this 
necessity of a complex system, supererogation can rightly be considered a 
complex moral concept, that is, one that requires more than a single moral 
dimension to be justified. If we oppose complex concepts to simple ones, 
we realize how the simple versus complex distinction somehow resembles 
the difference between thin and thick concepts. A thick concept (e.g., 
“courageous”) has both evaluative and descriptive elements231. Its nature is 
grounded on two relevant aspects of morality. In contrast, a thin concept 
concerns a single aspect of morality. Similar to this distinction, I generally 
define complex concepts as those concerned with more than one aspect of 
morality. Supererogation, far from being the only one, is a clear example 
of a complex moral concept. As we have seen above, this category of acts 
springs from the interaction of the axiological and the deontic levels. As 
such, supererogation requires this theoretical complexity and consequently, 
can only be conceived as a complex concept.
 In conclusion, given the characteristics of the theological framework 
that originated the concept in the Christian tradition, I believe that a complex 
moral system is the answer to the question of how we can give an account 
of supererogation. The challenge, widely expressed by the contemporary 
debate on the concept, is that of understanding if the existing moral theories 
can grant the degree of complexity that supererogatory acts require.
231  S. Kirchin (ed.), Thick Concepts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.

CHAPTER IV 
WHY MONIST THEORIES STRUGGLE WITH THE 
JUSTIFICATION OF THE CONCEPT
If we consider the normative ethics debate on the justification of 
supererogatory acts, we can infer that monist theories of different sorts 
generally struggle in this specific regard. As already suggested in the 
previous chapters, this difficulty is related to the loss of complexity that 
makes supererogation conceptually impossible. Heyd’s definition of the 
concept underlines the dual moral source of supererogatory acts (their 
intended consequences and optionality); as such, they show the inadequacy 
of single-guided theories:
This dual source of value explains why supererogation requires a 
theory which blends both axiological and deontological elements. 
Neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism alone is sufficient to account 
for supererogation […]232.
Along these lines, in this chapter, I aim to show this general inadequacy of 
monist moral theories. Roughly, this chapter represents the pars destruens of 
the work, being concerned with a negative argumentation on what interferes 
with the justification of supererogation. In particular, I give an account 
of the main problematic aspects of the justification of supererogation, as 
follows: a) I provide a general argument about the impossibility of a monist 
approach to morality. b) I focus on the relation between maximizing duties 
and supererogation. c) When these elements are clarified, it is possible to 
analyze in some finer detail the problems of specific normative systems. 
Specifically, I try to explain why both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics 
fail to give an account of the concept233. Once these criticisms about the 
232  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, p. 131.
233  This can be summarized with the claim that both moral traditions seem to demand our 
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justification of the concept are emphasized, it will be possible in the next 
chapter to take on the challenge of grounding supererogation according to 
moral complexity.
4.1 The General Argument
An argument for the inadequacy of a monist theory needs to start 
from a clear definition of what is intended for monism in normative ethics. 
Generally, a monist theory considers a unique, consistent, and ultimate 
source of morality. This role is usually played by a value, an ideal, or a 
principle. The good is then identified according to a single and unique way of 
reasoning. Well-known examples of this approach are Kantian ethics, which 
aims at freedom (intended as autonomy) and utilitarianism (here intended 
without further specification), which aims at the greatest happiness. Monist 
theories, such as these, thus assume that we act according to a single guiding 
principle that informs us about the morally good thing we ought to do 
(moral obligation). In this respect, Kant’s categorical imperative and Mill’s 
principle of utility represent ways of moral reasoning that require that our 
actions are directed at the promotion of the ultimate value. Traditionally, 
this approach is opposed to moral pluralism, the idea that morality deals 
with a heterogeneous (yet limited) set of values and principles234.
Furthermore, it is helpful to outline a synthetic definition of the concept 
of supererogation. Supererogatory acts, broadly considered, are morally good 
but not morally required235. As we have seen, this concept entails a distinction 
between the axiological level of morality (moral goodness) and the deontic 
one (moral rightness). Supererogatory acts exceed the requirements of the 
deontic level to bring about some extraordinary goodness. The failure to 
acknowledge this distinction between different levels of the moral discourse 
very best. This has been emphasized by Michael Ferry in M. Ferry, Does Morality Demand 
Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of Duty, «Philosophical Studies», CLXIII 
(2), 2013, pp. 573–589. See pp. 172–173 for a more detailed description of Ferry’s argument.
234  In Chapter II, I have discussed the issue of moral pluralism at length. For an overview, see 
E. Mason, Value Pluralism, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (spring 
2018 edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/value-pluralism/>; 
B. Gaut, Moral Pluralism, «Philosophical Papers», XXII (1), 1993, pp. 17–40.
235  Undoubtedly, Heyd’s definition, as outlined in the previous chapter, is far more adequate 
than this classification. Nevertheless, I believe that for the present argument, a simpler and 
less detailed definition is enough for understanding the point at issue. 
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consequently brings about the failure to appreciate the special and peculiar 
value of supererogation.
The general argument aims at underlining how the problems of monists 
with supererogation are derived from the difficulty in maintaining the fine 
distinction between the axiological and the deontic levels. In this regard, 
embracing a single principle of morality that outlines the moral ought 
might prevent us from appreciating the constitutive heterogeneous nature 
of morality by smoothing over every aspect of it into the deontic sphere. 
Unsurprisingly, strong monists are usually anti-supererogationists, as they 
include this category of acts within the realm of moral obligation.
Specifically, the general argument is outlined in the following table.
The General Argument for the impossibility of a monist account of 
supererogation
P.1 Moral monism is the theoretical approach that considers a single ultimate moral source and a single way of moral reasoning.
P.2 Supererogatory acts are morally good while not morally required.
P.3
The nature of supererogation entails the existence of and the distinction 
between the axiological (the good) and the deontic levels (the right). While all 
the right acts are also morally good (and obligatory), supererogation shows 
that not all good acts are also required (contra “the good–ought tie-up” thesis).
C.1
It is problematic to hold that the same moral source can give an account of 
the different levels of morality. We simply cannot conceive a moral principle 
(a way of reasoning from the moral standpoint) that both sets the agent’s duty 
and tells the agent how to go beyond this same duty.
C.2 The multilevel structure of morality entailed by supererogation requires a double (at least) source of morality. There is a need for moral complexity.
C.3 Moral monism is a moral structure that fails to give an adequate account of supererogation.
P - premise
C - conclusion
The first conclusion (C.1) requires a further careful comment. Its main point 
is that we cannot use the same principle for both setting moral obligations 
and understanding how to go beyond them. If we allow theories driven by 
a single principle to justify both the acts that “go beyond duty” and the 
duties that those acts surpass, we might be saying two things. First, the 
principle already points out the different levels of moral goodness. Second, 
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the principle can work in two ways, revealing different degrees of good acts, 
some morally obligatory and others beyond this class of requirements. Both 
options seem difficult to hold. A moral principle is a way of reasoning that 
provides reasons that count in favor of action. At the same time, we have 
good reasons to adopt such a principle if we aim at promoting the given 
ultimate value x. Indeed, when adopted, a principle (here understood as the 
“tool” of morality) fulfills the achievement of a specific value. For example, 
the categorical imperative helps the agent fulfill the ultimate moral value 
of freedom (in the case of Kantian ethics236). When freedom is taken to be 
the only ultimate moral value, the adoption of the categorical imperative 
is what makes an act morally worthy. The problem with such a monistic 
system is in leaving some space to those acts that, while not obligatory, are 
morally good according to that same ultimate moral value that animates 
the adopted principle. Thus, the problems raised by C.1 start to arise more 
clearly. How is it possible to say that a principle has sufficiently fulfilled a 
given end in order to leave that extra space needed by supererogation? It 
seems that in this regard, a single principle is unable to grant the different 
levels of morality. Moreover, how is it possible to understand how to go 
beyond requirements, when our theory envisions only one way of reasoning 
(principle) that is fully concerned with moral obligation? A single way of 
reasoning animated by a single ultimate value seems incapable of leading 
the agent into two different “moral realms”, roughly speaking.
The second conclusion (C.2), according to a person’s idea of the 
structure of morality, can be misunderstood. My point can be understood 
if we identify the two faces of morality in a way that the deontic coincides 
with the morally right and the axiological coincides with the morally good. 
Generally, monistic theories seem excessively concerned with the deontic 
aspect of morality by pointing out the right thing to do. Although this is an 
essential dimension of morality, it is not the only one. Supererogatory acts 
define the category of acts that are morally good in a way that exceeds the 
dimension of primary concern for monism237. Supererogation (and morality 
236  Since this argument intends to be critical of monist theories in general, it is implicit that 
I take it to work against other forms of monism, such as utilitarianism.
237  This passage might give the impression that I am saying that supererogatory acts 
can be defined as “morally good but not morally right”. I believe that this would be a 
misunderstanding of the relation between the good and the right, which are not opposed 
categories. Rather, the good fully includes the right. The right is a subset of the morally good; 
as such, while not all good acts are part of the right (i.e., supererogation), all right acts are 
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in general) reminds us that human flourishing involves many moral aspects 
and ways of behaving. These instances of the good can exceed the binding 
dimension of the morally obligatory in many surprising ways.  
The third conclusion (C.3) states that the loss of moral complexity that 
supererogation requires makes monism an inadequate structure of morality 
for a proper justification of these peculiar moral acts. As we will see in further 
detail in the following sections and in the next chapter, supererogation 
struggles to find its place in those systems that are unable to recreate the 
same complexity that originated the concept in the Christian tradition.  
4.2 Maximizing Duties and the Space of Supererogation
To highlight a possible failure to assign the proper space to supererogatory 
acts, we need to consider the relation between supererogation and duty. 
In this regard, it is helpful to recall Heyd’s conditions of continuity and 
correlativity238. Supererogation and duty stand on a continuous scale of value 
and are both evaluated accordingly. Moreover, they are logically correlated 
since the former exists only by being beyond the latter. Nevertheless, 
a specific kind of duty (i.e., maximizing duty) represents a problem for 
both conditions. A maximizing duty is a moral mandate of the sort, “you 
ought to bring about x as much as possible”, where x is usually a value or 
an ideal that the given theory aims at promoting. This is usually the case 
of consequentialist theories, which are structured around a certain value 
(utility, happiness, pleasure, etc.) considered to be morally good to maximize. 
Accordingly, a moral act is evaluated based on how much x it brings about. If 
act A is the one that brings about the most x, then A is obligatory.
In the case of supererogation, this kind of duty becomes particularly 
problematic as it undermines the existence of supererogatory acts and also, 
as a side effect, both the conditions of correlativity and continuity. Since 
maximizing duties aim at the maximization of the good, the distinction 
necessary for supererogation between the right and the good vanishes. 
Maximizing duties (and consequently, maximizing theories) have a tendency 
to fill the entire gamut of moral acts, leaving no space for some non-obligatory 
morally good. These two categories are not opposed but part of a continuous scale of moral 
evaluation.
238  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 5. See also Chapter III of the present 
work, pp. 103–104. 
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instances of the good. Act A would bring about the best outcome and can 
only be obligatory under a maximizing conception of morality, regardless 
of whether it would generally be considered beyond one’s duty according 
to common-sense morality. For example, sacrificing oneself to save many 
is considered a duty as long as the survival of many is a morally better 
outcome than the survival of oneself. In these terms, maximizing duties cut 
off any possibility of a space for supererogation. The denial of the category of 
supererogatory acts makes its relations with duty useless and unnecessary. 
More generally, my claim is that a maximizing approach to morality does 
not take into account the distinction between the two levels of morality that 
(as I have underlined so far) is necessary for the concept of supererogation. 
This denial of the concept might serve as a general argument against the 
validity of a maximizing approach to morality239 since it would cut off a 
relevant and significant part of our moral experience. 
It is interesting to note that supererogation is not the only moral 
category negatively affected by a maximizing approach to morality. A similar 
criticism has been raised in relation to another (and more important) aspect 
of morality—moral integrity. Indeed, Bernard Williams’ “moral integrity” 
argument is implicitly directed against the maximizing feature of act-
utilitarianism240. Roughly, the argument is as follows: (P.1) Act-utilitarianism 
is the moral theory that tells us what to do by evaluating an act according to 
the maximization of overall utility. (P.2) The overall utility is evaluated from 
the impartial point of view. (P.3) It is often the case that such an evaluation 
goes against one’s personal projects and ideals. (C.1) Act-utilitarianism is a 
misunderstanding of true moral agency, since it provides the agent with acts 
that are not “his or her” acts. (C.2) Act-utilitarianism undermines the agent’s 
integrity (identification with one’s own acts). Thus, Williams’ argument is 
explicitly against the kind of impartiality that utilitarianism requires. This 
moral theory expects an impartial and cold-blooded agent who is ready to 
give up his or her most essential ideals by virtue of the moral dictate that 
239  Note that I specifically refer to the moral perspective. Here, I do not claim that “maximizing” 
cannot be the proper approach to other aspects of life. For example, think of maximizing 
one’s own physical condition in view of an athletic competition or maximizing one’s own 
financial situation in view of providing proper education to one’s own children.
240  The first formulation of the argument can be found in B. Williams, Integrity, in J.J. Smart, 
B. Williams (ed.), Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1973, pp. 108–118.
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comes from the «point of view of the universe»241. We can go on with this 
line of argumentation and say that this misunderstanding of moral agency 
provides an indebted maximization, one that is not appropriately grounded 
on the agent’s personal beliefs. Implicitly, Williams is thus against a sort of 
moral maximization that is purely moral (in the sense that has nothing to do 
with the agent’s inner beliefs)242. In his own words:
It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source 
of his action in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel 
between the input of everyone’s projects, including his own, and 
an output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to 
which his projects and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and 
decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is 
most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack 
on his integrity243.
Such an understanding of morality as the result of an external point of 
view gives rise to an indebted authority over the agent. In a similar way, 
I believe that the failure to recognize a category of the supererogatory 
within a maximizing system is the result of an indebted maximization. The 
reason why I claim this is that a maximizing approach misses focusing on 
the distinction between the right and the good, and it fails to recognize 
that, rather than the good, it is the right that needs to be maximized. The 
good is too open-ended to be required of all moral agents as it includes, 
among others, all those acts that are performed out of gratuity, self-sacrifice, 
and benevolence that find their morally praiseworthy nature by exceeding 
the boundaries of the obligatory. This is the main feature of the acts that 
are typically considered supererogatory. Making this special category of 
acts obligatory (by virtue of their morally desirable consequences) would 
undermine its intrinsic value. Moreover, deeming supererogatory acts as 
241  This famous expression is taken from one of the most influential utilitarians, Henry 
Sidgwick. See H. Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, Indianapolis/Cambridge, Macmillan, 1874. 
With the “moral integrity argument”, Williams intends to specifically attack this impersonal 
understanding of moral agency.
242  The debate around Williams’ integrity argument is quite articulated. For a good hint of it, 
see S.G. Chappell, N. Smyth, Bernard Williams, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, (fall 2018 edition),
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/williams-bernard/>. See also 
D. Cox, M. La Caze, M. Levine, Integrity, in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (spring 2017 edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/
entries/integrity/>.  
243  J.J. Smart, B. Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, pp. 116–117.
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obligatory would mean conceiving them as universalizable and expected 
from all moral agents. Quite interestingly, the phenomenology of these 
acts reveals how their agents aim at some extra good when they personally 
endorse a given end244. Agents of this sort do not necessarily think that 
they have performed the right thing (whose non-performance would be 
considered wrong), but they have simply aimed at something considered 
extra. The only way of making sense of supererogation is thus to outline 
an approach to morality that aims at maximizing the right, rather than the 
good. All that lies beyond the boundary of the moral right is the moral good 
that would be good to bring about but not wrong to omit.
This understanding of morality, far from being free from possible criticism, 
relies on the conceptual distinction between maximizing and satisficing. 
Particularly interesting for ethical theory, this specification distinguishes 
between two levels of achievement of a given good. Roughly speaking, 
maximizing means (as we have seen) “doing as much x as possible”, while 
satisficing means “doing x up to a satisfactory point”. This distinction becomes 
particularly important in explaining the way supererogation works. As we 
have seen above, a maximizing understanding of morality does not allow 
any space to the concept, rather, as I now outline, a satisficing understanding 
of morality is what makes supererogation theoretically conceivable. Jamie 
Dreier’s paper on the issue is particularly helpful245. Dreier tries to show how 
the rational and the ethical domains differ regarding the question of whether 
or not to maximize the outcome of a given act. It seems that they differ in 
a way that ethical satisficing makes sense, while rational satisficing does 
not. The reason for the former is the intuitive plausibility of supererogatory 
acts. Here we are presented with the so-called paradox of supererogation. If 
supererogatory acts are morally better, why are they not obligatory? In other 
words, why does it seem plausible to allow a satisficing account of morality 
that aims at a certain level of satisfactory achievement and does not require 
going on and fostering the morally best? One way to explain this is that 
we might have moral reasons to do the morally best, but at the same time, 
we hold stronger non-moral reasons that outweigh the others. This excuses 
244  See Chapter V, pp. 160f.
245  J. Dreier, Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t, in M. Byron 
(ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theories on Practical Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp. 131–154. I will further discuss Dreier’s account of supererogation 
in the following chapter, when I will outline my own account of supererogatory acts. See 
pp. 158–159.
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the omission of the supererogatory. However, this justification misses an 
important point of supererogatory acts; in this way, supererogation would 
only be optional from the all-things-considered (rational) standpoint but 
not from a moral point of view. If this were true, the agent who refrains 
from doing some supererogatory act would be considered doing something 
wrong from the moral point of view246. Nonetheless, what intuitively strikes 
us about this kind of act is that it is morally excusable. This conclusion seems 
counterintuitive, and we are apparently led back to face the paradox.
The way that Dreier tries to avoid this is by appealing to the existence 
of two (at least) different moral points of view: that of beneficence and that 
of justice247. The former is a more ambitious moral point of view that ranks 
every act on a scale in terms of the morally worse and the morally better. 
Accordingly, there are good reasons to always do the best act. In a sense, it is a 
point of view that maximizes the good. The latter perspective, that of justice, 
evaluates moral acts in terms of their moral wrongness and prevents the 
agent from bringing about something morally wrong. Following the above 
terminology, we could add that this is a moral point of view that grants a 
satisfactory level of the right. Most importantly, then, Dreier emphasizes that 
normally, reasons derived from the point of view of justice are particularly 
stringent and strong, as it is difficult for an agent to do something plainly 
unjust. In contrast, reasons that spring from the standpoint of beneficence 
appear less forceful and binding, as it might be reasonable (given some 
relevant opposing non-moral reasons) not to do the morally best thing (i.e., 
the supererogatory act)248. What Dreier explicitly leaves as an open question 
is why the point of view of justice happens to be in this favored position over 
the other moral point of view. My take on this important issue is that reasons 
of justice disclose a stronger influence because it would be impossible to live 
in a society that openly allows instances of moral wrongness. This appears 
as the minimal standard required for conceiving the social dimension of 
human beings who want to live together. Differently, it is possible (even if 
undesirable) to think of a society that lives without any actualization of moral 
beneficence, one that is less (if not at all) concerned with living according to 
better moral standards than those strictly required by sufficient coexistence 
with others. This is what makes the moral standpoint of beneficence less 
stringent than the moral perspective of justice.
246  J. Dreier, Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t, p. 149.
247  Ibidem.
248  Ivi, p. 150.
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Furthermore, the moral points of view have to be confronted within the 
bigger picture of the point of view of the all-things-considered. In this regard, 
the agent considers the relevance and the stringency of all the moral reasons 
together with the non-moral reasons for acting in one way or another. This 
is ultimately the rational point of view, the one that envisions and combines 
all the pulls for action that the agent withstands. Since the rational point 
of view is the all-things-considered perspective, it would be impossible to 
claim that we do not always identify the rationally best thing. Regardless of 
the fact that we actually perform that act, it would be impossible to claim 
that we approach the rational point of view in a satisficing way. However, 
it is in this situation that reasons for supererogation can be silenced and 
outweighed by other more rationally stringent non-moral reasons for its 
omission. For example, it would be the morally better option to jump into a 
burning car in trying to rescue the people trapped inside, but it might not 
be the case that John would put his life in great danger given that his wife 
and his five children all rely on him as the breadwinner of the family. What 
if John finally jumps into the burning car? Would his action be considered 
irrational, since the non-moral reasons that originally outweighed the reasons 
for supererogation are just left unheard? I believe so. While supererogatory 
acts are always morally praiseworthy, sometimes, they are not rationally 
justified. It remains an open question if it is specifically this willingness to 
pursue that extra good, regardless of the consequences, hat assigns to these 
actions their special value.
An interesting example of the problematic nature of maximizing duties is 
that provided by the case of special obligations. These are peculiar obligations 
that we usually have by virtue of our relationship with the beneficiary of 
our acts. In this sense, the relational proximity to the beneficiary of the 
act grounds specific duties249. Take the parent–children relationship: I am 
required to do as much as possible to care for my son’s needs in a way that 
is completely different from my caring for a stranger’s needs. This reveals 
that a certain degree of relational proximity can involve maximizing duties. 
If this is the case, then the possibility of performing a supererogatory act 
is affected and eventually undermined by the presence of such special 
obligations. The larger the conceptual space taken by maximizing duties, 
the smaller is left to supererogatory acts250.
249  See D. Jeske, R. Fumerton, Relatives and Relativism, «Philosophical Studies», LXXXVII, 
1997, pp. 143−157.
250  I have dedicated some more pages to this issue in S. Grigoletto, Why Proximity Matters for 
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Summing up Dreier’s position again, I can highlight how the existence of 
the two moral points of view is what makes supererogation possible and not 
paradoxical. Dreier’s strategy (which seems to me fully plausible) is to show 
that the only way to solve the paradox of supererogation is to acknowledge (at 
least) the two necessary levels of morality that (as I have highlighted above) 
happen to be fundamental to the concept. In fact, this distinction stands 
for the two faces of morality—the evaluative and the deontic dimensions 
or (according to my understanding of them) that between the good and the 
right. Committing to a unidimensional understanding of morality results in 
the loss of the typical complexity of this domain. One of the consequences of 
this choice would be that of denying a space to the concept of supererogation.
4.3 Utilitarianism and the Denial of Supererogation
Following the conclusion of the general argument against the 
accountability of supererogation in monist theories, I now try to highlight 
more specifically how the most famous moral approaches might fail to 
accommodate the concept. In this section, I deal with consequentialism, 
mostly in the specification offered by act-utilitarianism. Traditionally, 
utilitarianism has been specified in many different ways, each attempting to 
respond to a particular criticism that has been raised against the classic version 
of the theory. Here, I mostly refer to the classic (and less artificial) version of 
act-utilitarianism251. Roughly, this (original) version of utilitarianism is the 
theory that evaluating the agent’s act by its consequences claims that the 
morally right thing to do is the one that brings about the most happiness 
overall (generally conceived as the promotion of pleasure and the absence 
of pain). Using the famous words of Jeremy Bentham, we can sum up this 
position with the motto “the greatest good for the greatest number”, also 
known as the principle of utility252.
the Concept of Supererogation, «Ethics & Politics», XIX (1), 2017, pp. 291−307.
251  It is interesting to see how different versions of consequentialism can greatly vary in 
dealing with the concept of supererogation. For good examples of this matter, see J.P. Vessel, 
Supererogation for Utilitarianism, «American Philosophical Quarterly», XLVII (4), 2010, pp. 
299−319. I will focus more precisely on this work on footnote 347.
252  While Bentham is acknowledged as the father of this expression, conceptually, he has been 
greatly influenced by the previous works of Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Cesare 
Beccaria. Beccaria himself claims, «La massima felicità divisa nel maggior numero», [«The 
greatest happiness divided by the majority» (my translation)], C. Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle 
pene, in G. Francioni (ed.), Milano, Mediobanca, 1984, p. 23. See J. Bentham, An Introduction 
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As it appears clear from these words, classical utilitarianism aims at the 
maximization of the good. Bentham claims that the right act, the one that 
ought to be performed, represents the optimal promotion of the happiness 
of those interested in the act. I think that from this claim, we can already 
acknowledge how maintaining a clear distinction between the two levels 
of morality becomes more problematic in such a moral structure. From 
a utilitarian standpoint, the right (what ought to be done) is intended as 
the morally best action available, the one that maximizes the good. As 
emphasized in the previous sections, this represents a major problem for 
supererogation, of which James Urmson is already well aware, as stated in 
his seminal article on the status of supererogatory acts:
If for Moore, and for most utilitarians, any action is a duty that will 
produce the greatest possible good in the circumstances, for them the 
most heroic self-sacrifice or saintly self-forgetfulness will be duties on 
all fours with truth-telling and promise-keeping253.
This is the main problem of utilitarianism; the maximization of the good 
elevates the right to the highest standard that is intuitively unreasonable to 
ask of everyone. Consequently, a moral approach of this kind ends up openly 
denying the class of supererogatory acts. If the alleged act of supererogation 
is the one that brings about the best outcome, then it makes no sense not to 
consider it a moral requirement. This denial of the two faces of morality and 
of its multilevel nature is well expressed by the motto “good–ought tie-up”. 
Plainly, what is good needs to be done254. Nevertheless, this criticism only 
works with the specific interpretation of ought as personal and prescriptive. 
The former of these two connotations refers to a use of ought as in “you 
ought to do x”, different from the impersonal use, as in “x ought to be done”. 
This personal understanding of ought is troublesome because it imposes a 
to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, New York, Hafner Press, 1948. In particular, refer 
to Chapter I.
253  J.O. Urmson, Saints and Heroes, in A.I. Melden (ed.), Essays in Moral Philosophy, Seattle, 
University of Washington Press, 1958, p. 206. However, it is interesting to note that the 
second part of Urmson’s paper reveals a strong belief in the possibility that utilitarianism, 
with some refinement, would be able to accommodate the concept.
254  «The denial of supererogation is basically associated with the rejection of the idea of the 
two faces of morality. Normativity is one and cannot be split into two levels, that of the 
good (the desirable, the ideal, the recommended) and that of the required (the obligatory, the 
prescribed). What “ought to be the case” also “ought to be done”», D. Heyd, Supererogation, 
in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2019 edition), 
URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/supererogation/>.
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requirement directly on a specific agent to do something no matter how 
costly the performance of the act is. However, I think that the aspect of ought 
that tends to generate the most substantial ambiguity is the commendatory 
versus the prescriptive use of ought. “You ought to see that movie if you 
want to spend an enjoyable night” is not necessarily a requirement but a 
suggestion, given the fact that there are some reasons to act accordingly. In 
contrast, the prescriptive use of ought generally entails a strong requirement 
to do x, given some alleged decisive reason to do it255. “You ought to finish 
your homework if you want go out and play with your friends’ says the 
mother to her child. In this second understanding of ought, the very idea 
of supererogation is denied since any good, as long as it is the best option, 
requires performance. The reason for this denial is a “good–ought tie-up” 
conception of ethics.
Christopher New criticizes the concept of supererogation that follows 
this conception of ethics256. He argues that we need to abandon the intuitive 
belief that supererogatory acts exist, rather than rejecting the founding idea 
of utilitarianism that whatever maximizes the good needs to be done. New 
recognizes a sort of distinction between basic duties (those necessary for a 
tolerable civilized life) and non-basic ones (those that enrich everyday life), 
and he holds that both categories are part of a person’s moral requirements. 
He directly addresses Urmson’s attack on utilitarianism when he points out 
how morality would become high and unattainable for most moral agents if 
the duty of maximizing the good were true.  New responds that morality is 
regulated by the “ought implies can” principle; thus, duties are commensurate 
to the agent’s capacities. If a particular agent would be perfectly able to 
perform a saintly or heroic act, we could not fail to consider it one of his or 
her duties. I believe that in this case, his argument against the existence of 
supererogation becomes faulty:
It may be retorted that the alcoholic and the kleptomaniac […] have at 
least a duty to try to be temperate and honest. But this argument can 
be applied to saintliness and heroism too – have we not all a duty to 
try to become saintly and heroic, to resist the pull of selfishness and 
fear as much as we can?257.
To confute this position, we need to point out how sometimes, supererogatory 
acts place the agent in front of a clear-cut decision. For example, think of 
255  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 79.
256  C. New, Saints, Heroes and Utilitarians, «Philosophy», XLIX, 1974, pp. 179–189.
257  C. New, ivi, p. 181.
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the case of a stranger who is drowning in rushing waters. The best thing 
to do in that situation would be to jump into the water and try to save the 
stranger. Still, due to the conditions of the water, there is no certainty of a 
successful rescue. First, if I cannot swim very well, the “ought implies can” 
principle prevents me from taking this action among the options that can be 
performed. There is no duty to “at least try” to save the stranger. Either I can 
(and ought to) do it or not. Second, what if I am a good swimmer indeed? 
What kind of ought is presented in this moral pull? I think that it remains a 
commendatory rather than a prescriptive use of ought. Given the high risk 
of the operation that would lead to the best outcome in terms of happiness, 
the performance of the supererogatory act maintains its optionality, 
regardless of the fact that it represents the act that would generate the 
best outcome. Moreover, in real life, there are plenty of cases where the 
calculus of utility is far from being easy to achieve. Uncertainty about the 
success of the act undermines the status of a duty, no matter how good its 
consequences are. The same can be said when the act entails a possible self-
sacrifice by the agent. It is usually the case that supererogatory acts, even 
if they let us imagine the best possible outcome, are far from providing the 
certainty of achieving these desirable results. I believe that this undermines 
the status of their alleged obligatoriness, even from a utilitarian perspective. 
Claiming that they would be obligatory, regardless of any evaluation of their 
consequences, leads to the idea of morality that tends to freely violate the 
agent’s autonomy. I believe that this is not the happy society where it would 
be desirable to live. To avoid this, I think that the optionality of performing 
these peculiar acts takes precedence over the theoretical needs of a given 
moral account; the choice to always perform the “morally best” deed is left 
to the individual agent’s commitment to bring about the good.
Cases such as this show how it is one thing to think of beneficence and 
altruism as qualities that are highly desirable and should be promoted as 
much as possible and another matter to consider this sort of maximization 
mandatory at any cost. The “higher flies of morality”258 cannot be considered 
altogether duties. As I have emphasized above, the concept of supererogation 
benefits from the fact that the categories of the good and the bad are not 
perfectly symmetrical within a reasonable moral system. While the rejection 
or the prevention of the bad is the first object of moral theorizing, the good 
is desirable and open-ended. While there is often a precise prescription of 
258  This is how Urmson refers to the performance of acts beyond the call of duty.
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how not to bring about the bad, the opposite is true in the performance of 
the good. Negative theorizing (of the kind of “do not do x”, “never forget to 
x”, etc.) is what grounds the level of the morally right. The reason for this is 
the necessity of setting that minimum level of morality that makes civilized 
life possible and enjoyable for everyone. Thus, it makes no sense, as New 
does, to say that a kleptomaniac is not doing something wrong as long as he 
or she tries not to steal and be honest. Using New’s terminology259, failing to 
act in compliance with a basic duty is very different from failing with regard 
to a non-basic one. Basic duties are ultimately what grounds the civilized life 
of a society and as such, have a different degree of obligatoriness. Anyone 
should be able to live according to basic duties, which is what makes them of 
a different moral character. The same cannot be said of what New calls “non-
basic duties”:; moral agents greatly differ in the ways they can contribute to 
the establishment of a better world, which explains why it makes no sense 
to consider beneficence a duty in a specific way. The achievement of the 
good is desirable and needs to be promoted by any moral agent. However, 
the specific way to do it is left to the moral imagination of every single 
self. New’s general argument for the obligatoriness of supererogatory acts 
misses this important aspect of morality. His argument states roughly the 
following: P.1) We do not want a civilized life for its own sake but because 
it is a happy life to live; thus, it is reasonable to want a civilized life to be 
as happy as possible. P.2) Basic duties are obligatory because they increase 
the happiness of life. C.1) Since alleged supererogatory acts also greatly 
increase happiness, they are obligatory indeed. It is apparent that this 
argument fails to consider any non-utilitarian consideration of morality260. 
As a consequence, the only moral purpose is the maximization of the good 
even at the expense of the agent’s autonomy. Moreover, New claims that 
according to the general argument, if someone has the capacity to perform 
a heroic or a saintly act, one has a duty to do so. I think that it would be 
very unlikely (if not impossible) to discern the morally relevant capacities 
of an agent and infer the degree of duty to which he or she is expected 
to conform. Again, this is what distinguishes the obligatory from the 
non-obligatory; the former can regularly be required of any moral agent, 
whereas the latter cannot. In many cases of supererogatory acts (e.g., the 
259  Nevertheless, I refuse to accept this terminology, given the fact that morality goes far 
beyond the basic and the non-basic distinction of duties.
260  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 79.
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rescue of the drowning stranger), it would be irrational to ask anyone to do 
them no matter what the degree of self-sacrifice involved. The concept of 
supererogation traditionally refers to the “higher flies of morality” and even 
if it is true that some moral agents are perfectly capable of these desirable 
achievements, it is preferable to maintain their optional moral status. A 
society that allows the requirement of sacrificing someone to benefit others 
by virtue of the calculus of utility would not ultimately be the expression of 
the civilized life that New holds dear. A society of this sort, while morally 
perfect for utilitarian standards, would not be a desirable one. According to 
Heyd, New’s anti-supererogationism originates from the confusion between 
the commendatory use and the prescriptive use of ought 261. It is true that 
sometimes, we tend to promote the performance of supererogatory acts, but 
if we keep in mind the commendatory use of ought, we realize how this 
promotion of the good does not necessarily entail a moral requirement. In 
these terms, utilitarianism, in its less articulated versions262, introduces an 
indebted oversimplification of morality. 
Generally, classical act-utilitarianism seems to fail to consider those 
supererogatory acts, which, while maintaining a high moral status, do not 
necessarily increase the general amount of utility. For example, think of the 
self-sacrifice of two parents, who are trying to save their only child. Losing 
two lives to save one might be considered a loss in terms of the calculus of 
utility. Still, from the moral standpoint, we do not fail to appreciate what 
they have done. Many supererogatory acts that involve self-sacrifice are 
considered morally good, no matter what the result in terms of utility263. As 
I have emphasized in the previous chapter, what really assigns the moral 
value to this particular category of acts is its optionality and altruistic nature. 
Both of these features are not concerned with the maximization of any given 
261  Ibidem.
262  A criticism of this sort does not necessarily apply to other more articulated versions 
of utilitarianism. See J.P. Vessel, Supererogation for Utilitarianism, «American Philosophical 
Quarterly», XLVII, 2010, pp. 299–317. It is nevertheless true that these other forms of 
utilitarianism present other related problems for accounting for the concept of supererogation. 
Non-maximizing or satisficing versions of utilitarianism tend to struggle to identify the level 
of the “good enough” that can be surpassed by supererogatory acts.
263  In truth, even the failure in the performance of a supererogatory act does not affect its 
moral status. I have already dedicated some pages to this matter (see p. 103). See also D. 
Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 133. However, I concede that the agent of 
a supererogatory act should at least aim at some good consequences (even if not necessarily 
the best ones).
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good, which is in open disagreement with the utilitarian doctrine. These 
lines by John Stuart Mill reveal how cases of non-maximizing self-sacrifice 
are not considered morally worthy:
The utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power 
of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others. It only 
refuses to admit that the sacrifice is itself a good. A sacrifice which 
does not increase or tend to increase the sum total of happiness, it 
considers as wasted. The only self-renunciation which it applauds is 
devotion to the happiness, or to some of the means of happiness, of 
others, either mankind collectively or of individuals within the limits 
imposed by the collective interests of mankind264.
Utilitarianism is usually widely influenced by a line of argumentation of 
this sort. The evaluation of the entire moral gamut according to a single and 
unique scale that ranges from the morally worst to the morally best265 is a 
moral approach that presents an indisputable theoretical loss. In this way, 
the morally right simply identifies with the morally good, and the deontic 
level of morality becomes the same thing as the evaluative one. In other 
words, the role of the deontic is delegated to the evaluative. Everything that 
is evaluated as morally good is morally required at the same time. Moreover, 
according to the maximizing conception of morality, something is morally 
good (and thus also right) only as long as there is no other morally better 
option. In the light of the importance of moral complexity highlighted in the 
first part of this book, this represents the loss of an important dimension of 
morality in favor of a theoretical oversimplification that does not take into 
account the complexity of our moral life. As a consequence, the utilitarian 
“good–ought tie-up” conception of morality leads to the denial of the 
concept of supererogation. The very existence of the concept relies on the 
distinction among the multiple levels of morality. If we deny this, we deny 
the concept altogether. Then, in its maximizing and less articulated versions, 
utilitarianism implies the following:
(Evaluative ↔ Deontic) → ¬Supererogation
in other terms
(Good ↔ Right) → ¬Supererogation
264  J.M. Mill, Utilitarianism, Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, pp. 
16–17.
265  Remember that such “morally best” ultimately becomes morally obligatory.
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If the good and the right are domains that do not maintain a certain degree 
of distinctiveness, we will lose the possibility of explaining those aspects of 
morality that appear so intuitively agreeable (and supererogatory acts are 
clearly of this sort). Deriving one level entirely from the other will make us 
lose that theoretical complexity that makes the concept of supererogation 
explicable. The utilitarian denial of supererogation is a consequence of 
considering obligatory everything that is morally good (“good–ought tie-
up”). As shown in the following section, a very similar (even if not identical) 
claim can be said of Kantian ethics.
4.4 Kantian Ethics and the Denial of Supererogation
In the contemporary debate, the classification of “Kantian ethics” 
is interpreted in different ways First, that name could refer to the moral 
philosophy explicitly developed by Immanuel Kant in the latter part 
of the 18th century. In this context, Kantian ethics is precisely Kant’s 
ethics. Kantian ethics might also pertain to a sort of ethics that, while not 
attributable to Kant himself, has been developed under an evident Kantian 
insight. The contemporary debate provides plenty of examples of this latter 
understanding of the term. Nonetheless, in this section, I aim to show the 
denial of supererogation according to the former understanding of Kantian 
ethics. As much as possible, I will try to refer to Kant’s original position266. 
As it will become clear, the sort of criticism that I intend to raise against 
the possibility of a Kantian account of supererogation is similar (while not 
identical) to the one raised against utilitarianism. I hold that both these 
criticisms are directly derived from the general argument, as expressed in 
Section 1 of this chapter.
Generally, the argument for the denial of supererogation in the Kantian 
moral theory follows this pattern: P.1) For Kant, the moral good of an act is 
directly derived from its being motivated by the moral law. P.2) Alleged acts 
of supererogation are morally good yet merely optional and thus, neither 
universalizable nor derived from duty. C.1) For Kant, there cannot be some 
266  This leaves as an open question whether or not Kantian ethics (intended in its second 
understanding) might be able to account for the concept of supererogation. Possibly, a good 
example of an attempt to interpret Kant’s theory and expand it in order to fit new questions 
is T. Hill, Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation, «Kant-Studien», LXII, 1971, pp. 55–76. 
In particular, see pp. 71ff. 
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moral goodness beyond the call of duty; therefore, supererogatory acts do 
not exist. However, as I will show in the following discussion, this argument 
cannot be taken as the Kantian position par excellence without further 
qualifications.
A study of Kant’s moral theory cannot fail to acknowledge that the 
entire Kantian production of ethical writings does not represent a unitary 
and coherent position. It has often been underlined how Kant’s claims in 
his earlier works on morality (namely the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason) slightly differ from those in his 
later works (most notably The Metaphysics of Morals). A study of a possible 
account of supererogation clearly shows these differences among Kant’s 
writings267. Let us then analyze some passages from Kant’s works that might 
cast some light on the question of supererogation within his moral theory.
The less rigorous position presented in the Metaphysics of Morals seems to 
allow some space for the category of supererogatory acts. Specifically, when 
Kant discusses the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties268, he 
seems to offer an understanding of morality characterized by different levels 
of accomplishment that would make supererogation possible. A perfect duty 
is a strict moral duty (e.g., “do not kill”). An imperfect duty allows a certain 
freedom of choice of how and when a moral duty is performed (e.g., “be 
generous with the others”). As usually emphasized, imperfect duties leave 
a sort of playroom (latitudo269) to the agent, whose role is to understand 
how and when to fulfill them. Regarding the broader and less demanding 
category of imperfect duties, Kant claims the following:
Imperfect duties are, accordingly, only duties of virtue. Fulfillment of 
them is merit (meritum) =+a; but failure to fulfill them is not in itself 
culpability (demeritum) =-a, but rather mere deficiency in moral worth 
=0, unless the subject should make it his principle not to comply with 
such duties. It is only the strength of one’s resolution, in the first case, 
that is properly called virtue (virtus); one’s weakness, in the second 
case, is not so much vice (vitium) as rather mere want of virtue, lack 
of moral strength (defectus moralis)270.
267  For a more detailed analysis of this sort, see Chapter III in D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its 
Status in Ethical Theory, pp. 49–72.
268  He has already introduced this distinction earlier in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals.
269  I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996, p. 153.
270  Ibidem.
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Passages such as this one make us think that supererogation is at least 
logically possible within the Kantian system. An imperfect duty, so 
explained, is almost identical to the contemporary idea of supererogation—
an act whose performance is good and whose non-performance does not 
constitute a moral loss271. It is hard to tell whether or not Kant himself had 
in mind something similar to the concept of supererogation (a term that he 
never adopted). Less rigorous interpretations of what an imperfect duty is for 
Kant tend to highlight this similarity between supererogation and this kind 
of duty. The focal point at issue is the permissibility to refrain from doing 
what a given imperfect duty tells an agent to do. If we would be able to do 
this without further qualification, supererogation and imperfect duties will 
finally be the same thing. The problem is that for Kant, we cannot dismiss a 
duty without qualification, as this passage clearly highlights:
[…] but a wide duty is not to be taken as permission to make exceptions 
to the maxim of actions, but only as permission to limit one maxim 
of duty by another (e.g. love of one’s neighbor in general by love of 
one’s parents), by which in fact the field for the practice of virtue is 
widened272.
A wide duty cannot be dismissed for no reason (for an inclination not to 
do so, we might say) but only insofar as another wide duty undermines its 
demandingness. I believe that this highlights the major difference between 
wide duties and supererogation; thus, it rules out any possible identification 
of one with the other. Supererogatory acts can be abandoned without 
qualification and permission. This is what grounds their optionality and 
what assigns great value to their potential performance. No matter how 
“wide” our understanding of Kant’s imperfect duties, they will never match 
that level of optionality typical of supererogatory acts.
Another interesting attempt to accommodate supererogatory acts within 
271  Similarly, other passages seem to make an implicit reference to the idea of supererogation, 
such as the following: «That man is worthy of positive honour, whose actions are meritorious, 
and contain more than they are due to contain» I. Kant, Lecture on Ethics, in P. Heath, 
J.B. Schneewind (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 75. «If someone 
does more in the way of duty than he can be constrained by law to do, what he does is 
meritorious (meritum); if what he does is just exactly what the law requires, he does what is 
owed (debitum); finally, if what he does is less than the law requires, it is morally culpable 
(demeritum)», I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 19. As Heyd points out, when Kant 
deals with these subjects, he apparently uses “the language of supererogation”, D. Heyd, 
Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 65.
272  I. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 19.
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a Kantian framework is that of the conjunctive performance of imperfect 
duties273. Roughly, this occurs when the agent has the possibility of fulfilling 
an imperfect duty by either doing x or y and decides to do both. In other 
words, this means that an imperfect duty, in a Kantian sense, entails the 
performance of at least one of the possible options that would fulfill the duty 
(call this a disjunctive fulfillment). In the case of supererogatory performance, 
rather than picking one of the alternatives that would fulfill a given imperfect 
duty, the agent decides to go beyond the morally required (given that he or 
she has the possibility to do so) by performing more than one satisficing 
option274 (call this conjunctive performance of imperfect duties). If the duty 
of beneficence might be fulfilled by donating either money to a charitable 
organization or two hours of the agent’s free time to the same organization, 
and the agent decides to do both, he or she exceeds the requirements of 
the imperfect duty in the given circumstances. The freedom of choice that 
Kant allows for the fulfillment of the imperfect duty in one way or the other 
is the same freedom of choice that allows the agent to perform both of 
them when possible. Nonetheless, even if this understanding of imperfect 
duties is paired with the performance of the good that is expected of a 
supererogatory act, I believe that it fails to match another important aspect 
of supererogation—its permissible non-performance. Let me sum up the 
conjunctive performance of imperfect duties that alludes to the possibility 
of explaining supererogation in Kantian terms275:
a) Imperfect duty: O (a ∨ b)
b) Supererogatory act in Kantian terms: O (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∧ b)
c) Omissibility of supererogation in non-Kantian terms: ¬O (a ∧ b).
It follows from c) that the omission of a supererogatory act can be expressed 
as P¬ (a ∨ b). From this, I derive276 P (¬a ∨ ¬b). This claim can be true in the 
273  It remains an open question whether this attempt is faithful to Kant’s original doctrine 
or relies on the second understanding of Kantian ethics, intended as a moral approach that 
shares the original spirit of Kant’s ethics, while seeking to revise it in some aspects.  
274  Thomas Hill has suggested the possibility of a category of supererogation of this sort. See 
T. Hill, Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation, p. 71.
275  For mere explicative purposes, I adopt here the syntax of standard deontic logic. Take 
“O” as obligatory and “P” as permissible. Moreover, “a” and “b” each stand for a given act. 
“Oa” can be read as “it is obligatory to perform a”, and “a ∧ b” can be read as “a and b are 
performed”. For simplicity, I focus on a case with only two available options.
276  According to De Morgan’s law, the negation of a conjunction is the disjunction of 
the negations. As such, the omission (or the non-performance) of supererogation can be 
expressed as: (¬a ∨ ¬b). Claims d, e, and f represent the three ways in which P (¬a ∨ ¬b) can 
be true.
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following cases:
a) P (¬ b) 
b) P (¬ a)
c) P (¬ a ∧ ¬ b).
However, claim f) seems to be a case of omission of a supererogatory act 
that Kantian ethics fails to account for. Specifically, the claim “P (¬ a ∧ ¬ b)” 
contradicts the Kantian definition of an imperfect duty, as in claim a) “O (a 
∨ b)”. Instead, a theory of supererogation has no difficulties in considering 
claim f) as morally permissible. The optionality of supererogatory acts 
makes it perfectly acceptable to entirely refrain from the performance of 
that extra good. The same cannot be said of a typically Kantian theory, where 
(regarding imperfect duties) claim f) is not morally permissible (in other 
words, considered morally bad). While there is a certain latitudo in how 
to fulfill the imperfect duty, not fulfilling that duty at all is simply morally 
wrong. Claim f) represents the case of the omission of a supererogatory act 
(or series of acts) that involves the infringement of an imperfect duty. In 
other words, claim f) represents a case where supererogation and imperfect 
duties ultimately differ, since a theory of supererogation would be perfectly 
fine with this sort of omission, while the Kantian theory of imperfect duties 
does not allow the same omission. I believe that this reveals how a Kantian 
account of supererogation, in terms of a conjunctive use of imperfect duties, 
fails to give a complete account of the optionality typical of supererogation 
as considered in non-Kantian terms. The case of the omission of imperfect 
duties reveals how these duties are nonetheless duties, and as such, they 
incur some degree of moral loss in at least one specific instance of non-
performance. I believe that this is the primary difference from the concept 
of supererogation understood in non-Kantian terms277. The impossibility 
277  It has also been noted that wide imperfect duties do not always offer such a clear-cut 
distinction between the viable options. This means that the analogy between wide imperfect 
duties and disjunctive duties is not always possible, as an account of supererogation 
would require. See D. Guevara, The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant’s Moral Theory, 
«Philosophy and Phenomenological Research», LIX (3), 1999, pp. 601–603. Other scholars 
have highlighted how this possibility of drawing a line in the fulfillment of imperfect duties 
is “alien” to Kant’s ethics. If so, this makes a conjunctive understanding of supererogation in 
Kantian terms impossible; if there are no degrees of fulfillment, it is impossible to go beyond 
a certain moral requirement. «This is all quite alien to Kant’s ethics. There is no clear line of 
demarcation between what I must do, morally, and what is nice but morally optional. Nor 
does Kant attempt to trace such a line of demarcation. To do so he would have to give up a 
central thesis: that we have a duty to strive to perfect ourselves morally», M. Baron, Kantian 
Ethics Almost Without Apology, Ithaca, NJ, Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 41.  
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to account for actual supererogation in Kantian ethics relies on the fact 
that no matter which interpretation of imperfect duties we provide, they 
essentially remain duties278. As I have briefly claimed above, supererogation 
represents a category of acts that can be omitted without qualification and 
with no occurrence of moral loss. The same cannot always be said of the 
widest imperfect duty, as expressed by Kant. This difference suggests that 
supererogation and imperfect duties vary in a way that makes it problematic 
to consider this a viable way for a Kantian account of supererogation.
This leaves us with t no other option but to accept the rigorous theory 
proposed in Kant’s writings and as such, to deny the possibility of proper 
supererogation in his moral system. In particular, some passages from Kant’s 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals seem to rule out the possibility of 
non-duty-based and morally good acts. For example:
To be beneficent where one can is one’s duty, and besides there are 
many souls so attuned to compassion that, even without another 
motivating ground of vanity, or self-interest, they find an inner 
gratification in spreading joy around them, and can relish the 
contentment of others, in so far as it is their work. But I assert that in 
such a case an action of this kind – however much it conforms with 
duty, however amiable it may be – still has no true moral worth, but 
stands on the same footing as other inclinations, e.g. the inclination to 
honor, which if it fortunately lights upon what is in fact in the general 
interest and in conformity with duty, and hence honorable, deserves 
praise and encouragement, but not high esteem; for the maxim lacks 
moral content, namely to do such actions not from inclination, but 
from duty279.
The main problem that these claims represent for supererogation is that 
regardless of the content of an agent’s acts, the only thing that makes them 
moral is their being motivated by duty. The reason for Kant’s attachment to 
duty is his desire to distinguish the moral realm from that of inclination. We 
can concede to Kant that supererogation (and in general, the category of the 
optional) relies on the agent’s inclination to pursue the good of others more 
278  According to Hill, this claim relies on a too rigorous interpretation of the Kantian use of 
the word “duty”. Although this term is an “old label” that Kant derives from a legalistic (and 
hence reductionist) conception of morality, the passages from the Metaphysics of Morals 
reveal how he is well aware of the fact that morality goes far beyond the legalistic level of 
the morally right. See T. Hill, Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation, p. 74.
279  I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in M. Gregor, J. Timmermann (ed.), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 13–14.
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than one is required to do. As such, the willingness to go beyond the call of 
duty might be temporary, fleeting, or driven by the circumstances. While 
all these features are compatible with a theory of supererogation, they 
are stranger to the moral philosophy of Kant, whose intent is to develop 
a rational, a priori, and universalizable theory for practical action. At one 
time, an agent might be willing to sacrifice a certain good for the sake of 
others, and on another occasion, he or she might be unwilling to do the 
same. From the Kantian perspective, this undermines the moral character 
of these acts. It is thus not surprising that any instance of supererogation 
would fail the universalizability test of the categorical imperative in all its 
versions. Since supererogatory acts spring from an inclination to bring 
about some extra good (while supporters of supererogation consider it a 
specifically moral inclination), for Kant, this makes them no different from 
choosing strawberry over vanilla ice cream (i.e., they lose their moral 
character). Certainly, as Kant would be willing to concede, the content of a 
supererogatory act and that of choosing an ice cream flavor greatly diverge 
(with the supererogatory one being distinctively praiseworthy). Nonetheless, 
both of them lack the true moral character bestowed by acting in conformity 
with the moral law. The “duty as a motive” feature of a moral act within the 
Kantian framework is what ultimately grounds the other hallmarks of this 
theory—the universalizability of the maxim and the obligatoriness of a moral 
act280. All these three features are incompatible with the intuitively appealing 
definition of supererogatory acts as “morally good but not required”.
It is important to underline how Kant is well aware of the existence of 
heroic acts. However, his understanding of heroism greatly differs from what 
the contemporary debate on supererogation takes as paradigmatic examples 
of it. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant offers the following example:
But I do wish that educators would spare their pupils examples of so-
called noble (supermeritorious) actions, with which our sentimental 
writings so abound, and would expose them all only to duty and to the 
worth that a human being can and must give himself in his own eyes 
by consciousness of not having transgressed it; for, whatever runs up 
into empty wishes and longings for inaccessible perfection produces 
280  Although Heyd does not ground (as I do) universalizability and obligatoriness on the 
“duty as a motive” feature of Kantian ethics, his analysis of a Kantian anti-supererogationism 
is almost identical to mine. See D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 53. 
Nevertheless, Heyd seems more willing to concede a peculiar understanding of the Kantian 
theory that leaves room for some instances of supererogation. Ivi, pp. 54ff. 
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more heroes of romance who, while they pride themselves on their 
feeling for extravagant greatness, release themselves in return from 
the observance of common and everyday obligation, which then 
seems to them insignificant and petty281.
In the passage that follows this quotation, Kant considers the example of 
an honest man who is ordered by a powerful lord to commit an immoral 
deed. Regardless of the degree of the lord’s threats against the unfortunate 
powerless man, the latter decides to adhere firmly to his moral obligations 
at the cost of his life. This is the sort of noble act that can inspire the youth 
and offer them a glimpse of what a moral character really is.
The attention to this particular example of heroism explains why Kant 
is generally suspicious of this category of acts. He is worried that the “high 
flies of morality” can hide an implicit approval of sentimental acting based 
on a temporary and evanescent inclination. For Kant, actual heroism is very 
different (if not opposite to) from these sentimental “high flies” of morality. 
In fact, it corresponds to the strict adherence to a perfect duty in cases where 
acting morally would entail a huge sacrifice. It is the ultimate triumph of the 
sense of duty in cases where the circumstances would suggest to the negligent 
agent to discharge his or her strict moral obligations. For Kant, heroism 
provides a further occasion to talk about adherence to the sense of duty, 
rather than a case to investigate what lies beyond duty282. Taken in Kantian 
terms, heroism is much more similar to the deeds of the rescuer of the victims 
of the 9\11 terroristic attack than to the acts of the big-hearted volunteer. 
Think of the clear examples of heroism demonstrated by the firefighters who 
adhered to their duty to rescue people no matter how costly such a rescue 
would have been. This is the sort of moral integrity that Kant holds dear; 
the firefighters being motivated by duty is what makes them heroes in a 
morally relevant way (and specifically so in Kantian terms). Passages of this 
sort in the Kantian work make us think that he is less inclined to concede 
a moral status to the instances of heroism taken as paradigmatic examples 
in the contemporary debate on supererogation. Kantian heroism differs 
from the broadly conceived heroism as it takes the sense of duty (rather 
than mere optionality) as a starting point. Kant is highly suspicious of any 
281  I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1997, pp. 127–128.
282  D. Guevara, The Impossibility of Supererogation in Kant’s Moral Theory, p. 609. Similar 
remarks about these passages from the Critique of Practical Reason have been made by M. 
Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, pp. 36ff.
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form of moral sentimentalism because this might make us lose sight of the 
ordinary dimension of morality. Rather than taking the supermeritorious 
(überverdienstlicher) as a paradigmatic example of morality, we need to keep 
the focus on the aspects of an ordinary moral life. As Kant believes, this can 
solely be the attention to the sense of duty.
From this brief analysis of a possible Kantian account of supererogation, 
it should be clear that followers of Kant’s theory can only endorse an anti-
supererogationist orientation. However, as Marcia Baron emphasizes, this 
does not mean that Kantians cannot give an account of the phenomenon 
of supererogation283. Claiming that there is no theoretical category of 
supererogation does not mean that the acts that supererogationists try to 
explain cannot be accounted for otherwise. According to Baron, Kantians 
have no theoretical need for this category of acts. Specifically, Kantians 
should rely on the more efficient category of imperfect duties and on some 
further evaluation of an agent’s virtuous character. According to this view, 
morally exceptional acts cannot be evaluated in themselves without a further 
evaluation of the moral status of the agent’s character284. Open-ended duties 
(e.g., imperfect ones) leave plenty of room for the expression of a good 
character, given the more or less ample fulfillment of the relevant duty. The 
example of Mother Teresa’s abundant fulfillment of the imperfect duty of 
beneficence well explains the sort of appreciation of moral character that 
a fulfillment of this kind entails. We consider her a moral saint because of 
the virtue of character she expressed by her commitment to the fulfillment 
of the imperfect duty of beneficence285. This way of explaining alleged acts 
of supererogation within the realm of moral obligations involves a greater 
explanatory role for the category of duty. In typical Kantian terms, duty is the 
sole indicator of the moral worth of acts. Moreover, note that Baron’s point 
relies on a different question than mere anti-supererogationism; it is not that 
she is against supererogation in itself. Rather, she asks whether or not we 
theoretically need a category of supererogation to explain the phenomenon 
that it is intended to define. It is not a critique of the existence of acts that 
are generally considered supererogatory; it is a critique of the authentic 
283  «The absence of a special category for the supererogatory poses no serious problem, given 
his understanding of “duty” and his category of imperfect duties», in ivi, p. 23.
284  Ivi, pp. 57–58.
285  Ivi, pp. 53–54. Quite similar to Kant’s example of the moral integrity of the powerless man 
threatened by the lord, the moral value of Mother Teresa relies on her extraordinary ability 
to fulfill an obligation, no matter what the sacrifice it involves.  
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necessity of having a dedicated category to give an account of them. In other 
words, those acts that can be accounted for by the supererogatory category 
should be accounted for by some other less problematic moral category286.
Generally, due to the different levels of understanding that the Kantian 
theory offers, it is difficult to have a clear opinion on the possibility of 
supererogation in this system. My assumption on this particular question is 
that Kant is not directly concerned about giving an account of the concept. 
The reason for this is that if we take seriously Kant’s aversion to moral 
inclination and his attention to the moral law, what we derive from it is that 
the concept of supererogation (which by definition, exceeds the constraints of 
the law) is not a coherent theoretical option. As such, from the impossibility 
of recognizing the moral worth of acts that are not derived from the sense 
of duty, it follows that a supererogatory act cannot be considered morally 
worthy. Contrary to the case of utilitarianism, this means identifying the 
evaluative level with the deontic one. Better still, this moral framework 
assigns to the deontic level of morality a typical evaluative role as well 
(the interpretation of what constitutes the moral goodness of an act). From 
this, we obtain the denial of supererogation in Kantian ethics (at least in its 
original understanding), which can be summarized as follows:
(Deontic ↔ Evaluative) → ¬Supererogation
in other terms
(Right ↔ Good) → ¬Supererogation
The Kantian denial of supererogation relies on the fact that something can 
be morally good only insofar as it is the result of a duty. Similar to the 
case of the utilitarian denial, deriving one level of morality entirely from 
the other leads to the loss of the theoretical complexity that makes the 
concept of supererogation explicable. In this sense, the Kantian and the 
utilitarian denial of supererogation do not differ in the general structure of 
their arguments (although, as we have seen, the contents of their arguments 
are opposite). This acknowledgment is already expressed, in more general 
terms, in Heyd’s work:
One implication of this basic difference is that while deontology tends 
to be too strict in its definition of “moral” (considering only obligatory 
286  I have already tried to explain the necessity of such a category of moral acts in Chapter 
III. See pp. 87–93.
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actions as having moral value), utilitarianism is inclined to provide a 
definition of “moral” which is too wide (taking every “useful” action 
as morally good). Both theories – in their pure but crude forms – 
are, therefore, anti-supererogationist, but for opposite reasons: in a 
deontological doctrine no action which is beyond duty can be morally 
good. In a utilitarian doctrine no action which is morally good can be 
non-obligatory287.
4.5 What to Learn from Anti-supererogationism
There is no question that an analysis of the contrast between anti-
supererogationism and our intuitive assertions about acts of supererogation 
can provide both an improvement of our moral systems and a refinement of 
our moral intuitions. As usual, revision and improvement come with new 
questions. Does a phenomenological approach to morality reveal a too vast 
and manifold moral panorama to be handled by our moral theories? Is moral 
monism apt for this task? Part of the contemporary debate has a negative 
answer to this latter question288. I think that acts of supererogation represent 
that overabundance of the moral gamut that theories have failed to account 
for. In contrast, anti-supererogationists claim that we need to refine our 
intuitions instead. They argue that although acts of supererogation express 
a strong intuitive appeal, we can explain them away without the use of 
a special and dedicated moral category. Depending on which side of the 
debate we uphold, it is thus worth asking whether it is possible at all to 
provide an exhaustive theoretical account of all moral phenomena. Are 
moral intuitions always trustworthy? Although it would be too ambitious 
to think of answering these questions in the present work, it would be 
worthwhile if I can provide some initial insights. If moral philosophy wants 
to remain faithful to its original task of being the subject that investigates 
how to conduct a life lived well, these questions acquire a fundamental role.
In the following chapter, I embrace the side of the supporters in this given 
subject of the relevance of our moral intuitions. In particular, I shall try to 
theorize positively in favor of an autonomous category of supererogatory 
acts. As I have tried to stress in the present chapter, the problems with the 
287  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, p. 73.
288  In this regard, see the interesting reconstruction provided in M. Gill, Humean Moral 
Pluralism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2014.
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justification of the concept generally arise as manifestations of the loss of the 
moral complexity that makes supererogation possible. Both utilitarianism 
and Kantian ethics share the same maximizing impulse that makes 
supererogation more difficult to be theorized. Utilitarianism generally aims 
at the maximization of the good; similarly, Kantian ethics is grounded on 
the duty to strive for the moral perfection of the self (a sort of maximization 
of the right). Consequently, the category of supererogatory acts is hardly 
acknowledged by moral systems driven by a maximizing inclination. 
In Chapter III, I have emphasized how the concept of supererogation 
has originated in a complex system, which has recognized a somewhat 
clear distinction between the realm of the right (characterized by moral 
requirements) and that of the good (the broader domain of the possible 
ways of fulfilling our moral ideals and values). This distinction opens up 
the possibility to pursue certain courses of action that cannot be induced by 
the mere adherence to our moral requirements (pace Kant). The concept of 
supererogation identifies those acts that pursue the morally good that lies 
beyond the morally right.
To maintain this complex structure intact, I propose the endorsement of 
a moral theory characterized by a pluralist (non-monistic) and satisficing 
(non-maximizing) structure. Analyzing the nature of moral complexity in 
Chapter II, I have tried to identify two sorts of pluralism: that of values 
(axiological) and that of the ways of moral deliberation (methodological). 
As the contemporary debate shows, it appears clear to many authors that 
in the moral domain, we deal with a set of incommensurable values, which 
eventually come into conflict289. As other authors have emphasized, we do 
not obtain moral justification for our acts by following a unique and fixed 
moral principle290 (as for Larmore). There is not only a plurality of values 
but also a plurality of ways in which we deliberate morally291. If this claim is 
correct, when moral conflicts arise, rather than trying to confute one of the 
opposing positions, it becomes more fruitful to consider which of the moral 
289  As emphasized in Chapter II when I addressed moral complexity.
290  I consider a principle as a way of reasoning to bring about a given end, to ground a certain 
duty, or to fulfill the aspiration toward a preferred value.
291  Once again, let me recall the words of Charles Larmore: «Finally, instead of supposing 
that the structure of morality must be in the end either deontological or consequentialist, 
and instead of assuming that either all or none of our moral obligations are categorical, 
we should recognize that the ultimate sources of moral value are not one, but many», C. 
Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 151.
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principles involved and which of the moral values at issue take precedence 
over the others. Taken in these terms, rather than being concerned with the 
morally correct and incorrect, morality becomes the realm of the varying 
relevance of principles and values according to the given circumstances. 
A moral structure that allows different levels and ways of actualization 
can describe the phenomenologically evident complex status of moral 
experience. Moreover, I believe that both these categorizations of pluralism 
will become functional in giving an account of those different levels of moral 
achievement that make supererogation theoretically conceivable.
For these reasons, I shall attempt to endorse a pluralist system of morality 
in order to explain the phenomenon of supererogation. The widespread 
diffusion of the major deontological and consequentialist theories presented 
in the ethical debate offers a glimpse of the plausibility of both systems292. 
Their equally convincing theoretical status suggests that we need to focus 
on the given situation in order to understand the priority to grant to the 
systems. Therefore, if this analysis is correct, a dual conclusion will be 
drawn. A pluralist system that allows multiple sources of the good and 
different levels of achievement will better explain both supererogation and 
moral experience. In particular, with supererogation being a “complex” 
concept (requiring more than a single level of the moral framework in 
order to be explained), pluralism seems to be the system that best satisfies 
the theoretical needs of the concept. In the next chapter, I shall thus try to 
deal with the decision-making process (the normative level) that leads to a 
supererogatory act. The tentative conclusion would be that supererogation 
is better accounted for by a pluralist moral system that provides, at the 
normative stage, a clear distinction between the good and the right.
292  Such a plausibility is testified by their large diffusion indeed. I exclude from this remark 
the (somehow) classic third member of the major systems of morality—virtue ethics (see 
M. Baron, P. Petit, M. Slote, Three Methods of Ethics, Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell, 1997). 
The main reason for excluding this approach is that virtue ethics deals primarily with the 
agent’s character and, only at a later stage, with moral acts. The debate on supererogation 
being about a peculiar category of acts, it directly addresses the other two moral systems. 
Nevertheless, I do not want to rule out the possibility of an account of supererogation within 
this system. For a detailed treatise on this issue, see D. Heyd, Can Virtue Ethics Account 
for Supererogation?, in C. Cowley (ed.), Supererogation, «Royal Institute of Philosophy 
Supplement», LXXVII, 2015.
CHAPTER V 
A NEW PERSPECTIVE:  
A PLURALISTIC ACCOUNT OF SUPEREROGATION
This chapter represents my attempt to address the issues regarding the 
justification of the concept of supererogation. I will do this by endorsing 
a pluralist moral system. I think that this attempt at justification will be 
valuable, regardless of whether or not monist theories can somehow give an 
account of the concept. In fact, even if we allow monist theories to provide 
a possible explanation of the concept (with major revisions of the original 
positions, in my opinion), I hope that the pluralist account will show as a 
more suitable and straightforward option for accounting for supererogatory 
acts. Pluralism is a kind of moral theory that allows multiple (but not infinite) 
sources of the good. The following tentative resolution of the problem of 
supererogation relies on the conviction that supererogatory acts spring 
from the interaction of different sources of the good. This is what I mean by 
“multiple sources dynamics” (MSD)—the phenomenon that allows a plurality 
of sources, among which an agent identifies (at least) two relevant ones, 
that is, one that fulfills a moral obligation relevant to the given situation 
and the other that expresses how to go beyond such obligation. If fulfilled 
by the performance of an optional act, the second source of value is the 
supererogatory achievement. In this chapter, I present the grounding belief 
that a pluralist system is the one that can better satisfy the theoretical needs 
of MSD.
5.1 The Multiple Sources Dynamics (MSD)
I have so far analyzed the question of moral pluralism and that of the 
concept of supererogation as apparently separated issues. As I have claimed, 
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they are both expressions of the moral complexity that characterizes our 
moral experiences. However, so far in the present work, the two issues 
have not been explicitly part of the same problem. The MSD is precisely the 
possibility of going beyond what is morally required by dealing with multiple 
sources of the good. Usually, the different sources of the good are addressed 
by using a specific moral principle. Relative to this argument, I take a moral 
principle as a way of moral reasoning. As I have sketched in Chapter II, 
according to Charles Larmore, one understanding of moral complexity is 
acknowledging three different moral principles, which provide the agent 
with moral reasons to act accordingly293. These three principles favor three 
independent sources of moral value, which introduce independent claims on 
the moral agent294. According to the given circumstances, one principle can 
gain priority over the others. In particular, we can distinguish the following 
principles295:
a) The principle of partiality outlines particularistic duties, that is, 
obligations that arise by virtue of some “empirically conditioned desire” or 
our special relation with the beneficiary of our act.
b) The principle of consequentialism, as traditionally intended, focuses 
on the consequences of our acts, so they will bring about the most good 
overall (or the “least evil”, as taken in the negative form).
c) The principle of deontology requires that we never break certain 
moral guidelines, no matter what the consequences are.
According to Larmore, all three principles express their conflicting 
authority over moral decisions. They provide moral reasons of different 
sorts, independent from one another. Taken in this sense, Larmore’s 
methodological pluralism (since I do not refer to the content of these reasons 
yet) is a consistent example of moral pluralism. It provides multiple yet not 
infinite ways of being engaged in a moral decision. Moreover, it is important 
to remember his distinction between partial and impartial principles. The 
principle of consequentialism and the principle of deontology are both 
293  This is a suitable expression of what I have earlier called methodological pluralism, that is, 
a variety of ways of moral reasoning. Larmore’s understanding of a moral principle is almost 
identical to mine: «If we think of a principle of practical reason as a rule for organizing and 
ranking particular desires or courses of action in the light of some general kind of practical 
value, then we seem to find ourselves subject to not one, but three such principles, and these 
principles seem to make contrary demands of us in various situations», C. Larmore, Patterns 
of Moral Complexity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 131–132.
294  Ivi, p. 133.
295  Ivi, p. 132.
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considered impartial (or categorical), that is, they offer binding reasons 
for action, independently from empirical facts about an agent (his or her 
desires and relationships)296. On the contrary, by definition, the principle 
of partiality is incompatible with this category of reasons. Rather, such a 
principle is always partial or related to the particular agent, being concerned 
with personal commitments that produce reasons for action accordingly. This 
also explains why we experience the greatest degree of moral complexity 
in the personal (first-person) dimension of moral agency, where partial 
commitments can eventually be overcome by impartial ones (deontology 
and consequentialism). In the political and the public spheres, this is never 
the case; impartial commitments always take precedence over particular 
ones297.
Let us now return to the original task of this chapter. How is a 
supererogatory act possible within this theoretical framework? I have 
extensively underlined so far how supererogation benefits from a moral 
structure that acknowledges different levels of achievement. In these terms, a 
clear distinction between the right and the good is necessary to explain why 
something can be morally praiseworthy while being morally optional (i.e., 
it does not produce blame in case of omission). I suggest favoring a pluralist 
system that endorses a variety of moral principles to provide the multilevel 
structure that makes supererogation possible. The prevailing principle in 
the given circumstances sets the agent’s moral obligation. Nevertheless, it 
might be the case that once the agent has fulfilled the demands these binding 
reasons, he or she is able to recognize additional ways of bringing about 
some good. From a pluralist perspective, once the particularly virtuous agent 
has fulfilled the demands of the prevailing reasons for action, he or she is 
able to concede that something more can be done. Choosing to follow the 
prevailing reasons for action also means letting go some other (less binding) 
options to bring about the good. Supererogation means deciding to follow 
these discarded options. Although non-prevailing principles have lost their 
priority in favor of the prevailing principle, they are able to provide reasons 
for bringing about some extra good. When this extra good is compatible 
with the agent’s obligations, the possibility to perform a supererogatory act 
296  This is different from saying that categorical reasons for action do not consider any 
empirical fact about the situation. For example, think of the consequentialist consideration 
on which course of action brings about the best outcome. For this specific comment, I am 
thankful to Charles Larmore. 
297  Ivi, p. 133.
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arises. Clearly, supererogation is not possible as long as the agent has not 
fulfilled his or her obligations. Following a non-prevailing reason despite 
the prevailing reasons is simply immoral. Following a non-prevailing reason 
when the agent has already fulfilled his or her obligations is supererogatory. 
Making a financial donation when the agent lacks enough money to buy 
food for his or her child is not only immoral but also an irrational sacrifice. 
Making a donation is supererogatory when the agent has enough money to 
provide for the basic needs of his or her family. The supererogatory option 
arises only when the agent has fulfilled his or her prevailing binding reasons.
Specifically, once we allow the coexistence of multiple principles, we 
will be equipped with the tools for both setting our moral obligations and 
understanding how to pursue the good that lies beyond them, namely 
supererogatory acts. Allowing a variety of principles of morality also means 
being willing to acknowledge the existence of multiple ways of fostering 
the good other than the way that merely fulfills moral obligations. MSD 
originates supererogatory acts in a pluralist system. It entails that according 
to some particular interactions of the three principles, we can have two 
ways of performing supererogatory acts: a) the interaction between two 
impartial principles and b) the impartial use of a partial principle. Let us 
refer to these two possible occurrences of supererogation as the exceeding 
instance (supererogation by making an impersonal principle exceed 
another impersonal principle) and the proximity instance (supererogation 
by considering proximate a moral stranger), respectively. In the following 
sections, I shall try to explain in some detail these two possible ways of 
bringing about a supererogatory act through MSD.
5.2 The Exceeding Instance of MSD  
The exceeding instance of MSD attempts to explain the performance of 
a supererogatory act through the interaction of two impartial principles. 
Accordingly, supererogation originates from the fact that the moral 
requirements set by a given impartial principle can be surpassed by the 
optional performance of an act based on another impartial principle. 
A pluralistic moral account allows many principles, which in a given 
circumstance, compete to gain priority over the others by offering 
compelling reasons to act in a certain way. In the following discussion, I 
call the prevailing principle the “active” principle (i.e., the one that offers 
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the most compelling reasons). The others are then indicated as the inactive 
principles. In this view of supererogation, it is important to note that for a 
principle to be inactive, it does not mean losing its ability to provide reasons 
for bringing about some instance of the good. Generally, the reasons provided 
by inactive principles are considered less compelling than those provided by 
active principles. In other words, the active principles provide the prevailing 
reasons (having priority over the others) and the inactive principles provide 
the non-prevailing reasons (less compelling). I believe that one way to 
account for supererogation in a pluralist framework can be conceived as the 
performance of the course of action that arises by following both kinds of 
reasons (given that the circumstances allow this superabundant attainment 
of the good). This is what I call MSD; it means following the reasons provided 
by different sources in the same situation. This plentiful achievement is what 
I consider supererogatory.   
To clarify this point, let me analyze more detailed examples of this 
interaction between principles. In particular, since I have decided to take 
Larmore’s account as a starting point, we can distinguish between two 
different impartial principles. Consequently, we will have two possible 
interactions that can generate a supererogatory act: a) the principle of 
deontology (active) overtaken by the principle of consequentialism (inactive) 
and b) the principle of consequentialism (active) overtaken by the principle 
of deontology (inactive). I start by analyzing the first kind of interaction. In 
this regard, it is helpful to sketch a brief scenario of the performance of a 
supererogatory act.
Example #1: Let us suppose that you are walking in the main square of your 
hometown. The city is a famous destination for tourists due to its many 
attractions. A tourist approaches you, asking for directions to the beautiful 
cathedral that makes your city so famous. Therefore, you know that telling 
her a lie and giving her wrong directions would be morally wrong, so you 
tell her exactly where the cathedral is. At the same time, you are aware of 
the fact that getting there could be tricky since the medieval city center 
makes orientation troublesome. Since you have some free time, you realize 
that you could bring about the most good overall by walking with the tourist 
until you arrive in front of the cathedral so as to prevent her from getting 
lost for the whole afternoon. Even though you are not required to do so 
(after all, she is just asking for directions), you decide to accompany her to 
her desired destination. 
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In this scenario, the moral obligation is to truthfully respond to the request 
for directions. At this point, as the agent, you would have already fulfilled 
your sole moral obligations to the tourist. By endorsing a pluralist system, 
you are not necessarily required to accompany the stranger, knowing that 
orientation can be troublesome. You can rightfully consider a truthful 
answer to the tourist’s question enough to satisfy your moral requirement. 
After all, given the circumstances, these are the most compelling moral 
reasons. Nevertheless, if you acknowledge that accompanying the stranger 
can be a morally better option, nothing prevents you from doing so. This 
is a clear example of a supererogatory act, since you would be doing 
something morally good that exceeds what is morally required in the given 
circumstances. Supererogation, so understood (in the exceeding instance of 
MSD), is brought about by the interaction between a principle that defines 
a satisfactory level of moral requirement (in this case, the principle of 
deontology) and the further application of a maximizing principle (such as 
the principle of consequentialism) that exceeds the former. The principle 
of deontology is the active principle, which states the moral obligation. 
For the purpose of supererogation, this moral ought is supplemented by 
the performance guided by the inactive principle of consequentialism. 
Not only do you decide to truthfully tell the tourist where the cathedral 
is (moral requirement), but you also decide to accompany her to the place 
(supererogatory act). What if you are late for a professional appointment 
when the tourist stops you, asking for directions? The moral requirement to 
answer truthfully remains, but the omission of the supererogatory act will 
not generate any sort of moral criticism.
What is important to underline here is that the active principle plays 
an essential role since, having priority over the others, it defines the level 
of moral requirement that could optionally be exceeded by the further 
application of an inactive principle (and a maximizing one in this case). The 
inactive principle plays a necessary but insufficient role in the performance 
of the supererogatory act. The active principle takes priority over the 
others in identifying the moral requirement. Nevertheless, it also plays an 
essential role in the performance of supererogation; the active principle 
defines the level of moral requirement that can be exceeded298. Furthermore, 
298  Generally, the moral source that constitutes the level of obligation is always one. 
Differently, a supererogatory act may be suggested by more than a single secondary moral 
source. After all, given a specific moral requirement, an agent can perform many different 
supererogatory acts. When I give you back the money that I borrowed from you, I might 
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it is interesting to recall here how monist consequentialist theories are 
often criticized for being too demanding. Maximizing principles alone can 
originate moral obligations so demanding as to be considered supererogatory 
instead, according to our moral intuitions299. The same demandingness of 
maximizing principles can be true in pluralist systems as well. However, 
in this scenario, the maximizing principle makes the achievement of the 
praiseworthy extra good possible despite its being allegedly demanding. The 
difference lies in the fact that you do not feel it as too demanding since you 
have voluntarily chosen to pursue it rather than considering it a requirement. 
Only the interaction with a non-maximizing principle that limits the moral 
requirement allows a maximizing principle to bring about a good that is 
understood as supererogatory without also being considered too exacting. 
In the present example, we can say that the active non-maximizing principle 
is what limits the reach of the inactive maximizing principle.
A second kind of interaction between impartial principles is that of 
the principle of consequentialism exceeded by the further performance 
of the principle of deontology. At first sight, this is a more difficult one to 
explain. Difficulties arise because consequentialism is usually understood 
as a maximizing principle. Therefore, before giving an example of this 
interaction, it is worthwhile to wonder if supererogatory acts are even 
possible when consequentialism takes priority as the active principle. 
According to its definition, the principle requires us to «[…] do whatever 
will produce the most good or the least evil overall, with regard to all those 
touched by our action»300. Apparently, the principle, so understood, tends 
to maximize the good, so there is no possible way to exceed the level of 
accomplishment of the good achieved by the endorsement of this principle. 
When maximizing obligations takes priority over the rest, it tends to leave 
no room for supererogation301. At this point, this question arises: is it even 
decide to express my gratitude simply by saying thank you, by buying you a present, by 
giving you back more than I owed, and so on. Nevertheless, the necessary and sufficient 
condition for the performance of a supererogatory act remains the existence of at least two 
moral levels (the moral requirement and what lies beyond it).
299  This is the case raised by the demandingness objection to act-utilitarianism. See T. 
Mulgan, The Demands of Consequentialism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 25. I 
have dedicated some pages to the question of maximizing duties in a previous chapter. See 
pp. 123–130.
300  C. Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity, p. 132.
301  See pp. 129–130 of the present work. See also S. Grigoletto, Why Proximity Matters for the 
Concept of Supererogation, «Ethics & Politics», XIX (1), 2017, pp. 291–307.
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possible to exceed the requirements of consequentialist reasons when they 
take priority over the others? One tentative answer might be the case of the 
dutiful hero so dear to Kant302. In this regard, we might suggest that the heroic 
deeds of the rescuers (who were mostly professionals) in the 9\11 terroristic 
attack are acts of supererogation by fulfilling the principle of deontology (in 
particular, “one professionally ought to do his or her job”), exceeding the 
requirement of the principle of consequentialism303. Still, I would maintain 
that their deeds do not represent the sort of heroism that springs from an 
instance of supererogation. Dutiful heroism derives its praiseworthiness304 
from being an example of moral integrity. Such integrity is expressed by 
the ability to adhere to one’s own duty, rather one’s capacity to go beyond 
duty. Recall that in Kantian terms, the sort of heroism demonstrated by the 
9\11 rescuers is an especially praiseworthy example of perfect duty. Dutiful 
heroism is closely related to the concept of duty; thus, its praiseworthiness 
might not be derived from its being beyond the call of duty. Claiming that 
this sort of heroism is not a proper example of supererogation does not 
mean that it is not equally praiseworthy. Nevertheless, I concede that there 
happens to be cases whose circumstances make it perfectly reasonable for 
an agent to withdraw from his or her duties. In this case, the agent achieves 
a praiseworthy extra good by deciding to adhere to his or her duties and 
perform a certain act no matter how costly the consequences are. Notice 
that the harsh circumstances have substantially affected the status of the 
agent’s duties to the point that deciding not to perform them is perfectly 
reasonable. It is indeed an open question if we can still properly call them 
the agent’s duties.
Let us return to the question of how to perform a supererogatory act 
when the principle of consequentialism gains priority over the others. 
How is it then possible to overtake a maximizing principle (such as 
consequentialism) in order to perform a supererogatory act? I think that 
a tentative answer might be the conjunctive performance of acts that are 
derived from non-conflicting values. To explain this point, let me recall 
302  In the previous chapter (p. 147), I have already analyzed the case of the man who refuses 
to lie at all costs. See I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in M. Gregor (ed.), Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 128.
303  In fact, we might imagine that in those harsh circumstances, the best possible outcome 
(the most lives saved) would have been obtained by giving up any sort of rescuing operation.
304  Such praiseworthiness is no less important than that demonstrated by supererogatory 
heroism.
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the second understanding of pluralism that I have sketched in Chapter I. 
Axiological pluralism holds that we try to live a good life according to a set 
of incommensurable values that we recognize as all equally valid. To use 
Nagel’s expression, values have a “fragmented” nature305. Moreover, I have 
claimed that moral principles are different ways of moral reasoning. We 
might add that principles always endorse and bear specific moral values. 
For example, the principle of consequentialism usually tries to maximize the 
good because it holds that happiness is good; the principle of deontology is 
usually concerned with the respect for moral agents’ autonomy, and so on. 
In such a scenario, the maximization of the principle of consequentialism is 
still the maximization of a single value. Moral pluralism entails that we can 
count on a set of equally important moral values. From this, we can conclude 
that supererogation, in this second instance of MSD, can be brought about 
by the conjunctive performance of acts that are derived from two non-
conflicting values. First, the agent recognizes the priority of the principle 
of consequentialism (the active principle), which requires the maximization 
of the given value a. Moreover, the agent recognizes that he or she has 
the possibility to foster the given value b by doing something else. If the 
agent is able to do both a (requirement) and b (optional), she performs a 
supererogatory act. Notice that this is not always possible, since we need 
to be in a situation where the observance of two non-conflicting values is 
possible. On the contrary, in the case of the performance of acts grounded 
on two conflicting values, the agent will possibly undermine the fulfillment 
of the moral requirement by performing the supererogatory act. This option 
is not only problematic but also morally impermissible306.
To explain this second kind of the exceeding instance of MSD, let me cite 
the following example:
305  T. Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in T. Nagel, Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1979, pp. 128–141.
306  A reader might wonder what differentiates this from Hill’s suggested conjunctive 
performance of two imperfect duties, analyzed in the previous chapter (p. 134f). Note 
that here, differently from Hill’s case, we have a precise priority of the moral requirement 
originated by the active principle. Only then is the performance of the supererogatory 
act possible. Remember that my criticism of the supererogatory conjunctive performance 
of imperfect duties relies on the possibility to refrain from performing both duties. This 
criticism does not apply to the scenario explained above, since one of the two conjuncts is 
clearly obligatory, and the other is clearly not required.     
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Example #2: It is Mary’s birthday, and she is organizing a birthday party at her 
home. She is inviting friends for dinner and definitely wants to be a good host. 
She knows that her guests would greatly enjoy having a birthday cake. Once she 
enters the pastry shop, she is undecided on whether to buy a strawberry cake 
or a chocolate cake. After a few minutes, she cannot make a choice between the 
two. Considering that she really wants to make her guests happy, she decides, 
“I will buy them both!”.
A case such as this presents a clear requirement. If Mary wants to make 
her guests happy and be a good host, she needs to provide a birthday 
cake for them. Obviously, she can fulfill the guests’ wish by buying either 
a strawberry cake or a chocolate cake. It is equally clear that if she buys 
both, she achieves more than she ought to have done. This superabundant 
achievement of the good is then supererogatory and is brought about by the 
performance of two equally reasonable (and non-conflicting) ways to fulfill 
the given requirement.
The conjunctive observance of non-conflicting values highlights how 
supererogation is, in a certain sense, the opposite of a moral dilemma. A 
moral dilemma is a situation where the agent is in the presence of at least 
two sources of value and cannot satisfy either of them without incurring 
a moral loss. In contrast, supererogatory acts are possible when the agent 
has multiple sources of the good (at least two) and can satisfy all (or both) 
of them, leading to a superabundant moral achievement. In other words, 
supererogation means following secondary moral reasons (the moral 
requirement being grounded on the primary and prevailing reasons). The 
most decisive moral reasons represent the level of obligation, but once the 
agent decides to follow some other non-decisive (secondary) reasons for 
action, he or she enters the sphere of the supererogatory. From all these 
assertions, it appears clear how supererogation is a phenomenon that 
represents the distinctively dual nature of morality as divided between the 
right and the good.
I now offer another example of supererogation that clearly presents 
a case of a consequentialist requirement that is exceeded by typically 
deontological reasons:
Example #3: It is Mary’s birthday, and she is organizing a birthday party at 
her home. She is inviting friends for dinner and definitely wants to be a good 
host. After the dinner has been served, it is time for the birthday cake. She 
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knows that she would need to cut the cake in a number of slices equal to the 
number of her guests, plus one for herself. Therefore, she does so. Mike, one 
of her guests, happens to enjoy the cake very much. Considering that she 
really wants to be a good host, Mary gives Mike her slice of the cake. 
I take Mary’s act to be supererogatory. Here, the situation is the following: if 
the agent wants to distribute a certain good equally, the morally right thing 
to do is to divide it by the number of the beneficiaries. I take this to be a 
typical consequentialist moral requirement as it deals with the maximization 
of the happiness of the beneficiaries who are equally capable of enjoying 
the good. Still, the interesting aspect of Mary’s act is that she gives up her 
share of the good (something that would be her right, considering that it is 
her birthday) by virtue of some other kind of moral reason. Specifically, she 
really wants to be a good host, and this entails her readiness to sacrifice a 
little part of her own good to benefit another person. In this case, the morally 
right thing has a consequentialist connotation, while the way that the moral 
agent decides to exceed the level of the right has a deontological nature. 
Mary acts according to a commendatory understanding307 of the claim, “If 
you want to be a good host, you ought to act in a way that benefits your 
guests”. Once again, this represents a case where the supererogatory act has 
been performed by exceeding a moral requirement of a certain kind by an 
act originated by a secondary moral reason of a different kind. I take this to 
be another good example of how the exceeding instance of MSD works.
Let me sum up the common features of all these instances of MSD. 
How can we generally define supererogation within such a moral system? 
Supererogation means following the reasons provided by the principle that 
does not obtain priority in the given circumstances without denying the 
reasons provided by the prevailing principle. The agent applies a principle 
that has no priority over the others (non-obligatory) in order to generate that 
extra good that is considered especially praiseworthy (supererogatory). After 
all, for a principle to have no priority over the others, it does not mean losing 
its ability to find possible ways to achieve the good. If the principle without 
priority is compatible with the one that has priority and the agent decides 
to apply both, she produces an extra good. Nonetheless, supererogation is 
not an option that is always available. Sometimes, the moral pulls of the 
307  See pp. 126–127 for an explanation of the “commendatory” versus the “prescriptive” use 
of “ought”.
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different principles are simply not compatible, so the interactions that we 
have previously analyzed are not feasible. For example, regarding urgent 
consequentialist reasons to relieve someone of a consistent amount of pain, 
there seems to be no room left for supererogation. In cases such as this, 
doing what is morally required fulfills all the possible goods that can be 
brought about in that given circumstance, making it impossible to exceed 
them in order to achieve the extra good. For example, a car accident occurs 
in front of an agent, who has a moral requirement to provide first aid to 
someone who has been injured308. Cases such as this, granted that the agent 
does not incur any sort of sacrifice and loss, offer a scenario where the mere 
moral obligation satisfies all the possible instances of the good. There is 
simply nothing the agent can do to make it morally better.
It is important to note that, according to my account, supererogation 
is a moral phenomenon that relies on many different factors: a) a moral 
system that provides different sources of the good, b) the compatibility of 
the different reasons for action, and c) the circumstances that allow the 
possible achievement of the extra good. All these features primarily focus 
on the relevant aspects of supererogation as a moral act. Much more can be 
said about the sort of character traits that the virtuous agent demonstrates 
when she performs this specific sort of moral act. Nevertheless, in this 
section (and generally in the present work), I have tried to focus on the 
first point, stressing how moral pluralism can provide a satisfactory 
explanation of supererogation. I have attempted to highlight the role that 
both methodological pluralism and axiological pluralism play in providing 
theoretical space for the concept. Without the two levels of morality, 
supererogation is inconceivable. 
5.3 The Proximity Instance of MSD
Let me now briefly focus on the instance of supererogation that 
originates from the interaction of partial principles. A partial principle 
grounds particularistic duties and reasons for action as part of our particular 
desires or commitments toward those who are relationally proximate to us. 
Usually, specific relationships or goals in life are associated with the so-
308  Interestingly, in my opinion, it is hard to tell whether this moral obligation is grounded 
on consequentialist or deontological reasons. It seems to me that both principles would lead 
to the same moral requirement.
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called special obligations. If I want to climb Monte Bianco, I will have to 
train consistently. If I care about my son’s future, I will provide him with 
all that is necessary for his education. It appears clear how these reasons 
for action rely on proximity. This is not intended as mere physical closeness 
but as relational closeness309. For this reason, I call this instance of MSD 
the proximity instance. It refers to the performance of a supererogatory act 
through the impartial use of a partial principle. In other words, this happens 
when the agent impersonally uses the principle of partiality to benefit a 
stranger in a supererogatory way. For example, acting in a way as though 
it is a special obligation, even if it is not so, leads the agent to perform an 
optional and morally good act. Let me cite another example to explain this 
point:
Example #4: Let us suppose that your little daughter is playing basketball in 
the school’s team. You know that by virtue of your caring for your daughter, 
you have a particularistic duty to provide her with new basketball shoes 
if needed. One day, while you are watching one of her games, you realize 
that one of her teammates need new basketball shoes. You also know that 
this teammate belongs to a very poor family that probably could not afford 
to purchase new basketball shoes for her. Motivated by your willingness to 
help this family, you decide to buy the shoes for your daughter’s teammate 
as if she was your own daughter.
I consider this a relevant and consistent instance of supererogation. 
Providing basketball shoes for somebody else’s daughter seems to be 
something morally good but not morally required. What defines this special 
moral status is the absence of the actual special obligation that would 
morally require buying the new shoes for someone who needs them (after 
all, she is not your daughter). Moreover, the absence of the special obligation 
explains why the omission of this morally praiseworthy act is not morally 
blameworthy. If you refrain from buying the shoes, you are not evading 
any moral requirement that tells you to do otherwise. Specifically, you are 
neither taking care of someone’s basic needs nor relieving her of pain (so 
there is no principle of consequentialism that provides reasons for you to 
309  See p. 124 of the present work. On the issue of proximity as the basis for special obligations, 
see D. Jeske, R. Fumerton, Relatives and Relativism, «Philosophical Studies», LXXXVII, 1997, 
pp. 143−157.
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do so). You are simply acting as if you had a particularistic duty to provide 
the other family’s kid with new shoes, even if you do not have such a duty. 
No principle of partiality justifies your act, but still, you decide to act as if 
there was one. This is why you are doing something supererogatory. The 
way you realize how to bring about the supererogatory act is by applying 
the principle of partiality to someone who is not supposed to benefit from 
your particularistic duties. Morally speaking, treating a stranger as if she 
was your daughter is an act of supererogation. This is why I call this the 
proximity instance of MSD; it means acting to benefit another person by 
expanding the reach of your particularistic duties in a way that makes them 
supererogatory. We might also add that the agent who performs this sort 
of supererogatory act makes an unconventional use of a moral source. A 
special obligation, which is conventionally undertaken for the welfare of 
those “near and dear”, is here carried out to benefit a stranger.
The proximity instance of MSD reveals how supererogation can be 
possible when we have multiple understandings of the moral source of 
particularistic duties. The two levels of morality that are necessary for this 
category of acts are here expressed by two “areas of competence” in the same 
duties: a) the proper understanding of particularistic duties toward those 
who are relationally proximate to the agent and b) a broadening of the reach 
of particularistic duties toward those who are not relationally proximate to 
the agent. When the agent decides to go beyond the first understanding, 
aiming for a broader way to benefit others, she performs a supererogatory 
act. It means setting a moral ought when the agent does not necessarily have 
conclusive and decisive reasons to do so. It is thus not surprising that Jamie 
Dreier has proposed a similar explanation of the concept of supererogation310. 
Specifically, as I have emphasized in the previous chapter, he argues that 
supererogation is possible as long as we consider the existence of two moral 
perspectives: the point of view of beneficence (which analyzes everything 
in terms of the morally better and worse) and that of justice (which focuses 
on the moral wrongness of an act)311. For example, the particularistic duty to 
care for one’s own child is especially binding because it would be wrong to 
do otherwise. Caring for the needs of somebody else’s child (provided that 
310  J. Dreier, Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t, in M. Byron 
(ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theories on Practical Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp. 131–154.
311  Ivi, p. 149.
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we are not in a situation of providing relief from physical pain) is certainly 
morally better than doing otherwise but not morally wrong. Buying 
the basketball shoes for your daughter’s teammate means evaluating a 
particularistic duty from the moral point of view of beneficence. It is correct 
to think that morally speaking, we would live in a better world if this were 
the only moral point of view312. Still, moral reasons that spring from the 
point of view of justice remain more binding on us because they represent 
the minimal level of morality that makes living together as human beings 
possible. It would be impossible to live in a world that does not (at least) 
blame moral wrongness, which is the role of the point of view of justice. 
Sadly enough, for this reason, the standpoint of beneficence will always play 
a secondary (and optional) role. This entails that the morally best cannot be 
required of us as the morally right is. In other words, the point of view of 
justice will always have precedence over the point of view of beneficence. 
Supererogation is a moral category that reminds us to praise all those acts 
where human beings foster the morally good that lies beyond the morally 
right.
Generally, as I have already claimed, supererogation is possible because 
the good is broader than the right. In the case of the interaction of two 
impartial principles, we can say that this distinction is granted as long as 
we use a principle to determine the right thing to do and another principle 
to understand what would be the extra good (and thus praiseworthy) thing 
to do. The two levels of morality are grounded on different moral principles. 
This is what I have defined the exceeding instance of MSD. Likewise, in 
the case of supererogatory acts done through the impartial use of a partial 
principle, we aim at achieving the good beyond the reach of what our 
particularistic duties require. The two levels of morality are here expressed 
by different ways of applying the same kind of moral reason. This is what 
I have defined the proximity instance of MSD. We can thus summarize 
that performing a supererogatory act requires looking at the bigger moral 
picture, knowing that the moral domain is not limited to the dimension of 
requirements. This means being able to pursue the good that we glimpse 
beyond the requirements of the right.
312  This moral point of view that would indeed bring about many alleged supererogatory acts.
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5.4 The Phenomenology of Supererogation
In this final section, I return to the issue with which I have started this 
work—the phenomenological aspects of a moral experience. In particular, I 
focus on “how it is like” to experience the performance of a supererogatory 
act. It can be helpful to recall Mandelbaum’s considerations regarding the 
experience of a moral obligation, which mainly focuses on its phenomenology, 
as outlined in Chapter I. . It would constitute a mere supposition to sketch a 
possible understanding of supererogation within his system. Nevertheless, 
I draw some useful terminology from his work to explain the phenomenon 
of supererogation. Mandelbaum’s account of the phenomenological analysis 
of moral judgments313 refers to the relation of the fittingness of a certain 
course of action in order to determine whether it leads to its intended 
outcome 314. The experience of this relation is particularly important for 
the fulfillment of a moral obligation. If I have promised to return the book 
I borrowed from you, the fact that we will meet tonight counts in favor 
of (or is a reason that favors) bringing your book with me and giving it 
back to you. Bringing the book with me fits the moral demands that the 
situation imposes on me, fulfilling the related moral obligation (I ought to 
keep my word). In this regard, we realize how supererogation deals with a 
different sort of fittingness. Undoubtedly, the given situation plays a role in 
defining what the agent can do to achieve some extra good. In other words, 
the situation indicates what course of action fits the agent’s willingness 
to do the supererogatory act. Nevertheless, this sort of fittingness is not 
derived from a moral demand, as in the case of moral obligation. Still, from a 
phenomenological standpoint, even supererogation presumes that the agent 
performs a specific given act. If I want to be kind to you while we are chatting 
in a bar, I will recognize that buying you coffee fits my desire to be friendly. 
From a phenomenological perspective, the performance of a supererogatory 
act means accepting a new moral task with all the conditions it entails. 
The achievement of the supererogatory act calls for the endorsement of an 
313  Remember that these judgments are divided between direct and removed ones. The former 
identifies those judgments that we make in the first person when we actually face the given 
moral scenario. They have to be distinguished from the latter kind of moral judgments, 
those that we make from a perspective that is removed from the situation, considering past 
or future situations.
314  M. Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, Glencoe, IL, The Free Press, 
1955, p. 64. 
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additional set of acts that can bring about the extra good. While this further 
set of acts does not originate a moral requirement (or a moral demand), 
the same teleological character of a moral obligation remains. If I want to 
bring about a certain supererogatory end, I will need to acknowledge those 
acts that fit my willingness to do so. This uncommon and additional moral 
endorsement is what generates the praiseworthiness typical of these acts.
Once again, the reference to the rich young man’s encounter with Jesus 
can help us understand this point. When the young man asks what he needs 
to do, other than the observance of the Decalogue, in order to gain eternal 
life, Jesus answers as follows:
If you want to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give to the 
poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me315.
It is interesting to note that the Gospel of Matthew (different from Mark’s) 
reports this answer as an if-then clause. We can interpret this as the fact 
that the way of moral perfection entails the endorsement of a new set of 
acts that fits the new moral scenario. If the young man wants to achieve 
moral perfection (not just moral righteousness), selling all his goods 
would fit the condition of achievement of the supererogatory end. From a 
phenomenological perspective, the performance of supererogation is able to 
recreate, at another level, the same relation of fittingness of Mandelbaum’s 
understanding of moral obligations316. However, it has been emphasized that 
what differentiates the two is the fact that in the case of a moral obligation, 
the relation of fittingness is grounded on a “felt demand” to act in a certain 
way317. The same cannot be said of supererogation, where fittingness is 
grounded on the agent’s espousal of the supererogatory end rather than 
on some external moral demand318. Interestingly, the experience of the 
fittingness of a supererogatory act is provided by the agent’s willingness 
to bring about some extra good. Supererogation grounds the fittingness 
of the act internally rather than externally. This explains why the non-
performance of an act required by a moral obligation generates public blame 
and criticism, while the non-performance of a supererogatory act does not 
315  Matthew, 19:21.
316  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of 
Supererogation, «Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation», XXVII (2), 2010, pp. 48–49.
317 Ivi, p. 44.
318  “External” here means that this sort of moral demand holds true regardless of the agent’s 
particularistic desires. Ivi, p. 45.
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bring about the same reactive attitude. For example, if I happen to be very 
late for a business appointment, I simply do not have time to stop and buy 
lunch for the very good friend of mine whom I have just run into. This 
kind of non-performance explains the sort of regret that an agent might feel 
when he or she fails to do the extra good. The agent might regret (at most) 
a situation where he or she recognizes the possibility to do some extra good 
but simply could not abide by the reasons to act accordingly. Moreover, it is 
never the case that the non-performance of a supererogatory act generates 
any sort of moral criticism by others or by the agent himself or herself. 
In fact, this is not the case in the non-performance of a moral obligation. 
The failure to conform to a perfect duty usually generates guilty feelings 
and blame319. Conversely, in the case of the non-performance of an act that 
would fulfill an imperfect duty, the agent will generally feel shame or some 
sort of disappointment in oneself320. It is very important for the definition of 
supererogation that we do not confuse the possible regret regarding the non-
performance of a supererogatory act with any sort of moral criticism against 
the agent. Otherwise, we would undermine the optionality of this category 
of acts and consequently affect the source of its moral praiseworthiness.
Before moving on to consider some features of the phenomenology 
of supererogatory acts, it is worthwhile to recall that from a theoretical 
standpoint, the most convincing accounts of supererogation rely on the 
acknowledgment of the different levels of morality321. I hold that supererogation 
can be accounted for only by means of the acknowledgment of moral 
complexity. It is thus reasonable to think that the very phenomenological 
experience of a supererogatory act needs to be similarly complex. Once we 
recognize the need for complexity on a theoretical level, we can only concede 
that the phenomenological experience of a supererogatory act entails the 
combination of different factors. Roughly, it needs to be an equally complex 
experience. Let us focus on the following example to clarify the issue:
319  Ivi, p. 46.
320  W. Sinnot-Amstrong, You Ought to Be Ashamed of Yourself (When You Violate an Imperfect 
Obligation), «Philosophical Issues», XV, 2005, pp. 192–208.
321  This account is based on outlining different moral standpoints (e.g., J. Dreier, Why Ethical 
Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t) or specifying the different roles of 
moral reasons (e.g., D. Portmore, Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?, «Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice», XI, 2008, pp. 369–388; T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Untying a Knot from 
the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation (or more implicitly, J. Gert, 
Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength, «Erkenntnis», LIX, 2003, 
pp. 5–36).
163A new Perspective: a pluralistic account of Supererogation
Example #5: Mary enters a bar and asks for coffee at the bar counter. While 
she is there, another person enters and asks for coffee. He appears to be in a 
hurry and right after having gulped down the coffee, he asks the bartender 
for his bill. The stranger suddenly looks very embarrassed as he realizes 
that he forgot his wallet in the car. Motivated by her altruistic and virtuous 
character, Mary intervenes in the conversation between the bartender and 
the stranger and offers to pay for the latter’s coffee. Surprised by Mary’s 
behavior, the stranger expresses gratitude and runs out of the bar to the 
business meeting that he has to attend.
What is it like to be in Mary’s shoes in this situation? What sort of 
phenomenological experience has she undergone? Certainly, she has decided 
to do the good deed because she has recognized the possibility to bring 
about some instance of the good. However, this feature is not only typical 
of supererogatory acts. Moral deeds generally share this phenomenological 
experience, especially for the benefit of others. What distinguishes 
supererogation from other moral instances is a further phenomenological 
experience that accompanies the widespread experience of the achievement 
of the good that generally characterizes the moral domain. Remember 
that supererogatory acts are fully optional and do not trigger any sort of 
criticism in the case of omission. In the above example, if Mary has decided 
to refrain from doing her altruistic act, we cannot imagine any sort of moral 
consequence. For her, after all, consider the following: a) The person whom 
she has benefited is a complete stranger, so she is not bound by any special 
obligation by virtue of her relationship with him. b) The bartender would 
probably have allowed the customer to go outside to get his wallet in the 
car. c) She is not facing a situation where someone is experiencing a great 
amount of pain, as consequentialist reasons would require her to act. All 
these circumstances allow that, from a phenomenological perspective, she 
is experiencing a situation where her act is optional to the point where in 
case of omission, nothing would have happened to her. Consider how this 
phenomenological experience differs from that of a perfect or an imperfect 
duty. As I have underlined above, the possible omission of a moral obligation 
(be it perfect or imperfect) comes with a related degree of moral disapproval. 
The omission of a perfect duty generates moral blame, while the omission of 
an imperfect duty generates self-reproach. The omission of a supererogatory 
act would cause, at best, regret of the agent who has missed the opportunity 
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to act accordingly. Moreover, supererogation phenomenologically differs 
from duties as it entails the combination of two experiences: a) the possibility 
to bring about some instance of the good and b) the prediction that the 
possible omission will not trigger any actual moral criticism or reactive 
attitude by others. This second feature explains why this category of acts 
differs from perfect and imperfect duties; its omission generates a different 
phenomenological experience. In fact, supererogatory acts are characterized 
by such a double and compound experience. In other words, supererogation 
entails a complex phenomenological experience. However, this should not 
be a surprising conclusion, since (as we have seen in the previous chapters) 
from a theoretical standpoint, supererogation is a complex concept. It is 
a moral category that requires more than a single level of morality to be 
justified.
This brief phenomenological analysis of the concept not only alludes to 
the experience in performing a supererogatory act but also reveals some 
characteristics of the moral agent who performs it. The phenomenology of the 
first-person experience discloses what makes supererogation possible from 
the agent’s point of view. In other words, it explains what sort of psychological 
state the agent experiences in the performance of a supererogatory act. As 
I have tried to show in the previous chapters322, I hold that supererogation 
entails an altruistic behavior that aims at benefiting others. How is it then 
possible to do so? The influential work by moral psychologist Daniel Batson 
introduces the so-called “empathy-altruism hypothesis”323. Briefly, this 
thesis holds that empathic concern (other-oriented emotions originated by 
the agent’s perception of someone else in need324) gives rise to an altruistic 
motivation (having as its ultimate goal that of caring for another’s welfare325). 
The more empathic concern a given agent feels, the more he or she would 
be willing to bring about the state of affairs that would meet the need of the 
related subject or group of subjects326. A moral agent’s empathic capacity is 
helpful in understanding what triggers a supererogatory act. If I were not 
in an empathic state, it would be impossible to find a motivation to act and 
to do the cost-benefit analysis that guides the instances of supererogation. 
Moreover, feeling concerned for those in need will also justify those cases 
322  See Chapter III, pp. 104–106.
323  D. Batson, Altruism in Humans, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011.
324  Ivi, pp. 11ff.
325  Ivi, pp. 20ff.
326  Ivi, p. 29.
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where a supererogatory act entails a considerable degree of self-sacrifice327. 
If I am eating a sandwich on a bench shared by a starving stranger, I would 
be willing to give him my entire sandwich or part of it (depending on the 
degree of perception of his hunger). I will take this psychological evidence 
of altruistic behavior as a further demonstration of what is the relevant 
understanding of the moral point of view in regarding this category of acts. 
From a phenomenological perspective, what makes supererogation possible 
is the ability to take somebody else’s good as a reason for action in itself. 
Larmore’s understanding of the moral point of view suits the explanatory 
needs of this specific consideration of supererogatory acts and morality in 
general:
Morality consists in seeing in another’s good a demand on our 
attention that is as direct, as unmediated by ulterior considerations, as 
the concern we naturally feel for our own. The ability to look beyond 
our own interests, whatever they may be, and to take an interest in 
another’s good simply because it is his or hers – that is the essence of 
moral thinking328.
I believe that this understanding of morality is not only functional but 
also ultimately fundamental to the achievement of the moral good that 
lies beyond the call of duty. Moreover, it explains something about the 
phenomenological experience that the moral agent undergoes when dealing 
with supererogatory acts. In this regard, morality is a matter of understanding 
others and embracing the task of benefiting them.
327  However, remember that self-sacrifice is not a necessary condition for a consistent 
actualization of a supererogatory act. See A. Archer, Supererogation, Sacrifice, and the Limits 
of Duty, «Southern Journal of Philosophy», LIV (3), 2016, pp. 333–354.
328  Larmore C., The Autonomy of Morality, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp. 
73–74.

Conclusion.  
Acknowledging the Need for Moral Complexity
6.1 A Brief Summary of the Many Dimensions of Moral Complexity
The dimensions of moral complexity are many, and they can be noticed 
on different levels of the moral domain. Certainly, the present work cannot 
represent a comprehensive and exhaustive treatise of complexity. Therefore, 
I have focused primarily on two aspects of moral complexity, and I have 
explained how morality holds true in both aspects: the nature of the moral 
experience and the possible account of supererogation.
To the first issue I have dedicated Chapters I and II, beginning with 
an endorsement of a phenomenological approach to the subject. I chose 
this approach because morality deals with acts that find their ultimate 
expression in everyday life. The first-person analysis of the moral agent 
aims at understanding what it is like to do x, allowing a more precise 
appreciation of the moral reasons for action. An analysis of this sort reveals 
the manifold nature of the moral sphere. This acknowledgement leads to the 
first theoretical conclusion: the preferable normative theory is a pluralist 
system. In this regard I have explained how Charles Larmore”s understanding 
of moral pluralism represents a good starting point for handling moral 
complexity at the normative level. The adoption of heterogeneous 
principles of morality (consequentialism, deontology, and partiality) helps 
us understand how different moral reasons can be disclosed by endorsing 
different methods of moral reasoning. For this topic, I have illustrated how 
pluralism is articulated in at least two distinct ways. We can distinguish 
between a methodological pluralism (different and equally valid ways of 
moral reasoning) and an axiological pluralism (different moral values that 
we consider incommensurable and of ultimate importance). These features 
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of our moral experience are expressions of the complexity that characterizes 
morality. This, to a certain degree, explains the motto contained in the title 
of this work: “only through moral complexity”. In other words, we would 
be able to understand morality only through a proper appreciation of its 
complexities. 
In the Chapter III, I showed how these metaethical (or, in a certain sense, 
meta-theoretical) claims about the nature of morality come with some 
repercussions on the normative level, too. I use the concept of supererogation 
as a clear example. If we want to acknowledge the complex nature of morality, 
we need to concede the existence of supererogatory acts. This claim requires 
further specification. Morality, it has often been underlined, has two faces: 
the right and the good. They stand as the two dimensions of the normative 
level, dimensions to which different authors have referred differently: the 
deontic and the evaluative, a minimal ethics and a maximal ethics, duties and 
values, and so on. This distinction, which acknowledges the different levels 
of morality, is the one that gives rise to the theoretical need for a category 
for supererogatory acts. This resembles the distinction between precepts 
and counsels that gave birth to the concept in the Christian theological 
tradition. There are different ways to achieve different levels of achievement 
of the good: this is what makes it possible to conceive of the “higher flies of 
morality” or, in other words, the morally good that lies beyond the call of 
duty. It is not surprising, then, that many attempts to solve the “problem of 
supererogation”329 rely on the identification of different sources of morality.
The contemporary debate on supererogation involves many examples of 
this method of illustrating the concept. Think, for example, of the position 
held by Portmore, Gert, and Dreier330. In the present work, I adopt a similar 
strategy, providing an account of supererogation by endorsing a pluralist 
moral system. As I demonstrated in Chapter IV, monist theories usually 
fail (or at least struggle) to properly explain supererogatory acts by virtue 
of their tendency to merge the two faces of morality into one. Therefore, 
these theories cannot recreate that manifold and multileveled structure that 
makes supererogation theoretically conceivable. As David Heyd highlights 
when he underlines what constitutes supererogation’s moral value:
329  These terms usually refer to the following quandary: if supererogatory acts often 
represent the morally best option, why is it that they are not morally required? This aspect 
of supererogation goes against the “good-ought tie up” motto, the idea that morality should 
always prescribe the morally best. See pp. 119-125.
330  More on these authors on the following pages.
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This dual source of moral value explains why supererogation requires 
a theory which blends both axiological and deontological elements. 
Neither utilitarianism nor Kantianism alone is sufficient to account for 
supererogation […]331.
The only way to solve the justificatory problem of the concept is to 
acknowledge the different levels that constitute morality and to provide, 
accordingly, a normative system that grants the appropriate distinctions. 
For this reason, in Chapter V, I provide an account of supererogatory 
acts from a pluralist perspective. A moral system that acknowledges 
many sources of morality is able to identify a level of the right that is not 
completely identifiable with the level of the good. This important relation 
between the two constituents of the moral domain recreates the theoretical 
needs that make supererogation conceivable. In this regard, I explain the 
performance of a supererogatory act via the multiple sources dynamics 
(MSD). Supererogation is better explained when the moral agent is able to 
distinguish different moral sources that make one’s own moral requirements 
clear, on one hand, and on the other, a way to exceed these obligations by 
aiming for extra good. While this explanation of supererogatory acts is 
not intended to exclude any possible monist account of supererogation, it 
clarifies how the pluralist perspective offers some advantages over other 
justificatory options.
6.2 How Recent Accommodations of Supererogation Acknowledge 
Moral Complexity
In the following pages, I clarify why acknowledging some degree of 
complexity is a strategy generally endorsed (either implicitly or explicitly) 
by more recent accounts of supererogation. As I justified in the previous 
chapters, the concept of supererogation requires a multi-leveled structure of 
morality in order to provide a theoretical framework that resembles the one 
that originated the concept in its theological roots. If we want to make sense 
of supererogatory acts and prevent their being explained away by other 
moral concepts (as anti-supererogationists do), we need to grant different 
degrees of achievement within the moral domain. This is what happens in 
many accounts of the concept that have characterized the contemporary 
331  D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982, p. 131.
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debate. Briefly, the general claim of the following lines is that the only way to 
account for supererogation is to grant a multi-leveled structure of morality 
(a task that I have accomplished through moral pluralism). This is the route 
that many contemporary accounts of the concept have taken.
One strategy to ground the concept is to allow different degrees of 
accomplishment within the moral domain. This theoretical challenge has 
been recognized to be true of different moral accounts:
This is the challenge of accounting for both the binary and the scalar 
elements of our moral discourse. That is, it is difficult for a moral 
theory to account plausibly for either/or concepts like permissible 
and impermissible on the one hand while also accounting for degreed 
concepts like better and worse on the other. But supererogation—
where the supererogatory act is better than the minimally permissible 
act—involves both of these sets of concepts. The difficulty this raises 
for moral theory is clear if we look at the Kantian and utilitarian 
traditions. Kant gives us an account of duty but no clear grounds for 
assessing an act as better than what duty requires. Utilitarians give us 
an account of acts as better and worse but no clear grounds for saying 
an act is permissible though less than the best332.
This is a structural problem that any account of supererogation faces. The 
contemporary debate has seen different attempts to address this problem.
6.3 Structuring Complexity Through Reasons
The “problem of supererogation” is a problem that some have tried to solve 
by outlining two different sources of morally relevant value. As such, the 
moral reason for an action plays a fundamental role as the primary element 
of a moral agent’s reflection. Supererogatory acts require us to ground them 
on reasons that support a level of dedicated moral commitment different 
from the commitment that originates from moral requirements. The delicate 
passage is that the optionality of this concept must be characterized in moral 
terms. This is different than saying that the moral point of view suggests a 
course of action that maximizes the good (in certain cases a very demanding 
course of action, such as a supererogatory act that involves a considerable 
amount of sacrifice), but this course action is trumped by another based on 
332  M. Ferry, Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of 
Duty, «Philosophical Studies», CLXIII (2), 2013, p. 574.
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non-moral reasons that prevent us from the performance333. An individual 
who does not try to save a drowning stranger because he or she cannot swim 
is an example. In this case the failure to perform the supererogatory act is 
supported by non-moral reasons (the agent’s swimming skills) that silence 
moral demands. Instead, the issue is that supererogation and duty require 
two different sources that are both ultimately moral in kind. Jamie Dreier 
suggested that one way to address the issue is to acknowledge (at least) 
two moral points of view334. He emphasizes that we have more stringent 
and stronger reasons for action that spring from the “moral point of view 
of justice” and supererogatory (and less compelling) reasons that originate 
from the “moral point of view of beneficence”335. In this way we maintain 
that both duties and supererogation have a moral connotation, while only the 
former have more compelling normative strength according to the relative 
reasons. Another way to arrange the theoretical framework is to focus on 
the different roles that reasons can have. This is a solution advanced by 
Joshua Gert, who claims that practical reasons can have a “requiring” role 
and a “justificatory” role336. Some reasons have an explicit requiring strength 
that, from a moral point of view, constitute a moral duty. An act (or lack of 
action) such as “do not smoke inside a restaurant” is determined by a moral 
reason with a requiring role. Some other reasons, less binding, would justify 
a certain course of action without having the same normative strength. For 
example, buying your friends a coffee because it would make them happy is 
an act supported by the justificatory role of the reason. Supererogatory acts, 
then, spring from this distinction in the roles of reasons:
For example, it is plausible that I would be rationally justified in 
risking serious harm by rushing into a burning building by the 
following reason: that by doing so I might well save a child. But no 
reasonable person thinks that this reason rationally requires me to do 
so. So this particular altruistic reason can rationally justify more than 
it can rationally require337. 
333  A line of argument that is well-represented by Susan Wolf’s famous position against 
moral perfectionism. S. Wolf, Moral Saints, «The Journal of Philosophy», LXXIX (8), 1982, 
pp. 418-439. A position that I have addressed at pp. 88−92.
334  J. Dreier, Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn’t, M. Byron (ed. 
by), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theories on Practical Reason, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, pp. 131-154.
335  Ivi, pp. 149-150. 
336  J. Gert, Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength, «Erkenntnis», 
LIX, 2003, pp. 5-36.
337  J. Gert, Moral Worth, Supererogation, and the Justifying/Requiring Distinction, «Philosophical 
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In line with this is the contribution from Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons338, 
who differentiated between a “requiring” reason and a “favoring” reason 
(the second being less binding)339. More specifically than Gert340, they 
emphasized the many roles that reasons can play (even contextually) in 
the moral dimension. In the case of supererogation, the role they introduce 
is particularly important: “moral merit-conferring role.” An act, to be 
considered supererogatory, does not have to be grounded on reasons that 
play a requiring role. Obviously, such an act has to be (rationally) justified, as 
Gert underlined, but it must also derive its moral value by virtue of the moral 
merit-conferring role played by some reasons. In these terms, the act would 
be deontically optional and yet morally meritorious341. This prevents us from 
confusing supererogation with other rationally justified (thus not required) 
but not morally relevant acts. For example, gambling a lot of money is not 
rationally required, but someone’s ability to play poker and the possibility of 
winning more money than initially invested might rationally justify the act 
of gambling. However, while rationally justified (and not required), this can 
hardly be considered an instance of supererogation. It is important that we 
defend supererogation’s moral worth, and the “moral merit-conferring role” 
of reasons allow us to do so.
With the same focus on moral reasons, Michael Ferry suggests something 
slightly different342. Instead of considering the nature of reasons in relation 
to acts alone, he claims that we also need to consider reasons in light of 
the agent’s accountability. He derives this (rather overlooked) distinction 
from the works of Sidgwick and Mill, emphasizing that it is important to 
distinguish two sets of reasons: reasons that count in favor of a certain act, 
which are generally addressed; and reasons for and against holding an agent 
accountable for the given act. The latter, when combined with the former, 
creates a proper moral obligation: something the agent has more reasons to 
Review», CXXI (4), 2012, p. 612.
338  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of 
Supererogation, «Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation», XXVII (2), 2010, pp. 29-63.
339  Ivi, p. 49.
340  At least in Gert’s 2003 publication where he seems to be more concerned with practical 
rationality than with the moral domain.
341  T. Horgan, M. Timmons, Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” 
of Supererogation, p. 63.
342  M. Ferry, Does Morality Demand Our Very Best? On Moral Prescriptions and the Line of 
Duty, «Philosophical Studies», CLXIII (2), 2013, pp. 573-589.
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perform and for which he or she is held accountable. This is not always the 
case, according to Ferry:
The difference is that an obligation is conceptually tied to accountability 
and to holding accountable, to what you have got to do; that is, you 
are not obligated to perform an act unless you can properly be obliged 
to perform it, or be held accountable for its performance […]. But it is 
not the case that we can properly be held accountable for everything 
that we ought morally to do. And this is because an agent’s reasons 
for performing an act are not the same as our (or even the agent’s) 
reasons for holding the agent accountable for the act’s performance343.
This is particularly important in the explanation of supererogation. While 
it is true that from the moral point of view we delineate moral reasons that 
ground moral acts we ought to perform, it is not always the case that those 
oughts hold for ourselves. It is one thing to recognize the reach of morality, 
but quite another to claim that this applies to us. Nevertheless, this does not 
prevent agents from performing acts for which they are not accountable. 
This opens the possibility for supererogatory acts. It is the ability to endorse 
a moral demand that is not necessarily our own.
What all these accounts of supererogation share is that by focusing on 
some characteristic of reasons, they try to grant the multi-leveled theoretical 
structure that makes this concept possible. By the existence of different 
moral points of view that provide different reasons (Dreier), different roles 
of reasons (Gert, Horgan and Timmons), or different sets of reasons (Ferry), 
all these attempts provide the adequately complex theoretical structure that 
is needed to make sense of supererogatory acts. 
6.4 Structuring Complexity Through Consequences
While some attempts to account for supererogation in neo-Kantian 
terms exist344, it is interesting to notice how this category of acts has 
343  Ivi, p. 586.
344  In particular, I consider the work of Thomas Hill (who tries to explain supererogation 
through the category of imperfect duties) and Marcia Baron (who claims that Kantian Ethics 
does not really need the concept of supererogation). See T. Hill, Kant on Imperfect Duty 
and Supererogation, «Kant-Studien», LXII, 1971, pp. 55-76; M. Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost 
Without Apology, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 1995. I have already addressed in the 
previous chapters Hill’s position at pp. 135f and Baron’s at p. 140.
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drawn the attention primarily of consequentialists. As I explain in Chapter 
IV, act-utilitarianism, at least in its classical understanding, struggles 
with the justification for these acts. Briefly, the problem is it relies on the 
maximization of the good to a point where no room for supererogation is 
possible. More recently, other utilitarians have tried to grant the space for 
supererogation by refining the theoretical framework. One way to do this is 
to negate the maximizing character of utilitarianism345. There are, however, 
other attempts to explain supererogatory acts within a consequentialist 
framework. Douglas Portmore presented the first strategy for doing so 
by highlighting cases where the calculus of consequences delineated two 
equally worthy acts that maximized the good346. For example, say that acts a 
and b bring about the same maximization of the good347. In consequentialist 
terms, according to the evaluation of moral reasons, whether to perform 
either a or b becomes optional. At the same time, this framework, in order 
to make sense of supererogation, should consider moral praiseworthiness 
in terms of how much the agent has to sacrifice in order to perform the 
act. Accordingly, option b is superior to the other for the degree of sacrifice 
involved. In these terms, b would be supererogatory by virtue of being 
morally optional (granted that moral reasons put it on par with a) and 
morally superior (more praiseworthy). While this peculiar consequentialist 
account would make sense of supererogatory acts, it does not consider the 
much more widespread cases where moral praiseworthiness is entailed in 
345  This possibility, among others, has been pursued in M. Slote, Beyond Optimizing. A Study 
of Rational Choice, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1989; F. Howard-Snyder, 
A. Norcross, A Consequentialist Case for Rejecting the Right, «Journal of Philosophical 
Research», XVIII, 1993, pp. 109-125.
346  This scenario is suggested in D.W. Portmore, Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-
Centered Options, and Supererogation, «Ethics», CXIII (2), 2003, pp. 326-327. 
347  These have also been referred to as “ties at the top situations.” See, for example, J.P. Vessel, 
Supererogation for Utilitarianism, «American Philosophical Quarterly», XLVII (4), 2010, pp. 
300-301. This situation deals with a very specific and limited instance of supererogation: 
«it is only in “ties at the top” cases that supererogation is possible on the classical scheme 
[of act-utilitarianism]. Supererogation (and “demandingness”) critics claim that there 
are many more cases of supererogation than those containing ties at the top» ivi, p. 302. 
Generally, what this article by Vessel shows is that utilitarianism will be able to account for 
supererogatory options only by adjusting to the major criticism of the theory (“self-other 
asymmetry,” “nearest and dearest,” etc.). This outcome, it has been noted, will produce a 
version of utilitarianism that would be very hard to hold. See ivi, p. 314. Moreover, Vessel’s 
style of argumentation deals with moral reasoning by analogy to a numerical calculus. This, 
to me, while allowing a certain degree of clarity, is far from being representative of what it 
is like to consider what to do from the moral point of view.
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moral reasons rather than in other aspects. In other words, is it possible to 
explain supererogatory acts in consequentialist terms by appealing to moral 
reason alone as a unique source of moral value (that is, leaving aside cases 
where moral praiseworthiness is derived elsewhere)? Portmore suggests 
that this possibility is viable only if we concede that moral reasons are not 
overriding348. This holds true as long as we maintain that moral reasons are 
only a subset of reasons for action349. Non-moral reasons contribute to our 
all-things-considered evaluations for guiding our agency and thus: 
Moral reasons are not morally overriding—nonmoral reasons can, and 
sometimes do, prevent moral reasons, even those with considerable 
moral requiring strength, from generating moral requirements350.
If I see a stranger who is trapped in a burning car, a consequentialist 
analysis of the situation would conclude that it is morally better if I save 
him. However, this strong moral recommendation is outranked by a non-
moral (but still morally relevant) consideration about my physical ability to 
perform the rescue as quickly as required to make it successful. Being unable 
to run or to open the blocked door would provide a reason preventing me 
from attempting the rescue. Further, the fact that I could risk my life by 
attempting the rescue would support the decision to overlook this course of 
action. This, however, does not make it morally forbidden for me to follow 
those demanding moral reasons. If I decide to attempt the rescue in spite of 
the non-moral considerations that discharge me from the accountability for 
such an act, I will perform something supererogatory. This point made by 
Portmore opens up the possibility of two different levels of accomplishment: 
on one hand, the agent has reasons that all-things-considered ground what 
ought to be done; on the other hand, moral reasons, while not overriding, 
still keep their moral value and praiseworthiness in case the agent decides 
to follow them. The claim that “moral reasons are not overriding” delineates 
a more complex framework that makes the justification of supererogation 
possible.
Another noteworthy attempt to deal with supererogation was advanced 
by Dale Dorsey351. The core of his argument is that supererogation springs 
348 D.W. Portmore, Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?, in «Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice», XI (4), 2008, pp. 369-388. See also D.W. Portmore, Commonsense Consequentialism. 
Wherein Morality Meets Rationality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 124f.
349  D.W. Portmore, Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding?, p. 376.
350  Ivi, p. 377.
351  D. Dorsey, The Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It, «Utilitas», XXV (3), 2013, pp. 
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from the comparison between the demands of morality (the moral point of 
view) and what we ought to do regarding practical rationality (all-things-
considered, that is, evaluating non-moral reasons as well). Surprisingly, he 
holds that the supererogatory is not what lies beyond the morally required, 
but instead what lies beyond the rationally required352. In order to explain 
this, we must focus on the notion of practical rationality that Dorsey 
adopts. For him, an agent who evaluates what to do in a given situation 
is considering different types of demands. Certainly, moral reasons play a 
part in this process, but they are not alone. We, as agents, consider different 
sorts of practical demands, and our ultimate choice is the product of this 
heterogenous reflection. In this regard, what we aim to do is always the result 
of this “all-things-considered” point of view, and this is what constitutes our 
rational requirements. More significantly for the nature of this book, Dorsey 
recognizes that human agency is characterized by a plurality of inputs:
To begin, consider the notion of a moral requirement. Moral 
requirements are, well, just that: if I fail to conform to a moral 
requirement, this entails that I will have behaved immorally, or 
in a morally unjustified way. But there are many different sorts of 
requirements—not just moral—that I face. I face legal requirements, 
prudential requirements, requirements of etiquette, requirements of 
my neighborhood association. Sometimes these requirements will 
conflict. But in cases of conflict, it seems natural to ask ourselves what 
we ought to do really, or all-things-considered. More generally, in the 
case of conflicting requirements, how should I live? For the sake of 
brevity, I will refer to this “all-things-considered” requirement, which 
is distinct from, e.g., moral, legal or prudential requirements, as the 
“rational” requirement, or rational “ought”353.
Claiming that supererogation is morally good but not rationally required 
(beyond rational requirements) means it is beyond the requirements that 
spring from the all-things-considered point of view. 
From a strictly theoretical point of view, Dorsey’s account is not different 
from the others I have analyzed in these sections. There is an attempt to 
account for supererogation by structuring a complex moral system. A first 
level of accomplishment is constituted by practical rationality. Secondly, it 
is permitted to extend beyond that level by performing what the moral point 
355-382. 
352  Ivi, p. 373.
353  Ivi, p. 369.
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of view suggests. Dorsey’s theoretical claim, among other things, restores 
the possible role of act-utilitarianism for a theory of supererogation354. The 
over-demandingness of the maximizing account of act-utilitarianism is no 
longer a problem, as the first level of accomplishment (practical rationality) 
is set in non-moral terms. All that is left to the moral point of view is to 
suggest the permitted supererogatory accomplishment. Accordingly, we 
won’t be dealing with the over-demandingness of moral requirements (a 
common objection to act-utilitarianism), but with the demandingness of 
supererogation. This does not necessarily represent a problem and goes 
along well with what we commonly think of as supererogatory acts. Dorsey 
thinks that this account of supererogation has the advantage of rehabilitating 
act-utilitarianism, even in its standard view355. However, this feat does not 
come without some relevant issues. It is significant that this view does 
not necessarily explain more than others, and thus, it is not clear why it 
should be preferred356. On the contrary, it has disadvantages. One reason is 
that maintaining a proper explanation of supererogation within the moral 
domain means to limit the alleged demandingness of moral claims. Setting 
practical rationality entirely outside the moral point of view leads to a general 
problem for non-supererogatory acts. Let me explain this point. According 
to this account, the moral point of view would delineate a very demanding 
act that is considered supererogatory (let us imagine a possible considerable 
donation to a charitable organization). Non-moral considerations (say, for 
example, prudential reasons) from the all-things-considered point of view of 
practical rationality prevent us from considering the donation a requirement 
(i.e., the donation would prevent me from sustaining my family). The 
problem with Dorsey’s account, and generally all those accounts that try 
to explain supererogation appealing to some feature from outside the moral 
domain, is that the moral blameworthiness for the omission of morally best 
action remains. It is true that practical rationality outlines what we ought 
to do. However, morally speaking (given the maximizing understanding of 
morality that Dorsey has357), we would be missing the performance of an act 
354  Ivi, p. 382.
355  Ibidem.
356  This is especially true for accounts, such as those by Dreier and by Timmons and Horgan, 
that seem to me to explain more moral phenomena. It remains an open question if the 
criticism that will follow Dorsey’s position by appealing to moral blameworthiness applies 
to Portmore’s account as well. 
357  «Morality, according to act-consequentialism, demands the best», D. Dorsey, The 
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with some relevant moral value, and this shortcoming causes moral blame. 
One important feature of the traditional view of supererogation is that its 
omission cannot cause any sort of criticism or moral blame (remember 
Heyd’s second condition358). Dorsey’s view seems to fail to account for this 
feature359. Even worse, in these terms our practical agency will be generally 
characterized by moral blame for all those times we do not follow the moral 
point of view. In other words, non-supererogatory acts, if a supererogatory 
course of action would be possible (and this is almost always the case), 
would be considered a moral shortcoming and thus morally blameworthy. 
I do not think this is a feature that we would be willing to concede to our 
moral frameworks and in general to any theory of human agency. It is true, 
Dorsey’s account would rehabilitate maximizing act-utilitarianism, but at 
the expense of all non-supererogatory performance. Allowing this would 
be conceding that theoretical features have a priority over human agency. I 
take this sort approach of moral research to be misguided.
My objection to Dorsey’s account of supererogation based on moral 
blameworthiness has been similarly emphasized by Alfred Archer360. He 
highlights how Dorsey’s view presents similar problems when it comes 
to the limitation of moral demands. In fact, holding a maximizing account 
of act-utilitarianism as the source of our moral claims incurs the well-
known problem of moral over-demandingness. Archer emphasizes that 
the reason why the problems with moral demandingness and moral blame 
are so important is that these issues are what grounds the necessity of the 
category of the supererogatory. Establishing agency on practical rationality, 
as Dorsey does, leaving aside the moral domain, means pretending 
that moral over-demandingness and moral blameworthiness no longer 
represent a problem. However, these problems are exactly what inspired the 
Supererogatory, and How to Accommodate It, p. 382.
358  «Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction or criticism—either formal 
or informal» D. Heyd, Supererogation: Its Status in Ethical Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1982, p. 115.
359  I do not think that this criticism holds with the multiple sources dynamics that I expressed 
in Chapter V to explain how supererogatory acts are brought about within a pluralist system. 
In that case both levels of accomplishment are constituted within the moral domain.
360  Our arguments are structured in slightly different ways. While he claims that not 
considering the limitation of moral blameworthiness leads to the fact that the category of 
supererogation is no longer needed, I claim that overlooking the reach of moral blame leads 
to an agency deeply characterized by it. This appears to be an undesirable feature of any 
theory of moral agency. See A. Archer, The Supererogatory and How Not to Accommodate It: 
A Reply to Dorsey, «Utilitas», XXVIII (2), 2016, pp. 179-188.
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debate on supererogation. The omission of the morally best act in certain 
circumstances (let us imagine a case where the performance requires a 
considerable sacrifice by the agent) does not seem to deserve moral blame. 
Conversely, the performance of such an onerous act cannot be demanded. 
These two claims are widespread in common sense morality, and the 
concept of supererogation has gained its legitimacy in order to account for 
them. Dorsey’s shift of the foundation of agency to practical rationality has 
apparently made vanish these two problems. If this holds to be true of his 
account, then Archer’s conclusion seems correct:
By denying that moral obligations are conceptually linked to 
blameworthiness and the legitimacy of demands, Dorsey removes the 
need to make room for any category of the supererogatory and so his 
proposed account is redundant361.
I think this problem holds for accounts such as Dorsey’s and generally all 
the accounts that try to explain supererogation from outside the moral 
dimension. 
In sum, the accounts that I have analyzed in this section (similar to 
those in the previous section) seem to have endorsed a similar strategy. 
The starting point to account for the concept of supererogation is that 
of imagining a theoretical framework that allows for different degrees of 
practical accomplishment. I have tried here to show how the proposals made 
by Portmore and Dorsey both follow this insight. This acknowledgement is 
the most relevant point for the present book. Either implicitly or explicitly, 
these theories present an endorsement of a more complex moral structure. 
More specific to the actual possibility of accounting for supererogatory acts, 
though, these two positions present something troublesome (and this is 
more evident in Dorsey’s). If we try to explain supererogation from outside 
the moral dimension, we are missing important elements of what originated 
the debate about this peculiar category of acts. 
6.5 A Shared Demand of Acknowledgment: «The Need for Complexity»
In these final pages I have highlighted how all the most noteworthy 
accounts of supererogation allow some degree of what I have addressed as 
“moral complexity.” This concept, while not always being endorsed explicitly, 
361  Ivi, p. 185.
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appears to be the only way to make sense of supererogatory acts362. That is 
what I called the “the need for complexity,” which is the insight that the 
performance of this category of acts can only be explained by the possibility 
of different degrees of moral accomplishment. This is, in the first place, a 
theoretical effort. What distinguishes my theory of supererogation from the 
others is that I have provided a multi-leveled moral structure by endorsing 
moral pluralism. Not only this but also, in the first part of the book, I 
suggest that pluralism can better explain our moral experience in light of 
a phenomenological analysis. This reveals how “the need for complexity” is 
a demand shared by other spheres of ethical research, and its endorsement 
can become helpful for other explanatory purposes.
It might be clear, at this point, why pluralism is taken to be, in the present 
work, the key to interpreting both moral experience and supererogation. I 
hold that pluralism represents a sort of “inference to the best explanation”363 
of many relevant questions of ethics. As I have illustrated, pluralism can both 
handle the complexity typical of our moral experience and give an account 
of the existence of complex moral concepts, such as supererogation364. If this 
normative theory can adequately answer more questions relevant to ethics 
than other possible alternatives can, it is the moral theory to be preferred. 
Again, this justifies the adoption of the moral approach I labeled “moral 
complexity.” This approach is primarily concerned with acknowledging the 
362  It has been noticed that the concept of supererogation traditionally refers to the 
explanation of peculiar acts. This has generally ruled out virtue theories that traditionally 
focus on character traits. Briefly, since supererogatory acts entangled with the concept of 
duty and virtue theories lack such a theoretical detail (they hardly take into consideration 
the concept of duty), supererogation cannot be easily conceived. Attempts to address 
the issue from the point of view of virtue theories are not missing (see, in particular, D. 
Heyd, Can Virtue Ethics Account for Supererogation?, in C. Cowley [ed.], Supererogation, 
«Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement», LXXVII, 2015), but the issue is not directly 
addressed by this theoretical approach. One reason for this is that virtue theories discuss 
moral excellence in a very different way (as in L.T. Zagzebski, Exemplarist Moral Theory, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2017). In fact, excellence is generally considered an 
ideal or a benchmark for the moral agent. This, however, does not prevent the requests of 
morality from eventually becoming overdemanding. I have addressed this issue (and the 
consequent possibility for supererogation) here: S. Grigoletto, Following the Wrong Example. 
The Exclusiveness of Heroism and Sanctity, «Ethics & Politics», XX (2), 2018, pp. 89-108.  
363  G. Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, «Philosophical Review», LXXV, 1965, 
pp. 88-95.
364  Moreover, it is important to highlight that pluralism explains the existence of moral 
dilemmas (even if it does not necessarily solve them) as the clashing of equally relevant 
moral sources.
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different dimensions of complexity typical of morality: the moral experience 
of the moral agent, the need for a pluralist moral system, and the existence 
of complex moral concepts365. The founding belief of this approach is the 
avoidance of any sort of indebted theoretical oversimplification. In addition, 
moral phenomena have always had precedence over moral theorizing. In 
this regard the explanatory potential of the pluralist approach ultimately 
explains the moral structure endorsed in this work. This is why I think that 
the case of supererogation can be solved “only through moral complexity.”
365  I have defined a complex moral concept as one that requires more than a single level of 
morality in order to be justified. I take supererogation to be a clear example of this sort of 
moral concept. 
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This volume deals with some of the major issues in con-
temporary moral philosophy. The core metaethical ar-
gument illuminates the structure of a moral system and 
emphasizes the importance of a phenomenological atti-
tude toward the moral subject. From this starting point, 
further questions (typically addressed in normative ethi-
cs) arise: “How does moral deliberation work?” “How is 
moral justification possible?” “How can we explain mo-
ral pluralism?” “How do we give an account of superero-
gatory acts?” Regarding all these questions, the volume 
works out the following answer: only through complexi-
ty. This view entails the belief that a life lived well is ri-
cher if we endorse a moral system that denies theore-
tical oversimplifications and favors the abundance of 
the constraints of moral obligations. As such, the overall 
goal of this volume involves mapping and recognizing 
different instances of moral complexity. This acknowle-
dgment comes with several assumptions. Only through 
complexity can we make sense of what lies beyond the 
call of duty. Only through complexity can we give an ac-
count of how morality works from the first-person per-
spective. Only through complexity can we better pro-
mote the pursuit of a flourishing life.
